

The Philosophy of Whitehead in the Light of Advaita Vedanta of Sankara

Other works of the author.

1. *Introduction to Vedanta (3rd Edition) Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, (Bombay) 1966.*
2. *The Bhagavad Gita—And the changing world—Sri Ramakrishna Seva Samiti, Ahmadabad, 1953.*
3. *The Epistemology Sri Madhva (1963) Adyar Library—Madras.*
4. *Vada-vali (text, translation and notes) of Jayatirtha.*

DEDICATED TO MY WIFE

**Srimathi P. Padma as a token of my
love and gratitude for all that she has been
and done to me.**

Foreword.

The volume is my doctorate thesis submitted to the Banares Hindu University in 1945. The writings on whitehead are growing in these two decades. My chief interest has been to compare his religious thought with that Sri Sankara's Idealism. I have examined the area of agreement and the difference between the ancient Indian Master and the great mathematical Philosopher. In the preparation of thesis I am indebted to Professor S. Radhakrishnan without whose active guidance and infinite sympathy it would not be possible to undertake the work. I am thankful to the U. G. C. authorities for sanctioning the financial aid to publish it. I am grateful to the authorities of Sri Venkateswara University for enabling me to get it printed through their help. I thank the T. T. D. Press for the excellent and quick printing they did of the work.

13, Dr. Rangachari Road,
Mylapore, Madras—4.

P. NAGARAJA RAO.

PREFACE.

In these pages an attempt is made to present the metaphysical and religious views of Professor A. N. Whitehead in the light of India's most profound philosophical system, the Advaita Vedānta of Śankara.

The first part of the thesis is an exposition of the religious philosophy of Whitehead. The study is based on his philosophical and metaphysical works. The exposition in Chapters I and II follows the "categorical scheme" outlined in *Process and Reality*. Chapter III gives a comprehensive and critical account of Whitehead's refutation of and answer to the contemporary challenge to religion. Therein his conception of religion is also explained. Chapter IV deals with Whitehead's conception of God and His function.

In the two following Chapters V and VI a comparison of Whitehead's thought with the Advaita of Śankara along with a criticism of the thought is attempted. A brief account of the special features of Indian Philosophy with special reference to Advaita, and a detailed comparison of Whitehead's celebrated definition of religion with those of the Upaniṣads and the Advaita Vedānta is undertaken. In this connection the important metaphysical doctrines of Śankara and their implications are worked out. The philosophical system of Whitehead is criticised on the ground that his mathematical presuppositions and excessive faith in the complete efficacy of reason are responsible for his abstract concept of God and his reliance on the ultimate nature of the Time process. Chapter VI gives an examination of the concept of God, His place in traditional religion and function, in relation to the spiritual development of man, and explains incidentally how Whitehead's God does not afford complete satisfaction to the moral, intellectual and spiritual aspects of human life. Chapter VII gives an estimate of Whitehead's contribution to metaphysics in general and philosophy of religion in particular.

I am highly grateful to my esteemed Professor Sir S. Radhakrishnan for the valuable and inspiring guidance and constant encouragement he gave me in the preparation of the thesis. I have duly recorded my other obligations in their respective places.

P. NAGARAJA RAO.

Contents.

	PAGES
<i>Chapters</i> I INTRODUCTION ...	1—20
II THE FUNDAMENTAL TENETS ...	21—38
III THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY ...	39—73
IV RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY (CONTD.) GOD IN WHITEHEAD'S SYSTEM ...	74—92
V WHITEHEAD AND ADVAITA VEDANTA ...	93—116
VI RELIGION AND THE CONCEPT OF GOD ...	117—140
VII GENERAL ESTIMATE ...	141—160
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF A. N. WHITEHEAD'S WORKS ...	161—162

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

The Philosophy of Professor A. N. Whitehead is the most impressive metaphysical effort of our times. The general framework of his metaphysics is derived from the conclusions of modern science¹ and is in consonance with the developments in the field of twentieth century Physics.² Contemporary historians of philosophy have bestowed high praise on the speculative system outlined by Whitehead. It is held that very few of the British thinkers of the present, and of the recent past, have reached the high level attained by Whitehead and hardly any one surpasses it. Viewed (even) from the distant historical perspective, it is plain that Whitehead's system is the highest achievement of British thinking of recent times and may be reckoned as on a par with the great classical systems of the past.³

Whitehead began his career as a mathematician, and remained so, for over sixty years of his life. During this long period he worked at the new science of Mathematical Logic and produced his monumental work *Principia Mathematica* (three volumes) in collaboration with Bertrand Russell. *Principia Mathematica* is epochal in its significance. The long line of development in the field of mathematical logic straight from Leibnitz, Hamilton, Boole, De Morgan, Peano and Frege took final shape in *Principia Mathematica*. This work placed the science of Mathematical Logic on a broad and firm basis.⁴

Logical positivists deride philosophical systems in general. They are for restricting the realm of significant discourse to the empirical. They maintain that at the root of traditional metaphysics there is a great deal of linguistic confusion. They attempt to formulate an universal Grammar through the method of linguistic

1. A. N. Whitehead—*Process and Reality*, Chap. II. p. 38, (1929).

2. A. N. Whitehead—*Science and the Modern World*, p. 238, (1926).

3. R. Metz—*A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, pp. 590-91, (1938)

4. For a rapid survey of the school. cf. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, pp. 705-26.

analysis and logical syntax. They hold that there are elementary propositions like atoms and that every complex statement can be resolved in terms of 'protocol propositions.' All this is given in sensible experience. A close analysis is the function of philosophy and not the erection of speculative systems. Reality, a famous exponent of this school defined, is a metaphysical term for which there is no legitimate use.⁵ Truth, they say, is discovered by studying the form or structure of the propositions concerned and there is no need for this purpose to go outside what it asserts or points out. The propositions refer to corresponding facts, and thus discourse and Reality are connected. The connection between proposition and proposition is not itself a proposition. It is held that, since we cannot know the supersensible, speculative philosophy is a body of pseudo-propositions. In recent years the doctrine has been developed by Carnap, Hempel and Neurath.

The development of Mathematical Logic and its extravagant claim to take the place of Philosophy were not received well by the critical students of Philosophy. Mathematical Logic is only one of the branches of logic, and there are other branches and philosophical disciplines besides it. Further, the novelty of the subject is not as much as it is made out to be. One of the recent representatives of the school, Miss Stebbing, holds that 'Aristotle's theory of syllogism is the first attempt to demonstrate the formal principle of deduction.' Besides, in Aristotle we find characteristics of the new logic *i.e.*, use of symbols instead of verbal terms (in the language of the new logic) 'ideograms' instead of 'phonograms.' The entire science of Mathematical Logic draws chiefly from Mathematics. Russell and Whitehead have given us examples of pure mathematical thinking.

Further, this science was developed in relation to language and thus the school of *Logical Positivists* grew up. After the publication of Prof. Wittgenstein's⁶ book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in German first and then in English, a school of thought grew up in Cambridge which exhibited a hearty distrust of all philosophical systems. They called themselves 'Philosophical Analysts' and held that 'the object of philosophy is the logical

5. Bertrand Russell.—*An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. pp. 281. (1940).

6. Wittgenstein, an Austrian by birth, for some years domiciled in England, holding a teaching post in Cambridge.

clarification of thought.' They held that Philosophy must be clear about the meaning of words. So they have set themselves the task of clarifying the meaning of words.

The school of Mathematical Logic and its consequent Logical Positivism have together failed to yield any genuine and lasting satisfaction for the human spirit in its craving for an intelligible universe.⁷ Besides, its view of Reality is a pure abstraction unrelated to human aspirations. The Reality of the Logical Positivists is 'an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.' It is a 'grey theory' and the 'golden tree of life' cannot grow green in its territory. It is these defects that turned Whitehead and others away from Mathematical Logic. So, they took to the methods of speculative philosophy.

The intellectual development of A. N. Whitehead falls into two periods. The first sixty years of his life pertain to his contribution to the field of Mathematics. In his sixty third year, he exchanged his mathematical career for that of a professorship in philosophy at Harvard (1924). Since then, his interest has centered round philosophy and he has been writing books on philosophy.

A systematic account of his thought is set forth in his Gifford lectures *Process and Reality* (1929).⁸ It is the most difficult, richest and the best, and the most concentrated of the works of Whitehead. It has remained to many a book with seven seals. We get glimpses of the tenets of his system in his popular work *Science and the Modern World*. In his other works, *The Function of Reason*, (2) *Symbolism*, (3) *Religion in the Making*, (4) *Adventures of Ideas*, (5) *Modes of Thought*, and (6) *Aim of Education and Other Essays*, he has amplified and extended the amplification of his first principles to the different spheres of life specially the social and the educational fields. In his works he has felicitously annotated and explained the principles of his system.

7. cf. Metaphysics may be the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct; but to find these reasons is no less an instinct. Bradley-*Appearance and Reality*, Preface. (1897) Second Edition.

8. Metz. observes 'Whitehead's philosophy appears to us (as to all critics and interpreters who have dealt with it) as a gigantic cryptogram at the deciphering of which generations will work'.....*A Hundred years of British Philosophy*, op. cit p. 594.

Miss Dorothy M. Emmet has produced a monograph entitled '*Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism*' (1932). Dr. Rasvihary Das of the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, has brought out a book on the Philosophy of Whitehead. Both the volumes are attempts at the exposition of Whitehead's Philosophy. They do not aim at any systematic criticism of his thought.

The student who takes to the study of philosophical works of Whitehead has to face many difficulties, those of form and matter. The style is not easy. The attention of the reader is arrested by the flashes of astonishing insight, illuminating phrases, and passages of noble eloquence. But all these do not remove the prevailing obscurity in the works. The obscurity irritates the feelings and baffles the understanding of the reader. The work abounds in technical terms and is overladen with unfamiliar terminology. The diction bears the stamp of mathematical thinking. It is severe, and is lacking in stylistic devices. It is rich in newly minted words. Whitehead has forged a new philosophical vocabulary.

In addition to the difficulties arising out of style, the very thoughts that underlie Whitehead's philosophy demand a great imaginative effort on the part of the readers for understanding them. The acceptance of the tenets of his philosophy requires us to revise our notions of philosophical categories in the light of modern science. Further, the philosophical terms employed by him acquire different meanings in his different works. They undergo a more or less continuous modification in several of his successive works.⁹ His system grows with his writings. His thinking has been definitely in continual movement and is never finally established. The verbal formulations of his ideas lack definition and 'they take part in the movement by which his thought is driven forward to ever new positions.'

The system outlined by Whitehead goes by the name, *The Philosophy of Organism*. It is an essay in constructive metaphysics. The great changes in the field of Mathematical Physics specially Einstein's Theory of Relativity, and the criticism of the traditional concepts of Space and Time, awakened Whitehead from his slumber.

9. The basic term 'event' is an example of the manifold meaning of terms in the different works of Whitehead.

He recognised the need to construct a philosophical system based on the knowledge supplied by the doctrines of *Relativity*, the *Quantum* and the Atomic theories. In the construction of his philosophical system he has made an original and independent use of the categories of modern physics. Among the thinkers of the west he is indebted to the prince of the Greek philosophers, Plato. Whitehead observes that the train of thought in his lectures *i.e.*, (Gifford lectures *Process and Reality*) is Platonic. He does not stop there, but goes further and describes the whole 'European philosophical tradition as a series of footnotes to Plato.' In his preface to *Process and Reality* he avows that he constructed his system from just those elements in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, which subsequent systematisers ignored and put aside. John Locke was the first in Whitehead's view to anticipate the main position of *the Philosophy of Organism*.¹⁰ He derived the concept of Organism from Natural Science. He holds that the philosophers and scientists of the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth centuries Descartes, Newton, Locke, Hume and Kant were perplexed by the inconsistent pre-suppositions of their inherited modes of expression. Instead of facing and harmonising these difficulties, they ignored them in their systems. He has used all the ideas which were rejected by the Seventeenth and Eighteenth century thinkers, in the construction of his system of ideas, which bring the aesthetic, moral and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in Natural Science. In doing all these he makes very great effort to avoid even the least streak of dogmatism. He says that in philosophical discussions the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly.¹¹

The cosmology of Whitehead is the result of the fusion of two views. The view represented by Plato in *Timaeus* and the view of Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Locke. Among the moderns, Whitehead acknowledges his indebtedness to Henry Bergson, William James and John Dewy.¹² Among the contemporary Realists he has been influenced by the writings of Prof.

10. Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human understanding op. cit Book IV, Chapter VI.*

11. *A. N. Whitehead's Process and Reality*, preface pp. 6 & 7.

12. cf. T. P. Nunn's papers on the doctrines of *Recent Realism* in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.

T. P. Nunn (of London). 'He avows that he has been specially influenced by the chapter on the 'Nature of Experience' in Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality*¹³ In the main, the philosophy of Whitehead 'is a recurrence to the pre-Kantian modes of thought.'¹⁴

Whitehead criticises the methodology of traditional metaphysics and defines the function and the methods of philosophy anew. Traditional metaphysicians Descartes, Spinoza and Kant have all formulated a few first principles and then derived the tenets of their respective systems from them. The mere method of Empiricism cannot lead to a successful metaphysical system. Natural Science would have been left where it was found if it had only, and exclusively, followed the Baconian method of induction.

Traditional systems of metaphysics have failed because of lack of insight. Weakness of insight and deficiency of language stand in the way of constructive metaphysics.

Our datum is the actual world including ourselves and this actual world spreads itself for observation in the guise of the topic of our immediate experience. The analysis of experience has been the task of philosophy and for a very long time Mill's methods of experiment were applied. But a mere collection of empirical data cannot help the individual to formulate a general law. Generalisations can only be had by imaginative insight. A mere collection of empirical data not informed by imaginative insight is bound to prove barren. Philosophic generalisation needs the use of imagination and intuitive insight.

Deficiency of language is a serious defect which any attempt at constructive metaphysics must avert. "There has been an insistent presupposition continually sterilizing philosophic thought."

It has been the opinion of the philosophers of the past that human language in single words or in phrases explicitly expresses these ideas. The belief that the language of literature is enough for expressing philosophical ideas dominated the minds of men in the past. This fact in Whitehead's phrase gave rise to 'the fallacy

13. Whitehead says "Though throughout the main body of the work, I am in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different." *Process and Reality. Prefce op. cit* p. 6.

14. *Process and Reality, op. cit* pp. 4-10.

of the perfect Dictionary.’¹⁵ Just as physical science redesigns the pre-existing appliances, so should philosophy re-design the language through which it has to express its new ideas. The language of literature is not enough. It breaks down at some stage or other. No speculative system must put excessive trust in closed linguistic process. ‘A precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge.’¹⁶

Another defect of traditional metaphysics is its over-statement.¹⁷ In the estimate of its success at generalisation traditional metaphysics exaggerates. The over-statement takes two forms. The first leads to what Whitehead calls the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness.’ This arises out of the neglect of the degree of abstraction involved in the conception of *actual entities*. This is the result of the non-comprehensive nature of the generalisation. Besides, the faith that they are certain, clear and distinct truths and that all else follows from them is characteristic of most systems of philosophy. They build a deductive system of thought from the clear and distinct premises formulated by them. Whitehead asserts that there are no such bare facts which are distinct. The facts are all inter-related and they derive their significance from their inter-relations. So, it is wrong to posit such isolated facts as first principles.

The metaphysical systems formulated by Descartes and others not only reveal illogicalities but also suffer from ‘inadequacy and incoherence.’¹⁸ Each of these systems in Whitehead’s view omits some significant, but still obvious, elements of experience from its scope. They make up for this omission by a bold denial of those facts. This is responsible for the non-comprehensive nature of the systems.

By incoherence Whitehead means ‘the arbitrary disconnection of first principles.’ Descartes’s system is an instance in point. He posited two kinds of substances, corporeal and mental. One has extension as its characteristic and the other has thought as its

15. *Modes of Thought* p. 235, (1938).

16. The *reductio ad absurdum* of this position is the school of Logical positivism.

17. *Process and Reality*. pp. 9-11.

18. *Ibid*, pp. 6-8.

quality. Whitehead points out that there is nothing rational which could prevent Descartes from having only 'one substance' excepting his own definition of 'substance' as that which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. "Thus his system makes a virtue of its incoherence."

Whitehead sets to correct all the defects of traditional metaphysics and builds a new speculative system of thought. 'Metaphysics,' he defines, "is a description of generalities which apply to all the details of practice." The formulation of these generalisations is the function of philosophy. 'It is an endeavour to frame a coherent logical and necessary system of general ideas, in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.'¹⁹ Whitehead defines every important term in the definition. The term 'interpretation' means that every item of our experienced events must be a particular instance of the general scheme. The scheme must not leave out any instance from the ambit of its interpretation. This is implied by the term 'applicable.'

By 'coherence' is meant that the ideas envisaged in the speculative philosophy should be inter-connected and not be independent of each other. There must be a relatedness between them. The ideas in the scheme cannot be viewed in abstraction.

The rational side of a speculative philosophy is implied by the terms 'logical' and 'coherent.' The empirical side of the system is denoted by the terms 'adequate' and 'applicable.' Besides the study of the empirical facts, there must be the play of imagination. The free play of imagination must be controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. 'The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation, it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalisation and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.'²⁰

Coherence is the supreme test of the soundness of a metaphysical system. It is in Whitehead's words "the great preservative of rationalistic sanity." Philosophic progress consists in the increased co-ordination secured between different systems.

19. *Ibid, op. cit* pp. 3-5.

20. *Ibid, op. cit* p. 5.

It is in this sense, the search of wider generalisations, that philosophy has advanced from Plato. When Whitehead refers to the deposition of the systems of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume and Kant he means that their ideas must be construed with limitations, adaptations and inversions, either unknown to them or even explicitly repudiated by them.²¹ 'Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher.' Whitehead holds that a comprehensive speculative system of philosophy is an effort to arrive at a scheme of general ideas. The special sciences—physics, chemistry and others—are only confined to a set of ideas. But they are co-ordinated in philosophy. Philosophy is a voyage towards larger generalities. Its aim is to challenge the half-truths constituting the first principles of some sciences. The systematisation of philosophic knowledge cannot be conducted in water-tight compartments. According to Whitehead 'all general truths condition each other and the limits of their application cannot be adequately defined apart from their correlation by yet wider generalities. Philosophy, he thinks, did wrong in taking to the mathematical method of deduction. Deduction should not be treated as a primary method of philosophy. It must be treated as an auxiliary mode of verification whereby to test the scope of generalities. "The primary method of philosophy is largely descriptive generalisation."²² It is because of the misapprehension of the method of philosophy as deduction, the world has not estimated or discerned the harvest of generic notions.

Speculative philosophy has an approach entirely different from that of science. 'The student of philosophy is not satisfied with the concurrence of sensible people whether they be his colleagues, or even his own previous self. He is always assailing the boundaries of finitude.'²³ The scientist is also enlarging knowledge but his work consists mainly in the deduction of consequences, from some fundamental notions. The scientists ask for the consequences, and seek to observe the realisation of such consequences in the Universe. The philosopher asks for the meaning of those ideas. The scientists and the philosophers can help each other. The philosopher can supply the scientist the

21. *Ibid. op. cit* pp. 21-33.

22. *Ibid. op. cit* p. 14.

23. *Modes of thoughts. op. cit* p. 234.

new idea, and for the discovery of the new idea of the philosopher, the scientist gives him the raw material namely the record of scientific consequences.

Whitehead further holds that the philosopher and the scholar are not alike in their outlook. 'The scholar investigates human thought and human achievement armed with a dictionary.'²⁴ Speculative philosophy enlarges the dictionary. It is essentially an adventure of the mind and not a rule of safety. Still there is no denying the fact that scholarship and science are subsidiary weapons for philosophy. Speculative philosophy is essentially an attitude of the mind. 'Philosophy maintains an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system.' Philosophy, Whitehead defines, is mysticism (if you like to phrase it so). He at once describes mysticism as the direct insight into depths as yet unspoken.²⁵

Whitehead answers some plausible objections against the possibility of speculative metaphysics. The first objection is that speculative metaphysics is a very ambitious attempt. The successful application of the rational method within the limited fields of particular sciences should not egg us on to undertake all comprehensive systems of thought. It is not possible for a finite mind to frame a scheme of thought expressive of the general nature of things. The entire history of European thought is littered with metaphysical systems, abandoned and unreconciled. Hence, it is foolish to hope to frame a sound speculative system. The objection dates from the Sixteenth century and Francis Bacon gives graphic expression to it.

It is urged that any system of general interpretation, be it true or false, does not in any way affect things. It remains intrinsically barren. Thus the Positivists hold that the study of particular facts alone is useful.²⁶

Whitehead holds that it is not ambitious to hope and construct a speculative system. To abandon the enterprise is to deny the instinct for progress which characterises the history of thought.

24. *Ibid.* pp. 236-237.

25. *Ibid.* p. 277.

26. *Process and Reality. op. cit* p. 19.

'Mankind never quite knows what it is after. When we survey the history of thought and likewise the history of practice we find that one idea after another is tried out, its limitations defined, and its core of truth elicited.'²⁷ The proper test for ideas is not finality but progress. We no more retain the physics of the Seventeenth century and likewise we have to leave behind the Cartesian philosophy and that century.

The second criticism is that philosophy is useless, because it is concerned with the general interpretation of ideas; the validity or the otherwise of general interpretation does not affect facts. Whitehead holds that there are no particular facts that are isolated from their setting.

There are 'no brute self-contained facts, capable of being understood apart from the interpretation as an element in a system.'²⁸ The understanding of the immediate brute fact requires its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world with some systematic relation to it. We never come across a bare and uninterpreted fact. 'Interpretation is always there and when thought comes upon the scene, it finds the interpretations as a matter of practice. Philosophy does not initiate interpretation.'²⁹ There are no bare scientific facts. 'Every scientific memoir in its record of facts is shot through and through with interpretation.'³⁰

The sole aim of speculative metaphysics is to be the corrective for partial outlook. In our study of particular facts, there is the possibility of our not taking into account external circumstances and facts. This defect arises in all the modes of philosophical idealism on account of the selective character of consciousness. The subjectivist selective interest of consciousness obscures the external totality of circumstances and exclusively emphasizes the particular aspects of things. The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by this selection. 'It is a self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of subjectivity.' 'The function of philosophy does not exclude any interest out of its ambit. Religion and science come under its sway. There is an

27.	Ibid.	p. 19.
28.	Ibid.	p. 20.
29.	Ibid.	pp. 20.
30.	Ibid.	p. 20.

insistent particularity in religion and science which need connection. Whitehead is of the opinion that a genuine morality is inseparably conjoined with a generality of outlook. The antithesis between general good and individual interest can only be harmonised in a speculative system. The function of philosophy is to promote the most general systematisation of civilised thought. It modifies the one-sided nature of common sense on the one hand, and the particularity of specialism of the sciences on the other. Philosophy is the welding of imagination and common sense into a restraint upon specialists, and also into an enlargement of their imaginations. By providing the generic notions, philosophy should make it easier to conceive the infinite variety of specific instances which rest unrealised in the womb of nature.'

In this task it has to steer clear of ineffectiveness and non-relatedness to life. To secure effectiveness it establishes close relations with science and religion. It fuses religion and science into one rational scheme of thought. The emotions and purposes springing out of particular societies in particular epochs are expressed in religious feelings. These are connected with the rational generality of philosophy. 'Religion is the translation of general ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions and particular purposes; it is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity. Philosophy finds religion and modifies it; and conversely religion is among the data of experience which philosophy must weave into its own scheme.'³¹

The scientific interest, according to Whitehead, is a variant of religious interest. The study of facts which the scientist undertakes does not quell the desire for a rational explanation. The plurality of discordant facts cannot lead to the advancement of science. Hence the need for generic ideas. Philosophy encompasses such ideas and gives speculative boldness to science. The very notion of the rational order of the universe is the finding of philosophy.

Philosophy, for Whitehead, is the description of generalities. Its speculative boldness must be balanced by complete humility before logic and before fact. He laments that traditional philosophy

has remained a mere reflection of the temperamental presuppositions of exceptional personalities.

In a powerful little book '*The Function of Reason*' Whitehead points out that Reason plays its proper role only in a bold speculative system of metaphysics. "Reason," he defines "is a factor in experience which directs and criticises the urge towards the attainment of an end realised in imagination, but not in fact."³² He holds that mere mechanical methodology is of no great use to metaphysics. The Darwinian Theory of Evolution does not explain the trend upward in the process of Reality. Some of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good methodology.³³ The function of Reason is not mere utility. The pragmatic view is narrow. Whitehead distinguishes two different uses of Reason:—

Ulysses's reason and Plato's reason. Reason in its evolution from below has been pragmatic and has only a short range of forecast. It is this short range and pragmatic view of reason that has led science to make overstatements.³⁴ Thus conclusions true within strict limitations have been generalised dogmatically into a fallacious universality. Metaphysics must essentially be explanatory. What we want is explanatory metaphysics. The new metaphysics must avoid obscurantism. Obscurantism is the refusal to speculate freely on the limitations of traditional methods. It is the negation of the importance of speculation.³⁵

Science without speculation is mere description of things observed. The entire history of science, if it is not lit by imaginative insight and speculative boldness, turns out in Whitehead's words into 'a scientific who's who.'³⁶ To set limits to speculation is treason to the future.

Before proceeding to construct his metaphysics, Whitehead makes a brief survey of the history of ideas and points out certain

32. *The Function of Reason*. p. 5, (1929).

33. A. N. Whitehead writes: 'It is less true to say that necessity is the mother of invention than that it is the mother of futile dodges.' *Aim of Education* (1929).

34. *The Function of Reason* op. cit p. 22.

35. Ibid. (1929).

36. Ibid. p. 44.

significant defects in them. He holds that such a study is essential to the understanding of his system. The origin of science in the Sixteenth century marks a very definite date in the history of ideas. 'It marks the quiet commencement of the most intimate change in the outlook of men and it altered the metaphysical presuppositions and the imaginative contents of men's mind.'³⁷ The rationality of science rested on the 'instinctive conviction' of the 'order of things in Nature.' To distrust this would amount to the denial of the rationality and possibility of science itself.

The method adopted was observation of facts. Galileo's appeal was chiefly to the study of 'irreducible stubborn facts' and not to generalisations which applied to facts. The concept that there is an order of things in Nature is as old as the Greek tragedians. They were the first to imagine it. Whitehead avows that the "pilgrim fathers of scientific imagination, as it exists today, are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. Their vision of Fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue is the vision possessed by science. Fate in Greek tragedy becomes the order of Nature in modern thought.....The laws of physics are the decrees of Fate."³⁸

The rise of Mathematics marked the dawn of abstract thinking and it gave science a method with which it was able to reduce illogicality and inaccuracy to a very negligible degree.³⁹ The Seventeenth century inherited the instinctive belief in the detailed order of things in Nature and the mathematician's appeal to abstractions. It is 'a century of geniuses.' The capital of ideas produced by the thinkers of this century nourished the needs of the two subsequent centuries. The great thinkers of the century are Francis Bacon, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, and Huyghenes. The scientific philosophy of the age was domi-

37. cf. *Science and the Modern World*, op. cit Chap. I.

38. Ibid. pp. 12 & 13.

39. Ibid. Chap. II.

Whitehead observes 'that the study of the constructive history of thought, without taking an account of Mathematics would be playing Hamlet without Ophelia (she is quite essential to the play, she is charming and a little mad). (Mathematics) is divine madness of the human spirit, a refuge from the goading urgency of contingent happenings. It moves in the world of abstractions.

nated by physics. Galileo's discovery was formularised by Newton. Newtons 'Law of Motion' was the fundamental contribution of the age. Matter and motion in space expressed in terms of laws became the ruling thought of the day. Newton left for empirical investigation the determination of particular stress existing between objects. The essence of a material body (consists) in its Mass, Motion and Shape'—Thus we had the age of Mechanistic Theory. It became the orthodox creed of the physical science. The familiar concept of Matter was that of an enduring packed dense stuff, moving through a static space at a uniform rate of motion. Matter consisted of atoms, which could not be further split. The simple location of atom in space and its motion explained events. Mechanistic physics did not only reign but it was without a rival.⁴⁰

Corresponding to the concept of the atom in physics psychology too entertained the conception of pure sensations. David Hume reduced everything into impressions and sensations. Sensationalism in psychology and Atomism in physics were the accepted doctrines of the age.⁴¹ The objects of the world possess two types of qualities, the *primary* and the *secondary*. The *primary* qualities are extension in space, number, motion and solidity. These qualities belong to the things. The *secondary* qualities *i.e.*, colour, taste and smell are projections of the subject on the object. They are not the very nature of the object as the *primary* qualities. They are the ideas projected by the mind. The bifurcation between Mind on one side and Matter on the other was complete. Locke developed the theory of Representative Perception to explain knowledge. Locke compared the human mind to "a dark cabinet containing a brightly lit screen which is illuminated by the light of consciousness. Upon this screen our senses throw the images of external things

40. cf. David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*.

'All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference between these consists in the degree of force and liveliness.....'

41. cf. Whitehead admirably sums up Locke's philosophy in the following celebrated passage "Thus Nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves; the rose for its scent; the nightingale for his song; and the sun for his radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material endlessly, meaninglessly."

and it is these that the mind knows, and at the same time invests them with *secondary* qualities.⁴²

Thus Nature was bifurcated into Mind and Body by Descartes. An impassable gulf was erected between them. It was suggested that interaction between them could take place only with the aid of God. Leibnitz postulated the Law of the Pre-established Harmony as accounting for the interaction. He held that the universe was a colony of self-sufficient windowless monads. Everything was plenum for him. There was no empty space. Idealist metaphysics explained knowledge in terms of the constructive ability of mind in altering the perceived data. Mind was given a precedence over other objects. The Idealists proclaimed the famous doctrine of Kant that 'Understanding prescribes Laws unto Nature.' For Kant the world emerges from the subject. Science embraced the scheme of matter and motion and philosophy clung to a dualism of Mind on one side and Matter on the other. Idealists ignored matter and treated it as projection of the mind, and Materialists ignored mind and treated it as an attenuated form of matter. The Nineteenth and Twentieth century development in physics gave a hard blow to the tenets of mechanistic physics and Newtonian dynamics. The atom was split into more minute corpuscles, which were in turn reduced to electrical units, the mass of which was only one factor in electromagnetic momentum. Further, Rutherford pictured the proton as a positive nucleus with negative electrons circling round it. "The atom was described as an open structure with large empty spaces and scattered electric charges." Modern physics has established that the central stuff of reality is Force or Energy and that Light, Heat, etc., are forms of Energy. The modern point of view is expressed not in terms of isolated bits of matter, moving at a particular rate of motion in an unchanging space, retaining all the while their respective self-identities. The physicists of today express every thing in terms of energy, activity and vibratory differentiations of space-time.

It is this conclusion of modern physics that has attracted Whitehead and has given him the fundamental concept of his metaphysics *i.e.*, *Organism*. This concept was greatly stressed by the developments in the science of Biology. Evolution was no

42. *Science and the Modern World*, *op. cit* pp. 68-69.

longer conceived as the unfolding of what was potential in the initial stuff; Evolution was conceived as creative and not mechanistic. The emergence of Life, Mind, etc., was not accounted by the laws of mechanics. Further, Bergson pointed out that the mechanist hypothesis in biology does not explain the phenomena of *transformism*,⁴³ *mutations*⁴⁴ and *metamorphoses*. Thus Biologists closed the dualism of the seventeenth century between Life and Nature and between Matter and Mind. The whole of Reality is conceived as a process and an organism. It is on these conclusions of modern science that Whitehead builds his metaphysics. He criticises the mechanist hypothesis in physics and at the same time does not fail to give it its due.

The world picture of Seventeenth century science (as we saw) consisted of particles of matter, located in an empty space. The particles of matter in motion explained the configurations of matter. Matter, they said, has certain *primary* qualities *i.e.*, weight, mass, and the *secondary* qualities *i.e.*, colour, sound are the projections which the mind of man invests the object with. The ruthless analysis of the Seventeenth century physicists reduced Nature 'the bride of the bards into a skeleton of rattling bones.' Nature was viewed as a complex system obeying certain laws inexorable. The ideal picture of the universe of facts was distinguished from the world of ideals. This is described by Russell in his celebrated essay on the *Freeman's Worship*. There is no point in the lives of men or purpose at the heart of the universe. Man at best can be 'resolved into a few pounds of carbon, a few quarts of water, some lime, a little phosphorus and sulphur, a pinch of iron and silicon, a handful of mixed salts, scattered and recombined.' Further, "it is held that man is the product of causes which had no pre-vision of the end they were achieving, that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs are the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noon-day brightness of human genius are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system;

44. Abrupt variations are called *mutations*.

43. *Transformism* is the accumulation of small variations in animals which in Darwin's view results in the evolution of new species.

and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.”⁴⁵

Whitehead holds that the universe is not as described by the physicists of the Seventeenth century. He points out that on the mechanist hypothesis we encounter a number of difficulties and experience wide gaps. He starts with the examination of the concept of the simple location in space. With these isolated atoms in empty space we cannot adequately explain the concept of causation. The cause-effect relation is a very important tenet for science. We need some connecting link to make intelligible the concept of cause and effect. The relatedness of things was to be assumed if the category of cause is to be rescued from Hume's attack. Whitehead holds that people have not taken Hume's criticism of cause seriously. In his words Hume's criticism makes 'nonsense of the scientists scheme.' It is only by assuming the organic nature of things that we can account for the category of cause and not with isolated bits of matter spread out in empty space.

Further induction as a logical process for obtaining generalisation would be impossible without some connection between events. From the observation of the bare isolated events, we cannot frame a general law. If the isolated bits of matter and motion and empty space were all, then 'induction must be the despair of science.' But we know that induction is the very basis of science. Intelligibility for the principle of induction can be secured only on the basis of the existence of an inter-related Reality which is more like an organism than a static entity.

The scientific picture of the universe according to Newtonian physics leaves unexplained the why of the facts of science. Though 'Newton's methodology for physics was an overwhelming success, the forces which he introduced left Nature still without meaning or value. In the essence of a material body—in its mass, motion, and shape—there was no reason for the 'Law of Gravitation.'

45. *Selected papers of Bertrand Russell*. p. 3, (1927).

Thus the science of Nature stands opposed to the presuppositions of humanism.

Even if the particular forces could be conceived as the accidents of a cosmic epoch, there was no reason in the Newtonian concepts of mass and motion why material bodies should be connected by any stress between them.....He left no hint, why in the nature of things there should be any stresses at all? The arbitrary motions of the bodies were thus explained by the arbitrary stresses between material bodies conjoined with their spatiality, their mass, and their initial states of motion.....(Newton thus) illustrated a great philosophic truth, that *a dead nature can give no reason*. All ultimate reasons are in terms which aim at value.⁴⁶ Further, science is not able to comprehend in its scheme, Mind and Values. A mere chain of events, one explaining the other leads to *infinite regress*. The rule of law or order in nature can only be explained by assuming a mind. Mind cannot be explained by science with its terms, for it can only deal with quantitative aspects. The scientist can only tackle what is determinable in terms of quantity. He cannot measure what is not quantitative. A true explanation necessarily entails the notion of purpose. Whitehead expresses the idea,—“All ultimate reasons are in terms which aim at value.”⁴⁷

Science not only leaves out mind but also values; Truth, Beauty, Goodness. It has to forge new instruments to deal with these aspects of Reality. Mere sense perception is of no avail. Science abstracts from Reality that aspect which is mathematically determinable in terms of quantity.⁴⁸ For the entire interpretation of Reality mere sense perception will not do.

Besides this, the very principles that govern the universe and our knowledge cannot be had by mere sense perception. “Sense perception does not provide the data in terms of which we interpret.”⁴⁹

The limitations of science namely its incomprehensive nature, its inability to explain its presuppositions led Whitehead to construct a comprehensive metaphysics in accordance with the spirit of modern science. So, in his own words he has made a bold attempt

46. *Modes of thought, op. cit* p. 184.

47. *Ibid.* p. 184.

48. A. Huxley—*Ends and Means*: pp. 266-269, (1938).

49. *Modes of Thought, op. cit* p. 182.

The above arguments of Whitehead are developed in *Philosophy for Our Times* by Dr. C. E. M. Joad. (1940).

to construct 'a system of ideas, which bring the aesthetic, moral and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have origin in Natural Science.'⁵⁰

Whitehead begins his philosophy by correcting the one sided and partial view of Newtonian Physics and the empiricist psychology of Hume. The pure sensations of Hume and the simple location of atoms in space are abstractions from the concrete Reality. 'Combining Newton and Hume we obtain a barren concept namely a field of perception devoid of any data for its own interpretation, devoid of any reason for the concurrence of its factors.'⁵¹ It is at this stage that Kant devised his critical method and developed an elaborate idealist theory of knowledge in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. He points out that we never know what the 'thing-in-itself' is but we only know about a thing. Our knowledge, he held, is the synthetic construction of the categories of the understanding of the raw material of knowledge supplied through the gate ways of the senses. Kant accepted both Hume and Newton and improved on them. But Whitehead is not in agreement with the interpretation of Kant, which still retains the dualism between mind and matter. Further, idealism detracts from the beauty and glory of objective power of the human mind. As James Ward put it 'Copernicus had exalted the universe and humbled the earth, Kant exalted the knowing subject and humbled experience.'⁵² Whitehead thought that Hume-Newton situation is a *reductio ad absurdum*, and should not be accepted as the basis for philosophical speculation.⁵³ Both of them abstracted things from their concrete setting and failed to understand the implications of a rich inter-related organic reality. They fell a prey to the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.'

50. *Process and Reality. op. cit* (preface) p. 6.

51. *Modes of Thought. p. 184.*

52. James Ward—*Kant. p. 60.*

53. *Modes of Thought. op. cit p. 184.*

CHAPTER II.

THE FUNDAMENTAL TENETS.

The fundamental tenets of the Philosophy of Whitehead are set forth by him in great detail in his Gifford lectures, *Process and Reality*.¹ A succinct account of the same is found in the third part of his book *Adventures of Ideas*.² For the first time anticipatory hints of his metaphysics break on us in his popular book *Science and the Modern World*. There he gives a rapid and critical account of the development of the history of scientific and philosophic thought interspersed with the doctrines of his own philosophy. The most lucid and non-technical presentation of his thought is set forth in the two lectures *Nature and Life*,³ delivered at the University of Chicago. After the manner of Spinoza, Whitehead presents in the form of clear propositions the categories of his metaphysics in a brief compass before elaborating them. His categorical scheme consists of four divisions (1) *the category of the Ultimate*, (2) *the category of Existence* comprising eight entities, (3) *the category of Explanation*, (in twenty seven propositions the explanation is set forth), (4) *and the category of Obligation* consisting of nine propositions. The entire range of discussion of his metaphysics either leads up to these categories or is explanatory of them, or is considering our experience of the world in the light of these categories.⁴

Whitehead conceives Reality after the model of an organism. It is essentially a process and not a static entity. Everything in the Universe is changing. All things are entangled in the unrest of becoming. Everything is a living movement and restless development. Reality is a continually flowing stream of happenings and events. As Heraclitus puts it "we do not step into the same stream twice, because the second time we step into it, it is no longer the old stream." It throws up new evolutes at every stage because

-
1. *Process and Reality*. op. cit. Part I, Chap. II.
 2. *Adventures of Ideas*. Part III. pp. 225-309.
 3. *Modes of Thought*.
 4. *Process and Reality*. op. cit. p. 38.

it is creative in its process. It is not the mere unfolding of the past that is potential in it. It is the creation of the new that was not in it, prior to the process. We can never catch Reality taking a holiday from the laws of growth, process and motion. It is a flow of events, a surging of life moving incessantly to new forms.

The universal process of Reality has nothing in it that persists with an unchanging identity. There is no possibility of the reappearance of the old. It is being affected in the process and so it cannot persist with its identity unchanged. When the old makes room for the new, the new arises. There are two different sides to the process. The first indicates the passing away of the old and in its place something new comes into being. This coming into being is the second aspect of the process. This is called Creativity.

Creativity is the chief and the most primary category in Whitehead's thought. It is given the place of primacy in his categorical scheme. It is called the *category of the Ultimate*. It expresses the general principles in all the other three special categories. They all imply creativity. "It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one Actual occasion which is the universe conjunctively. It is in the nature of things that the many enter into a complex unity.⁵ Further it is creativity that is responsible for the fact of novelty. The advance of Reality consists in the passage from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the given entities in disjunction. "The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 'many' which it finds, and also, it is one among the disjunctive 'many' which it leaves; it is a novel entity disjunctively among the many entities it synthesises. The 'many' become one and are increased by one."⁶ Creative activity underlies the very nature of things. It is an urge towards differentiation and unification for the purpose of individualizing itself into creatures. It is concerned "with becoming, the being and the relatedness of Actual Entities."⁷

5. Ibid. p. 28.

6. Ibid. p. 29.

7. Ibid. pp. 42-43.

For Whitehead, Reality is a complex and patterned process. Everything in Reality is suffused by every other thing. It is a huge organism with a definite and a pervasive scheme of internal relations.

Creativity is defined by Whitehead as "another rendering of the Aristotelean term 'Matter' and of modern *neutral stuff* of the Realists. It is divested of the notion of passive receptivity either of form or relations. It is a pure notion of activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world." Creativity is without a character of its own exactly in the same sense that Aristotle's 'Matter' is. It is the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterised because all characters are more special than itself.⁸ Thus Reality on Whitehead's account turns out to be an intelligible pattern and a process, accomplishing something new always. There is a purpose at the heart of the universe and a point in the different forms and functions of the evolutes. Whitehead singles out four philosophical notions as being basic to his system of thought. Most of the four notions come under the eight categories enumerated under the *categories of Existence*.⁹

'Reflective experience' says Whitehead, resolves into (a) Actual-entities, (b) Prehensions, (c) Nexus and (d) Ontological Principle. The chief point to be noted in Whitehead's thought is that the Real is the concrete. He refuses to think of Reality in terms of abstractions and describes that way of thinking as "the fallacy of the misplaced concreteness." Reality is an organic, live, inter-related, complex and concrete entity.

8. Ibid. pp. 42-43.

Terms like *creativity*, *many* and *one* are the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of the term *entity*. These three terms complete the category of the *Ultimate*. The terms *thing*, *being* and *entity* are synonymous. The term '*one*' does not signify the 'integral number one.' It is a complex notion. It stands for the singularity of an entity. The term *many* presupposes the term '*one*' and the term *one* presupposes the term *many*. The term *many* conveys the notion of 'disjunctive diversity' which is essential to the concept of Being. Creativity is the principle of novelty.' P. (28) *This is the first category*.

9. The second of the categories is the categories of *Existence*. They are eight in number;—1. Actual-Entities 2. Prehensions. 3. Nexus. 4. Subjective forms. 5. Eternal-objects. 6. Propositions. 7. Multiplicities. 8. Contrasts.

The ultimate facts of immediate actual experience are called Actual-Entities. They are also called Actual Occasions. The Actual Entities are the growing together of the many things into a new Entity. They are the final real things of which the world is made. There is no going behind them. The concept of an Actual-Entity in Whitehead's thought has had a steady development. It has taken a final shape in his book, *Process and Reality*. In his earlier works *The Concept of Nature* and *Science and the Modern World* he began with the concept of events. The events constituted Reality. An Event was defined as something that is here and now. It was originally understood by Whitehead to be temporal but not spatial. Later on Whitehead points out that it is neither spatial nor temporal and that spatiality and temporality are interwoven in it. It is self-contained and marked against other entities. It is described as atomic. At other times it is described as 'throbs of emotions' in terms of feelings, and 'vibrations.' The atomic and separatist nature of events is given great prominence in the earlier works of Whitehead. The demands of the rigour of his metaphysics led him to water down the stress he laid on the atomic and separatist nature of an Event. The purpose of the concept of an Event is to displace the traditional notion of the unchanging thinghood of objects. There are no things that endure with a self-same identity. The notion that objects exist as independent entities, located in space, is attributed by Whitehead to "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." The abstract is not real, only the concrete is. There is nothing in Nature that exists by itself. "Everything suffuses everything else, for instance, the relation of things to other things, to their environment, to their past, to their future and to the minds that know them, literally constitutes part of the being or essence of the thing."¹⁰

The dynamic, the concrete and the organic nature of Events when fully stressed gives us the concept of Actual-Entities. The concept of an Actual-entity throws over-board the traditional philosophical category, Substance. The dynamic nature of an Actual-Entity goes against the concept of the block universe. The concept of Actual-Entity is the foundation of Whitehead's thought. Among the eight categories of Existence Whitehead makes out that Actual-Entities and Eternal objects stand out with a certain

10. Joads: *Guide to Philosophy*. p. 573, (1935).

decisive finality. The other types of existence have a certain intermediary character.¹¹

The entire philosophy of Organism is, in one sense, the history of Actual-Entities and their development. The process is described in the third category, the *category of Explanation*. Under this head he enumerates as many as twenty seven categories.¹² This list is valuable as a table of reference for the basic ideas of Whitehead.

The first six categories of explanation deal with Actual-Entities. "The actual world is a process and that Process is the becoming of Actual-Entities. Thus Actual-Entities are creatures; they are also termed Actual-occasions."¹³ Every Actual-Entity in the process of its becoming extends over other events which are contained in it and is itself contained as a part in other events which extend over it. Rudolf Metz's illustration makes the point clear. "For example the journey of a cart through a street is a part of the whole life of the street; the life of the street extends over the journey of the cart. Similarly the revolution of a wheel of the cart is a part of the event which is constituted by the journey of the cart which extends over the revolution of the wheels."¹⁴ The Actual-Entity is "not a morphology of stuff."¹⁵ It is *concrescence* several factors enter into the *concrescence* and thus constitute an Actual-Entity. In the last analysis it is a net work of several entities in relation. In its becoming the potential unity of many entities, actual and non-actual acquired the real unity. Thus it is the *concrescence* of many potentials.¹⁶ The inter-related nature of Actual-Entities is fundamental to the thought of Whitehead. He posits that there are no independent entities in the universe. Every Entity is drawn towards other entities. There is a reciprocal and binding affinity obtaining between the things of the world. This universe is a net work of inter-related feelings. There is a sort of electrical affinity obtaining between the things of the world.

11. *Process and Reality*: op. cit. p. 29.

12. *The categories of Explanation*. (27) pp. 29-35.

13. *Process and Reality*: op. cit. p. 29. The first category of Explanation.

14. Metz's *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*. p. 602.

15. *Process and Reality*: op. cit. p. 55.

16. *The second category of Explanation*: "That in the becoming of an Actual-Entity, the potential unity of many entities-actual and non-actual—acquires the real unity of the one Actual-Entity, so that the Actual-Entity is the real *concrescence* of many potential" p. 30, *Process and Reality*.

This affinity is called 'feeling' as well as 'prehension.' Prehension exists not only between conscious objects, but also between inert objects. It is this reciprocal pull which obtains between objects that makes for the organic nature of Reality. But for such an interconnection Reality would merely consist of plurality of entities discrete and unconnected. Such an atomism militates against the intelligibility of scientific concepts like Causation and Induction. It is this scheme of Prehensions that has enabled Whitehead to combine *atomism* with the *organic* nature of Reality. Apart from these Prehensions there is no Actual-Entity at all. The Actual Entity joins the different feelings. It is defined by the rest of the universe, and it has no being at all out of those relations. It is determined by its predecessors and also conditions its successors. It affects other entities and is affected by them. The inter-relatedness of things is derived from the fact of the existence of "universal feeling." The doctrines of universal feeling and the relatedness of things together rule out *atomism*. There are no independent particular entities located in empty space. This principle of the inter-related nature of entities is called by Whitehead the Principle of Relativity.¹⁷

The Actual-Entity is the growing together of these Prehensions. The scheme of Prehensions and the idea that every object feels drawn towards others is taken over from Bacon by Whitehead. He quotes more than once in his books and elaborately comments on the passage where Bacon says "It is certain that all bodies whatsoever though they have no sense, yet they have perception, for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate; and whether the body be alterant or altered, ever more a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies would be alike to one another. And sometimes this perception,

17. *Process and Reality*: op. cit. p. 30.

The doctrine of Relativity is the fourth category of Explanation. "That the potentiality for being an element in real concrescence of many entities into one actuality, is the one general metaphysical character attaching to all entities, actual and non-actual; and that every item in the universe is involved in each concrescence. In other words "It belongs to the nature of being" that it is a potential for every becoming. This is the principle of Relativity." Whitehead observes "that categories one four, eighteen and twenty seven state different aspects of one and the same truth. p. 39".

in some kind of bodies is far more subtle than sense; so that sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it; we see a weather glass will find the least difference of the weather in heat, or cold, when we find it not. And this perception is sometimes at a distance, as well as upon the touch; as when the loadstone draweth iron or flame Naphtha of Babylon a great distance off. It is therefore a subject of noble enquiry to enquire of the more subtle perceptions, for it is another key to open Nature, as well as the sense; and some times better."¹⁸

It is from this passage that Whitehead derives his inspiration for the feeling element that exists between things. The extreme position that Whitehead takes namely that inanimate objects too have reciprocal pull between them and that consciousness is not necessary for the existence of feeling is derived from Bacon's illustration of the weather glass in the passage cited. In short Whitehead's philosophy is a "critique of feeling."¹⁹

The Actual-Entity is a concrescence of many potentials. It is the growing together and a becoming in one of novel Prehensions, Nexus, Subjective-forms, Propositions, Multiplicities and Contrasts.²⁰ This holding together is rendered possible because of the inter-relatedness of things. The processes of the Actual-Entity can be described in two ways viz., one which is analytical of its potentiality for "objectification" in the becoming of other Actual-Entities and the other which is analytical of the process that "constitutes its own becoming."²¹ The term Objectification refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of one Actual Entity is realised in another.²²

The Actual-Entity being essentially a process of a self-formation organises the data presented to it by the rest of the world for its

18. Francis Bacon: *Natural History* (Silva Silvarum) Chap. IX. cf. *Science and the Modern World*. p. 52.

19. Dorthy Emmet's *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism* (1932) pp. 143-145. Whitehead writes "The Philosophy of Organism aspires to construct" a critique of feeling." *Process and Reality* p. 156.

20. cf. *The third category of Explanation*.

The entities mentioned in the concrescence, Prehensions Nexus, etc., are instances of the Category of Existence.

21. cf. *The eighth category of Explanation*.

22. *Process and Reality*: op. cit p. 31.

appropriation. The appropriation is effected according to the principle of unity which Whitehead calls the "subjective aim." In the process of appropriation no two Actual-Entities originate from an identical universe. The differences between the universes of Actual-Entities consist in some Actual-Entities being included in one and not in the other and in the subordinate entities which each Actual-entity introduced in the world.²³

In the process of *concrescence*, though there is the possibility for each given entity in so far as its own nature is concerned to get implicated in one or other of many modes, still it is only in one mode. That particular mode of interpretation is rendered determinate by concrescence. This *concrescence* no doubt is conditioned by the "correlate universe."²⁴ In the process of the concrescence the data throw up the subject. Here it must not be forgotten that Whitehead takes a stand which is diametrically opposed to 'Idealist metaphysics.' He believes that consciousness is derivative and not primary. He says "according to the Philosophy of Organism these three components—consciousness, thought and sense-perception, the basic elements of experience according to philosophic tradition, are inessential elements in experience, either physical or mental."²⁵ Any instance of experience is bipolar whether that instance be God or an Actual Occasion of the world. The origination of God is from the mental pole, the origination of an Actual Occasion is from the physical pole; in either case consciousness, thought, and sense perception, belong to the derivative 'impure' phases of the concrescence if in any

23. cf. *Fifth category of Explanation*.

24. cf. *The sixth category of Explanation* explains this aspect.

25. *Hogben: Nature of Living Matter*, p. 25.

In our generation, the work of Pavlov school has successfully tackled for the first time in history, the problem of what Dr. Haldane calls conscious behaviour in non-teleological terms. It has reduced it to the investigations of the conditions under which new reflex systems are brought into being. cf. Hogben's address to the *British Association of Science, Capetown*. "The modern mechanist does not say that love and heroism do not exist but he says "show me the behaviour to which you apply the adjective thoughtful, living or heroic, and we will one fine day endeavour to arrive at predicatable conclusions with reference to them, following the only method of enquiry which we have learnt by experience to trust."

cf. "Experience has been explained in a thoroughly topsy-turvy fashion the wrong end first" pp. 224-227. *Process and Reality*. op. cit.

effective sense they enter at all.²⁶ The subject or consciousness is the result of the grouping together of the data. Whitehead calls it the 'Superject.' This is Whitehead's doctrine of the *emergent unity of the superject*. Consciousness is not the fundamental stuff to begin with, it is something that is manifest at a later stage. The feelings create the subject. The subject is always called the 'superject.' "It is a fundamental metaphysical doctrine of the Philosophy of Organism, that the notion of an Actual Entity as the unchanging subject of change no longer exists. An Actual-Entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is Subject-superject, and neither half of the description can for a moment be lost sight of. The subject is always to be construed as an abbreviation of Subject-superject."²⁷ Whitehead refutes the position that consciousness is fundamental and is presupposed in the functioning of Prehensions. It is a later phase. The group of Prehensions gives rise to it.

Whitehead in defining the doctrine of the Emergent-subject contrasts his position with that of Kant. He says "the Philosophy of Organism is the inversion of Kant's position. The *Critique of pure Reason* describes the process by which the subjective data pass into the appearance of an objective world. The Philosophy of Organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction. For Kant the world emerges from the subject; for the Philosophy of Organism, the subject emerges from the world (a *Superject* rather than a *subject*). The word 'object' thus means an entity which is a potentiality for being a component in feeling; and the word Subject means the entity constituted by the process of feeling, including this process. The feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings."²⁸

Every Actual-Entity has a three fold character: (1) it has a character 'given' for it by the past, that is the datum presented, in the form of Prehensions. (2) There is a Superject formed by these Prehensions which unifies all the Prehensions and keeps away the incompatible Prehensions *i.e.*, the negative Prehensions.

26. *Process and Reality*. pp. 49-50.

27. Ibid. p. 39.

28. Ibid. p. 123.

(3) Every Actual-Entity has an appetite which constitutes the Subjective-aim of the Actual-Entity. It is the Subjective aim that determines what Prehensions go into the unity of an Actual-Entity. Every Actual-Entity is analysable into an indefinite number of ways. In some modes of analysis the component elements are more abstract than in others. The analysis in terms of Prehensions is that mode of analysis which exhibits the most concrete elements in the nature of Actual-Entities. This mode of analysis is called Division. It reproduces in itself the general characteristics of an Actual-Entity. It is referent to an external world and in this sense it is said to have a *vector character*.²⁹ The analysis of an Actual-Entity into its most concrete elements discloses it to be a concrescence of Prehensions which have originated in its process of becoming. All further analysis is only an analysis in terms of Prehensions.³⁰ Every Prehension consists of (1) the subject which is prehended and (2) the subjective form, *i.e.*, how that subject prehends that datum.³¹ The Prehension of one Actual-Entity by another Actual-Entity is called *physical prehension*. Prehension is of two varieties, positive and negative. The positive one determines and comprehends feelings that are compatible. The negative eliminates the incompatible feelings. It holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive *concrescence* of Prehensions constituting the unity of the subject.³² The Actual-Entity corresponds to a complex cell in biology which can be resolved in terms of Prehensions. The process of these Prehensions is itself the constitution of the Actual-Entity. When an Actual-Entity attains satisfaction it passes into another entity. The process is termed objectification. The Actual-Entity is said to have attained immortality. Every Prehension is essentially a transition effecting a concrescence.

The complex constitution of an Actual-Entity is analysable into five factors which expresses what that transition consists of and effects. The factors are: (1) the subject which feels, (2) the initial data, which are to be felt, (3) the elimination in virtue of negative-prehensions, (4) the objective datum which is felt and (5) the subjective-form which is, how that subject feels that objective datum.³³

29. Ibid. p. 25.

30. cf. *Tenth category of Explanation*.

31. cf. *Eleventh category of Explanation*.

32. cf. *Twelfth category of Explanation*.

33. *Process and Reality*. op. cit. p. 311.

The multiplicity of Prehensions throws up the subject which is the unifying principle. It is this unifying principle namely the subjective-aim that governs the successive phases of the interplay of Prehensions. There are two definite laws regarding the Prehensions constituting an Actual-Entity. They are (1) an entity can only be felt once: (2) the diverse Prehensions in the one and same subject of an entity which are to be unified into one must be compatible in their treatment of the entity felt.³⁴ It is this second principle that makes "objective diversity" and "objective identity" possible in one and the same entity. It is this compatible nature of the Prehensions that achieves that subjective unity of the Actual Entity.

An Actual-Entity is a concrescence arising not merely from the coming in of other Actual-Entities and Prehensions, but it includes a class of objects called the 'Eternal Objects.' The Actual Entity is not the result of mere spatio-temporal flux. It gets itself defined by the ingression of the Eternal-Object. The Eternal-Objects constitute for Whitehead the realm of possibility., They can be compared in a qualified manner to the forms of Plato.

Plato would not recognise many of Whitehead's Eternal-Objects as forms. Whitehead admits an indefinite number of 'Eternal-Objects.' The Eternal-Objects represent the recurrent element in the formation of an Actual-entity. They can be described in terms of potentiality for ingression into the becoming of Actual Entities. They are a type of entities that are different from Actual Entities. They constitute the realm of the possibilities. The actual world is a selection from the world of Eternal-Objects. An Eternal-Object is defined "As an entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to a definite Actual-Entity of the temporal world."³⁵ An Actual-Entity is bipolar. Its physical Pole is the feeling of other Actual Entities and its mental pole is its appetite of the Eternal-Object.

The Eternal-Objects are in their nature abstract. By abstract is meant "what an Eternal Object is in itself—that is to say, its essence—is comprehensible without reference to some one particular

34. Ibid. p. 327.

cf. The first three categories of obligation treat about it.

35. *Process and Reality*. p. 60.

occasion of experience.³⁶ An Actual-Entity is what a thing is, and Eternal-Object is what a thing can be. The world of Eternal-Objects is not exhausted in the Actual-Entities. The ingression of an Eternal-object in an Actual-entity means nothing more than the realisation of the Eternal-Object by that Actual-Entity. It comes into existence only under the form of an Eternal-Object. It has no existence apart from the existence of the Eternal-object. An Actual-Entity is anything at all, because it is definite, and its definiteness is due to the ingression of Eternal-Objects in it. It is the balanced unity of the total givenness together with the ingression of the Eternal-Objects. The entire scheme of Eternal-Objects is envisaged in the mind of God. Every Eternal-Object is a unique universal. It is universal in the sense that it can enter into more than one Actual-Entity. It is unique in the sense that there is no other identical object. The Eternal-Object is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular Actual-Entity of the temporal world.³⁷ It needs a limiting agent. To the question as to what determines the selection of Eternal-Objects in respect of the ingression into the spatio-temporal flux, Whitehead's answer is, God. He is the principle of *actuality* and the principle of limitation. He selects the Eternal-Objects for concretion. We conceive of actuality as an essential relation, an unfathomable possibility. It informs Actual Occasions with hierarchic patterns included and excluded in every variety of discrimination. Every Actual-Entity is a limitation on the possibility, and that by virtue of this limitation the particular value of that togetherness of things emerges. "The novelty of the object is merely the choice between the alternative forms envisaged in the primordial nature of God." Whitehead is never tired of pointing out "That an unfettered possibility would be impotent to produce anything. The Eternal-Objects impose order on the universe. They form themselves into groups. They are related within themselves. The relation between an Eternal-Object and an Actual-Entity is external, and the relation of the Actual-entity to the Eternal-object is internal. The Eternal-Object may be well understood without a reference to the Actual-entity, but the Actual-Entity cannot be conceived apart from Eternal-object which is exemplified in it. There is an infinite hierarchy associated with an Actual-Entity.

36. *Science and the Modern World*. p. 228.

37. *Process and Reality*. p. 60-63.

cf. The seventh category of Explanation treats about it.

In order to give a definite Ontological status to Eternal-Objects they are secured in the nature of God. They constitute the conceptual feeling of God. As entertained in His feeling they are real and get related. God envisages the whole range of Eternal-Objects with all their determinate relationships. But we must not forget the fact that God does not create the Eternal-Objects. These Eternal-Objects are as necessary to God's being as He is to them. God is so because he has the conceptual feeling of all Eternal-Objects.

The feeling of an Actual Entity towards an Eternal Object is called Conceptual Prehension.³⁸ Without Conceptual Prehension there is no possibility for the concrescence of an entity. Conceptual prehension has to be contrasted with physical prehension. The Prehensions whose data involve Actual Entities are termed physical prehensions.

In the becoming of an Actual Entity there are several factors involved, Prehensions, Nexus, Subjective-forms, Propositions, Multiplicities and Contrasts.³⁹ All the entities involved are cases of the category of Existence. Excepting for the two categories namely Actual-Entities and Eternal Objects all other types of entities only express how all the entities of the two fundamental types are in community with each other in the actual world.⁴⁰

We have seen that in the process of *concrescence* there is a succession of prehensions integrating themselves into unity. Thus they throw up the superject. It is the integration of prehensions that gives rise to "subjective forms and the data for it. Out of this through the ingression of Eternal Objects the novelty is produced."⁴¹

'The manner in which a subject prehends its datum is called the Subjective-form. The Subjective-form determines the elements that are to be included and excluded. "The Subjective-form receives its determination from the negative prehensions, the objective datum and the conceptual origination of the subject."⁴²

38. cf. *Category seven of Explanation*.

39. cf. *The third category of Explanation*.

40. cf. *Nineteenth category of Explanation*.

41. cf. *Twenty seventh category of Explanation*.

42. *Process and Reality*, p. 312.

The subject is at work in all the feelings, in order that it may be the subject with that feeling. The feeling is an episode in self-production and is referent to its aim. A feeling is the agency by which other things are built into the constitution of its one subject in process of concrescence. The Subjective-form expresses the purpose which urged it forward and the obstacles which it encountered and the indeterminations that are dissolved in the process."⁴³ The Subjective-aim is the unifying factor of all feelings in the successive phases of the inter-play between physical and conceptual feelings. The physical feeling treats Actual Entities and conceptual feeling treats Eternal Objects. In between them there is a category of feeling called 'transmuted feelings.' Transmuted feeling is a combine of physical and conceptual objects.

Prehensions constitute into groups called Nexus.⁴⁴ They can be divided into several elements. The prehensions with in a group are interdependent. There is mutual attraction between the different prehensions. This is what Whitehead calls the doctrine of the *mutual sensitivity of prehensions*.⁴⁵ The members of a Nexus holds together the prehensions. The members of a Nexus are in a relation of mutual immanence. A Nexus can have both temporal and spatial extensions. When it is purely spatial, it concludes such Actual Entities, as are contemporary with each other. When it is purely temporal it includes such of those Actual Entities that are in the past and future.

Propositions are a kind of metaphysical entities for Whitehead.⁴⁶ They are involved in the becoming of actual entities.

43. Ibid. p. 328.

44. Nexus is the *third category of Existence*. It is explained in the 14th *category of Explanation* as follows: "A Nexus is a set of Actual Entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehension of each other." Whitehead explains society on the basis of the Nexus doctrine "Society is a Nexus which illustrates or *shares* in some type of social order." *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 261.

This topic is developed with imaginative insight in Chap. III. *Process and Reality*. Whitehead avows that his discussion of the topic is largely conjectural p. 134 *Process and Reality*.

45. *Process and Reality*. p. 332.

46. cf. For an elaborate and technical exposition see *Process and Reality* Part II, Chap. IX and Part III Chap. IV.

A proposition which is the sixth of the categories of Existence is defined as "the unity of certain Actual-Entities in their potentiality for forming a Nexus, with its potential relatedness partially defined by certain Eternal-Objects." A proposition represents a kind of feeling. It takes a place midway between an Eternal-Object and an Actual-Entity. It arises as a result of 'impure prehensions.' A proposition is a mere possibility restricted to a certain range of actuality. It is the datum of an impure prehension. It is also called a theory. It is fundamentally "a lure for feeling." Its primary function is to be an element in judgments.

Before the actual *concrescence* of an entity there is the possibility for the actualisation of a number of Eternal-Objects. For example let us take the battle of Waterloo. This battle resulted in the defeat of Napoleon. But before the result there must have been hovering a number of possibilities which are relevant to the actuality. Thus there is a penumbra of Eternal-Objects constituted by the relevance to the actuality. An element in such a penumbral complex is termed a proposition.⁴⁷ "It is hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities." It represents the hypothetical ingression of a definite set of Eternal-Objects.

The definite set of Actual-Entities involved in a proposition constitutes its logical Subject. And the definite set of Eternal-Objects involved constitutes the predicate of the proposition. The locus of the propositions is the Actual-Entity. Propositions are not for belief but for feeling.⁴⁸ They are present at the level of the unconscious. There is no need to presuppose consciousness for being affected by a proposition. When propositions conform to the Actual-Entity they are said to be *conformal*, otherwise they are termed *non-conformal*. A proposition in Whitehead's metaphysics has not the function it has, in traditional or idealistic logic. To him proposition is an objective entity and not subjective knowledge *i.e.*, knowledge entertained by a subject. It has nothing to do with verbal expression. He says that a verbal statement is never the full expression of a proposition."⁴⁹ The proposition is felt and realised by a member of its locus. The logical subjects of a proposition enter our experience primarily to elicit novel

47. *Process and Reality*. p. 262.

48. *Process and Reality*. p. 263. cf. 15th category of Explanation.

49. *Ibid.* p. 272.

feelings. It is a combination of a universal and a particular. In the last analysis a proposition is only "a manner of germaneness of a certain set of Eternal-Objects to a certain set of Actual-Entities."⁵⁰

Whitehead draws a clear distinction between Judgment and Proposition. In traditional logic a judgment when expressed in language is called a proposition. Whitehead holds that judgment "is the decision admitting a proposition into intellectual belief."⁵¹ Proposition is essentially a way of feeling. Horror, relief, purpose are primary feelings involving the entertainments of propositions." They grow with the creative advance of the world. They elicit novel feeling. They effectively subserve the production of new feelings by including in themselves elements of potentiality which go beyond actuality.

Whitehead affirms that a proposition is not judged. It is neither identical with a judgment nor an expression of it. They are involved in a judgment. It is the objective datum that is felt in a judgment. Judgment is the synthesis of two feelings, one of which is proposition and the other an Actual-Entity. It is concerned with the conformity of two components within one experience. It is thus a coherence theory. It is also concerned with the conformity of a proposition, not restricted to that individual experience, with a Nexus whose relatedness is derived from the various experiences of its own members, and not from that of the judging experiment. In this sense there is a 'correspondence theory.'⁵² Thus judgment affirms the real facts in the constitution of the judging subject. Hence Whitehead asserts that a distinction must be made between proposition and judgment. "A proposition can be true or false, a judgment is correct, incorrect or suspended. With this distinction we see that there is a correspondence theory of truth and falsehood of propositions and a 'coherence' theory, of correctness, incorrectness or suspension of judgment."⁵³ A Proposition emerges in the analysis of a judgment. It is the datum of the judgment in abstraction from the judging subject and from the subjective form."⁵⁴ The judgment is a synthetic

50. Ibid. p. 266.

51. *Process and Reality*, p. 273.

52. Ibid. p. 270.

53. Ibid. p. 270.

54. Ibid. p. 272.

feeling embracing two subordinate feelings in one unity of feeling, propositions, and actual entities." All judgments are held by Whitehead to be categorical. They concern a proposition true or false in its application to the Actual-Occasion which is the subject making the judgment.⁵⁵

In the becoming of an Actual-Entity there is the functioning of a metaphysical entity called Multiplicities. It is one of the categories of Existence. It is a type of complex entity which has the unity derivative from some qualification which participates in each of its components severally; but it has no unity derivative *merely* from its various components.⁵⁶ In the becoming of an Actual-Entity there is the transition from the initial data to the objective datum effected by negative Prehensions. The initial data contribute the Multiplicity. The only statement that can be made about a Multiplicity is that it expresses how its individual members enter into the process of the actual world. In a sense all the categories of the Existence are examples of Multiplicities.⁵⁷ They have solely a disjunctive relationship to the actual world. Every statement about a multiplicity is a disjunctive statement about its individual members. The unity of the multiplicity is the result of the fact of all its constituent entities severally satisfy at least one conditions which no other entity satisfies.⁵⁸

'CONTRASTS' is the last of the categories of Existence. It is a mode of synthesis of the entities in one prehension. Contrast is an unity of the component elements that go to the make up of a complex datum. It is the opposite of incompatibility. It is defined as a complex entity with an individual definiteness arising out of determinateness of Eternal-Objects. It cannot be abstracted from the contrasted relata. Thus "Contrast is the particularity

55. Ibid. p. 283. Whitehead's theory of judgment is in some points like Bradley's doctrine. According to F. H. Bradley the ultimate subject of every judgment is the one ultimate substance the Absolute. The judging subject is a mode of the Absolute. When taken apart from the Absolute it is self-contradictory. For Bradley the judging subject has only a derivative actuality. It is only an affection of the Absolute. cf. "Judgment is an act which refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act." *Principles of Logic*. Vol. I. p. 10. (1883) IInd Edition.

56. *Process and Reality*. p. 63.

57. Ibid. p. 40.

58. cf. *The sixteenth and the seventeenth category of Explanation*.

of conjoint unity which arises from the realised togetherness of Eternal-Objects.”⁵⁹

The history of an Actual-Entity and its becoming is in short the entire metaphysics of Whitehead. The Actual-Entity after attaining its satisfaction becomes in its turn the datum for another Actual-Entity. At this stage the Actual-Entity is said to have attained objective immortality.” The functioning of an Actual-Entity in the creation of another Actual-Entity is called Objectification.⁶⁰ An Actual-Entity in its function of self-formation plays diverse roles without losing its self-identity. It is self creative and its process of creation transforms its diversity of roles into one coherent role. Thus ‘becoming’ is the transformation of incoherence into coherence and in each particular instance ceases with this attainment.⁶¹

The systematic metaphysics of Whitehead is made self-sufficient by the positing of the Ontological principle. It is defined as “Whatever is real must have a foot-hold in some Actual Entity functioning towards it either as an efficient cause or as a teleological ideal and thus into its physical or conceptual feeling.” The universe is a solidarity of many Actual-Entities and this is secured by the Ontological principle. It is this principle that states everything, is positively somewhere in actuality and is potency everywhere.⁶² Every fact in the general composition of the universe is expressible in terms of the component constitution.⁶³ But for the principle the universe will not be self-explicable in terms of the constitution. The Actual-Entity in this sense is explained in itself and it needs no fact external to explain it. Thus the universe of Actual-Entities does not go beyond itself for its explanation. The explanation for a concrete Actual-Entity is to be sought within itself.

The Actual Entity in its internal constitution, in its becoming through the ingression of Eternal-Objects, and in its transition into other objects, is the central theme of Whitehead’s metaphysics. This is outlined in the background of a conception of Reality that is at once organic and inter-related, complex and dynamic.

59. *Process and Reality*. p. 322.

60. *The twenty fourth category of Explanation*.

61. *Process and Reality*. p. 22.

62. Ibid. p. 22. cf. see the 18th category of Explanation.

63. Ibid. p. 205.

CHAPTER III.

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.

The religious philosophy of Whitehead is an important and integral part of his comprehensive cosmology and metaphysics. It is not as some of his critics hold "an irrelevant *addendum* to his metaphysics."¹ For him, religion is one of the chief strands of human culture and civilisation. He stands for a creative type of religion that does not go against the findings of modern science and can at the same time fit into a sound system of metaphysics.²

The advance of Scientific Materialism, the lack of social conscience exhibited by religious institutions, the conclusions of the science of Psychoanalysis and the threat and danger to life from the war in the midst of which we live have all driven the average intelligent man into a mood of frustration. It expresses itself in a hearty distrust of religion and its dogmas. Dr. Joad describes the contemporary world "as an age of demolition" and that "the modern man's mind is a *waste land* strewn with the rubbish of demolished temples."

Scientific Materialism regards nothing as mysterious at the heart of the universe, which the laws of Physics and Chemistry cannot explain, if not today atleast at some distant date.³ It swears by tangible evidence and laboratory proof. It argues that such aspects of Reality as are not quantitatively determinable are non-existent. It believes that the measuring rod, the chemical balance and laws of Physics, are the only instruments we need. The Materialist does not admit the presence of any purpose at the heart of the universe nor a point or ideal for human life. To

1. Miss Stebbing in her review of *Process and Reality* (*Mind*-Oct. 1930) holds "that the use of God in his (Whitehead's) metaphysics is scandalous."

2. For a clear treatment of his views on religion cf. *Religion in the Making*, 1926.

3. Lancelot Hogben's address to the British Science Association Cape Town.

him the universe is a process running blind to no known or knowable end. Some parts of the universe are organised, the rest are cinders. To him the traditional values of life, Truth, Beauty and Goodness, are the mere projections of the human mind on the empty canvass of the universe. They are at best a process of wishful thinking that men indulge in to make themselves happy. The cosmic process goes on with no definite discernable end in view. The universe is neither friendly nor inimical to man. An empirical inquiry into the happenings of history does not disclose any definite pattern or the working out of any purpose.⁴ Such an attitude goes against the positing of an hyperphysical and supersensuous Reality.

The more humane variety of Scientific Materialists suggest that "a life guided by knowledge and inspired by love" is what the world needs and they replace the will to believe by the *will to know* and do. Life on this earth is something definite, and most of the evils from which men suffer are due to poverty, malnutrition, foul air etc., to which an unjust social order condemns a majority of its members.⁵ The Scientific Humanist exhorts us to produce more goods and distribute them in an equitable manner. The solution to world's troubles consists in adequately psycho-analysing men and giving them economic competence. Marxism and Psycho-analysis are hailed as the Gods of the age.

Scientific Materialism results in a creedless life. The lazy individual looks at all creeds and sticks to none. Life bears most hard on the intelligent because he is perplexed at the conflict between the deliverances of Science and the dogmas of Religion. He feels with the early Aldous Huxley "that science is no 'truer' than common sense, or lunacy, than art, or religion." So he takes to a life of indulgence. The more refined variety try to pursue a scheme of all-round development. "No God is cheated and none is over-paid."

4. cf, H. A. L. Fisher's Preface to *History of Europe*

"One intellectual excitement has however been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me."

5. Hogben remarks that our expectation of life has increased as we have learnt to worry less about good life than about good drains.

When men have no faith to live by or creed to subscribe to they take to a codeless life. A codeless life has received academic backing from Psychoanalysis. Two important conclusions of Psychoanalysis have helped to undermine traditional morals. The deterministic outlook of the science has made the 'unconscious' in man entirely responsible for his acts. Man is depicted as the plaything of the 'unconscious'. He is not responsible for his acts. They are determined for him and not by him. Secondly, suppression of natural instincts is said to be fraught with dangers to health. 'Suppression' we are told 'leads to surprising outlets.' Hence, men are to indulge fully in a free life. Some of the current maxims express the point well. "Excess is the gate way to success." "To obey the senses is to have character" said Ibsen. The best way to overcome temptation is to yield to it. (Oscar Wilde). "Passion sustains the universe, and genius paints the roof." Scientific Materialism and the sanctions of Psychoanalysis make the creedless and codeless life possible. Heavenly rewards no longer attract men to good acts nor do infernal punishments deter them from bad acts. They are equally derisive of both.

Traditional religious institutions which are associated with the different religions of the world are in no small degree responsible for the contemporary mood. They have all failed to give a correct lead to men. Most of them are associated with financial interests and help the rich to grow richer at the cost of the poor. Prof. R. H. Tawney holds that capitalist interest grew strong with the help of the church. The title of one of his books *Rise of Religion with Capitalism* is significant. It is with the help of the church that the "religion of inequality" was held as written into the eternal order of things. It is the church in league with political powers that took the edge off the discontent of the poor by associating poverty with religious virtue. Again the church used its Master's gospel that it is easier for the camel to pass through the needle's eye than for a rich man to go to heaven, to serve its privileged classes. Religious doctrines were applied with a view to promoting class interest. The church losing its sense of independence became

-
6. cf. "The rich man in his castle
The poor man at his gate
God made them high or lowly
And ordered their estate."

a protagonist of the State and used religion to justify the ways of the State.⁶ Napoleon is reported to have said "what is it that makes the poor man think it quite natural that there are fires in my palace, while he is dying of cold? That I have ten coats in my wardrobe, while he goes naked? That at each of my meals enough is served to feed his family for a week? It is simply religion, which tells him that in another life I shall be only his equal and that he actually has more chance of being happy there than I. Yes, we must see to it that the floors of the churches are open to all and that it does not cost the poor man to have his prayers."⁷

For example the Christian church, the typical religious institution has failed to give the modern individual the relevant pattern of goodness. In critical moments it has shifted from its moral anchorage. It became homogeneous with the secular world. In a powerful little book "*The Betrayal of Christ by the Churches*"⁸ J. Middleton Murry points out that the church men were not above the secular average and that they sanctified the unregenerate secular life of the individual and the violent nationalism of the State. Every accommodation of the church with the spirit of the world was so much territory yielded by the spirit of God. Due to the lack of social conscience on the part of churches "religion is so widely felt to have no purchase on the contemporary world." The church forgot the Master's words "In as much as ye did it unto the least of these ye did it unto me." It not only failed the individuals but the nation also. It never criticised the corporate acts of the State. J. M. Murry observes "the church knows its functions which is that of a good wife to the State. Like a good wife it never advises and never criticises, and when there is a row, it always stands for its husband. And it insists on one thing, as far as it may—that the husband shall keep out of the kitchen."

The contemporary mood of frustration has not only undermined belief in metaphysics and morals but also in politics. The modern intellectual has no serious political conviction. He is an honorary

7. Dr. C. E. M. Joad: *The Present and the Future of Religion*. (1929) pp. 119-20.

8. J. Middleton Murry. *The Betrayal of Christ by the Churches*. p. 15. (1942).

member of all political creeds but a practitioner of none. Even communism has ceased to attract the idealism of the youth. "It is now only a convention and is no longer a revelation, it is a fashion to be followed rather than a truth to be fought for." "Ours is an age with no creed in religion, no codes in morals, no conviction in politics and no values in arts."⁹

The contemporary mood of frustration is upheld by philosophers as not a matter for despair but as the harbinger of a creative type of religion. It is from this mood that the religion we need can emerge. "The indifference to organised religions is the product not so much of growing secularism as of deepening spirituality."¹⁰

Whitehead has been alive to all the factors that have undermined the faith in traditional religion and he has criticised each of them in detail. He has exposed at great length the limitations of Science and the partial nature of the scientific picture of Reality, in the two lectures on *Nature* and *Life* delivered in America. He points out that Science cannot provide us the reason, *why* the laws should be as they are, and not otherwise. Science can at best give us only secondary causes and not the true explanation of things. This limitation arises because it has instruments only to measure the quantitatively determinable. So it can explain only the mechanical mode of causation and not the teleological. Teleology presupposes that the causes are somewhere ahead of the phenomenon attracting them. What is not present as fact in a situation, Science has no instruments to take note of; so Science cannot include purpose or mind or value in its scheme. Hence, Whitehead asserts that the scientific picture of Reality is only an abstraction from the real world and that in consequence there are some regions of Reality which it ignores altogether. For the realisation of those aspects of Reality that are not determinable in terms of quantity Science has forged no adequate instruments. From the limitation of its instruments it is a wrong step to argue the non-existence of religious experience and aesthetic values.

9. C. E. M. Joad. *Philosophy for our Times*. Chap. I. p. 20.

10. S. Radhakrishnan: *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. p. 59. (1939).

After pointing out the limitation of Science Whitehead discusses the conflict that arises between the deliverances of Science and the truths of Religion.¹¹ He avows that such a conflict does exist. The results of Science and the beliefs of Religion come into a position of frank disagreement from which there is no escape for sensitive minds that have a zeal for truth. They have either to abandon the clear teachings of Science or to give up faith in Religion. The importance of the issue and conclusion we reach have far reaching effects on the course of human history. Science and Religion are the two strongest general forces that influence the conduct of men. When the scientific force *i.e.*, "the impulse to accurate observation and logical definition" is set against the other, the force of religious intuition, the conflict stares us in the face. To fly from the face of this contradiction we take refuge in mutual anathema. We assert that Science is a way of knowing and Religion is a way of feeling.

Whitehead takes his stand on the clash and works out its implications. "Clash of doctrines is not a disaster."¹² It is not a mere failure with no hopes for the future. It brightens up the prospect and deepens the scientific spirit. It calls for the untapped resources of the human mind. "The clash" in his words, "is a sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle science will be found. A mere logical contradiction cannot itself point to more than a necessity of some readjustment on both the sides. In formal logic a contradiction is a sign of signal defect, but in the evolution of real knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards a victory."

The clash is a call for a wider synthesis of the facts and a more comprehensive account of things. Disraeli's advice to his countrymen to use large scale maps is not without significance in the realm of thought. A synthetic and large outlook is a great preservative against conflicts, contradictions and clashes.

Religion and Science both change their positions as they grow with the increase in knowledge. "Science is even more changeable

11. *Science and the Modern World*. Chap. XII.

12. *Ibid.* pp. 229-230.

than theology. No man of science could subscribe without qualifications to Galileo's beliefs, or to Newton's beliefs, or to all his own scientific beliefs of ten years ago." Every scientific doctrine has received at the hands of its subsequent generation modifications, additions and distinctions in the light of new facts. When a scientific law is asserted it is subject to limitations or expansions of meaning which were not contemplated at an earlier epoch. Even the truth-value of a scientific proposition is subject to the limitations and qualifications which at present remain undiscovered. There is no absolutely true law for all times. Absolute certainty is an impossibility in a world of growing knowledge. Both Science and Religion have been in a state of continual development. Many of the doctrines which the church held were abandoned later on. A learned Jesuit Father of Seventeenth century, Petavius, showed that the theologians of the first three centuries of Christianity made use of phrases and statements which since the Fifth century would be condemned as heretical. The early Christians believed that the world was coming to an end in the life time of the people then living. This formed an impressive part of the popular religious doctrine of the day. It did not come to pass and the belief proved to be mistaken. Subsequently the church doctrine adjusted itself to the change. Such changes are common and they should not be taken as conflicts.¹³

With the increase in knowledge we have to modify our general conceptions of laws. Once we modify our general conception the conflicts disappear. For example "Galileo said that the earth moves and the sun is fixed; the inquisition said that the earth is fixed and the sun moves; and the Newtonian astronomers, adopting an absolute theory of space, said that both the sun and earth move. But now we say that any one of these three statements is equally true, provided you have fixed your sense of 'rest' and 'motion' in the way required by the statement adopted." Each of the ways of stating was true within the general perspective of the age. Particular truths appear to be inconsistent with growth of knowledge. Galileo's way of stating the fact was beyond question true. But at that time the modern concept of relative motion was in nobody's mind. So the statements were made in ignorance of it. Hence it had to be corrected, in the light of the Relativity Theory.

Whitehead gives another example from Physics to point out that contradictory theories persist side by side with their limited fields of application. Newton's theory of light *i.e.*, the corpuscular theory of light, was believed in the Eighteenth century and Huyghens theory of light *i.e.*, the wave theory, was believed in the Nineteenth century. The two theories are contradictory. But today a set of phenomena (diffraction, refraction, interference, etc.) are explained in terms of Huyghen's theory and another set of phenomena pertaining to quantum effects is explained in the light of Newton's theory. Scientists have left it at that. In some distant future they hope to attain some wider vision which reconciles both.¹⁴

Whitehead assigns two reasons for the decline of the influence of traditional religion. Religion in the first place has been on the defence for the last two centuries. The intellectual authority of religious thinkers is on the wane. This is due to the fact that Religion has not kept pace with nor adjusted itself to the development of modern thought. With the rise of every novel situation, Religion retreated. For most new adjustments, it was not prepared. Religion, if it has to be vital, has to face the change in knowledge in the same Spirit as Science does. When a Darwin or an Einstein proclaims his theories, which modify our knowledge, we do not bewail that as a defeat for Science, because its old ideas have been abandoned. We hail it as a triumph for Science. In the same spirit we will have to face the developments in thought. "Religion will not regain its old powers until it can face change in the same spirit as does Science. The principles of religion may be eternal, but the expression of those principles requires continual development."¹⁵ They require restatement in terms of the growth of knowledge. Religion must try to disengage its proper ideas "from the adventitious notions which have crept into it by reason of the imaginative picture of the world entertained in the age." The world picture changes with the advance of scientific theory, and Religion in order to be vital must disengage its important ideas from the discredited scientific picture of the world. It must develop new modes of expression to suit the scientific temper of the age. There must be "release of religion from imperfect science." Normal advance of scientific theory requires some sort of modi-

14. Ibid. p. 228.

15. Ibid. pp. 233-34.

fication in religious expression. The modification takes the form of explanation, expansion or at times a complete restatement. Such a process in no way affects the genuine spirit of Religion.

The chief concern of Religion should be to allow scientific facts to influence it and not shut itself as "a garrison of a fort surrounded by hostile forces." The religionists dare not modify because they are indolent to find out some large general principle which can reconcile the facts of Science and the doctrines of Religion. The clash makes them acquiesce in the inerrancy of scriptural statements and they indulge in recrimination against Science. It is at this juncture, Whitehead says, there is the need for a scientific outlook. "The important question is in what spirit are we going to face the issue. There we come to something absolutely vital."¹⁶ "We should wait when there is clash, but not wait passively."¹⁷ "To acquiesce in discrepancy is destructive of candour and of moral cleanliness. It belongs to the self-respect of intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final unravelment. If you check that impulse, you will get no religion and no science from an awakened thoughtfulness."¹⁸

Whitehead sums up the controversy thus "religion is the expression of one type of fundamental experience of mankind; that religious thought develops into an increasing accuracy of expression, disengaged from adventitious imagery: that the interaction between science and religion is one great factor in promoting this development."¹⁹

Religion, Whitehead holds, must be able to rise above its scriptures. The scriptures of different religions should not be treated as final. "The effective sense in which a doctrine has been held in the past cannot be determined by the mere logical analysis of verbal statements made in ignorance of logical traps. We have to take into account the whole reaction of human nature to the scheme of thought. The reaction is of a mixed character. It is here that the impersonal criticism of Science and Philosophy

16.	Ibid.	p. 230.
17.	Ibid.	p. 229.
18.	Ibid.	p. 230.
19.	Ibid.	p. 236.

comes to the aid of religious evolution. The truths of religious experience and "inspiration are not confined to any age or race, the revelation of God is larger than any book or set of books."²⁰ The last chapter is never finally written. Religion must rise above its verbal trappings. It has only two courses open to it. Either by its 'closed' nature it fades into a meaningless formula, or it gains power by the new lights thrown on it. Religion is transformed by the urge of critical reason, by the vivid evidence of emotional experience and by the cold certainties of scientific perception.

'Religion,' Whitehead holds, is the most important factor in man's development and culture. Unlike arithmetic and other sciences it is a "transforming agency." We *use* arithmetic, but we *are* religious.²¹ One's character develops according to one's faith. He defines religion on the doctrinal side as a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended. On the practical side religion is "a force of belief cleansing the inward parts." From this it follows that the primary religious virtue is sincerity, a penetrating sincerity. Religion is the art and theory of the internal life of man.

Whitehead does not subscribe to the static concept of Religion. For him it is a complex and fundamental fact of life resulting through the interaction of several factors. It runs through different stages. The religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the world as a realm of adjusted values. It is religious experience that helps the emergence of values. It is the principle determining the grading of values. Emotions, purposes, and physical conditions are subservient factors in the emergence of value.²²

"Religion is founded on the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness, concepts whose separate relationships to fact and whose mutual relations to each other are only to be settled jointly by some direct intuition into

20. S. Radhakrishnan: *The Religion We Need*. p. 25 (Benn) (1928).

21. *Religion in the Making* pp. 5 & 6.

22. Ibid. p. 49.

the ultimate character of the universe.”²³ The direct intuition into the ultimate character of the universe constitutes the core of religious experience. It is this experience that gives the man of religion an insight into the mutual relationships of the different concepts. The concepts are:—the value of an individual for itself, the value of the diverse individuals for one another and the value of the objective world which is a community derivative from the inter-relations of its component individuals, and also necessary for the existence of each of these individuals. Religious experience is the synthetic vision of the togetherness of all these concepts. This experience gives the insight into the principle determining the grade of values. Valuation in the true sense of the term is the result of this intuition. It is the synthetic vision which comprehends all the facts and their mutual relations and values that makes religious experience integral. Whitehead seeks to convey all the aspects of religious experience in the following celebrated passage:—“Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehensions; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.”²⁴ Religious experience is not a social fact resulting from collective emotions. “Collective enthusiasms, revivals, institutions, churches, rituals, Bibles, codes of behaviour are the trappings of religion, its passing forms. They may be useful or harmful; they may be authoritatively ordained, or merely temporary expedients. But the end of religion is beyond all this.”²⁵ It is something inward and personal. It unifies all values and organises experience. It is a unique and at the same time, fundamental experience of man. It is not a mere humanist gospel with a blue print for civilisation. It is an attempt with a robust faith to disengage the self and the ideal from its adventitious elements. “It is an attempt to discover the ideal possibilities of human life, a quest for emancipation from the immediate compulsions of vain and petty moods. It is not

23. Ibid. p. 48.

24. *Science and the Modern World*. p. 238.

25. *Religion in the Making*, p. 7.

true religion unless it ceases to be traditional view and becomes personal experience. It is an independent functioning of the mind, something unique, possessing an autonomous character.....It is the reaction of whole man to the whole Reality. We seek the religious objects by the totality of our faculties and energies. Such functioning of the whole man may be called spiritual life, distinct from a merely intellectual or moral or aesthetic activity or a combination of them.”²⁶

Religious experience in the last analysis is personal and it is the insight of chastened spirits in their moments of contemplation. We have it in moments of solitariness. “Solitariness is religion. If you are never solitary you are never religious. Religion is what the individual does with his solitariness.”²⁷ The element of solitariness was not there from beginning of civilisation. It is the result of the general growth of ideas and worldwide consciousness. It is a very late stage in the development of religion.

Religion to begin with receives external expression in human history in the forms of rituals. Ritual is a definite organised procedure of a round of acts indulged in by men for the sake of experiencing pleasant emotions. Rituals when repeated increase the joy of exercise and the emotion of success. “Thus emotion waits upon ritual; and then ritual is repeated and elaborated for the sake of its attendant emotions. Mankind become artists in rituals.”²⁸

Ritual is the stimulus to emotion. The stimulus is applied with two different ends in view. When the emotion excited is for its own sake, it diverges into play activity. When it excites such emotions as to get attached to a person or a thing we have respectively Religion and Magic. The use of the ritual is determined by “the quality of the emotion it excites.”²⁹ Ritual is highly

26. S. Radhakrishnan *An Idealist View of Life*. p. 88 (1932).

The implications of Whitehead's definition of religion as what the individual does with his solitariness is explained. cf. *Gita* Chap. VI, 10.

27. *Religion in the Making*. p. 6.

28. Ibid. p. 10.

29. Ibid. p. 11.

Whitehead observes “an habitual ritual may diverge into religion or into play, according to the quality of the emotion excited. He illustrates it. The Olympic games of the Greeks of 5th century B.C. were tinged with religion. The Dionysiac festival in Attica ended with a comic drama. And also in the modern world, a holy day and a holiday are kindred notions.”

impressive and it produces tremendous effect on the minds and the imaginations of men who partake in it. The emotion generated in rituals is active and it creates a bond between the man and his tribe or his clan. A collective ritual, and a collective emotion, become the binding force of savages. However crude an expression of religion it may be, it still lifts the members of the clan out of the sick prison of their animal necessities. Religion at this stage is essentially a social phenomenon. But all the same we discern at this stage "the first faint glimmering of the life of the spirit raised beyond concentration upon the task of supplying animal necessities."³⁰

The ritual and the emotions get to rest on some beliefs. Man essentially needs some belief, which satisfies the demands of incipient rationality. The 'human mind,' said Pascal, 'naturally believes' and 'the human will naturally loves.' The need for belief is instinct with men. It is there expressing itself in some form or other in all ages. Canon F. R. Barry observes 'before all else man is a worshipper. From his earliest appearance in history, he has been building pathetic altars, stretching forth his hands to the unknown God. This is persistent through all the mazes of his social and religious record, through all its preversions and unlovely forms, its ignorance and cruelty and terror. If he cannot find his God in heaven, he must fall down before a God on earth.'³¹ The different dictators are the Gods for the men of our age. The need to believe is ineradicable in men. "Nature abhors a vacuum in the spiritual world no less than in physical." Emotions and rituals get explained in terms of myths. Myths have a force all their own. They satisfy the vague feeling of rationality in men. Myth gives force to rituals and emotions. It makes ritual vivid. Ritual, performed in conjunction with the explanatory purpose of the myth it stands for, constitutes primitive worship. The worship is sometimes of a hero person, and at other times it is a hero thing. But there is very little disinterested worship among the primitive folk. They had identified every power of Nature with a spirit. Modern scientific ideas had not touched them. To them the process of Nature was mysterious. From the hero-

30. *Religion in the Making*. p. 13.

31. Cannon F. R. Barry, *What has Christianity to Say?*

person in whom they had faith they expected to get something good and to avert the evil which they feared. This necessitated prayer, praise, sacrifice, incantation and ritual absorption. "If the hero be a person, we call the ritual, with its myth, 'religion'; if the hero be a thing, we call it 'magic.' In religion we induce, in magic we compel."³²

The difference between magic and religion is determined by its capacity for development. Religion is progressive³³ and magic is unprogressive.³⁴ Religion at this stage is social in its significance. It is at this stage that most of the denominational religions stop. They have their uncriticised beliefs which give them satisfaction. Whitehead observes that "masses of semi-civilised humanity have halted at this stage—the stage of satisfactory rituals, and of satisfied belief, without impulse towards higher things. Such a religion satisfies the pragmatic test: It works, and thereby claims that it be awarded the prize for truth."³⁵ This stage of religion with all its defects marks a formative step in the ascent of man. Ritual and emotion, we saw, encouraged men to go beyond the mere response to practical necessities. In the same manner belief helped "the mind to beget thoughts divorced from the mere battling with the pressure of circumstances. Imagination secured in it a machinery for its development." Mind started its flight and disengaged itself from the mere immediate objects that surround it. It marks the emancipation of thought. In the world of uncoordinated beliefs there is room for all. With coordination and definition they go off into parties and isolated creeds. It is at the stage of definite coordination that conflicts come in. The God of one religion becomes the devil of another. The beliefs become rigid and lose all powers of adaptation and so they stand opposed to one another.

'Rational religion' marks the true nature of religion. The antecedent phases are essentially social and customary. It emerges not from sociality but from solitariness. Hence the famous

32. *Religion in the Making*. p. 16.

33. Whitehead adds only 'sometimes.'

34. Whitehead holds that magic is unprogressive, except in so far as science can be traced back to the progress of magic.

35. *Religion in the Making*. p. 17.

definition 'religion is what the individual does with his solitariness.' The result is the experience and vision of men of great insight in their mood of solitariness. It is above all a vision presenting a synoptic view of Reality. It is primarily derived from the special experience of a few. The chosen few distinctly discern the vision in their moments of deep insight. "For many of us it comes only after suggestion from without."³⁶ This final phase introduces solitariness. "Strait is the gate and narrow is the way* and few there be that find it."³⁷ It is very difficult for our gregarious age to appreciate the effect of solitariness. We dread to face ourselves so we continually indulge in self-forgetting activities. But if we turn to history we find "The great religious conceptions which haunt the imagination of civilised mankind are scenes of solitariness. Prometheus chained to his rock, Mahomet brooding in the desert, the meditation of Buddha, the solitary man on the Cross. It belongs to the depth of religious spirit to have felt forsaken, even by God."³⁸ "Rational religion is religion whose beliefs and rituals have been reorganised with the aim of making it the central element in a coherent ordering of life—an ordering which shall be coherent in respect of the elucidation of thought, and in respect to the direction of conduct towards a unified purpose commanding an ethical approval."³⁹ "Rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special occasions and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions. It arises from that which is special, but it extends to what is general."⁴⁰

36. Ibid. p. 21.

37. Ibid. p. 18.

cf. *The Bhagavad Gītā* Chap. VII—V. 3.

Manuṣyānām saharṣeṣu Kaścidyatati siddhaye

Yatatāmapi siddhānām Kaścinnām vetti tattva taḥ.

cf. Chap. VII—19. "Vāsudevaḥ sarvamiti sa mahātmā sudurlabḥ"

*The path is described by Kaṭha Upaniṣad Chap. I, III, 14.

Kṣurasya dhārā niṣitā duratyayā

durgam pathastat Kavayo vadanti."

38. *Religion in the Making*. p. 9.

39. Ibid. p. 20.

40. Ibid. p. 21.

Rational religion arises as a gradual transformation of the pre-existing religious forms. The old forms could no longer contain the new ideas, and most of the modern religions of our civilisation are traceable to such definite crises. Institutions and rituals cease to have any hold on men's mind when they are out of tune with the intellectual climate of the age. The religious ideas must be in consonance with the scientific and other ideas of the age. They should not suffer from a 'cultural lag.' They grow with the general ideas of the age.

Rational religion is conditioned by the general progress of men. It is the critical function of modern ideas that has made religion rational. In its antecedent phase it could not disengage itself from its immediate surrounding interests. With the march of time and the growth in ideas, the consciousness of men widened and world-consciousness disengages men from the narrow circle of their ideas. It lifts the individual up from his little surroundings to a place from which he can command a general view. Human thought gets beyond the limited horizon and takes into account the wider world beyond his immediate special structure. "The world as a whole enters into an explicit consciousness."⁴¹ This results from the contact the individuals make with other strangers.

Science has reduced the whole world to a compact home by annihilating distances. This has enabled the individual to wander and gather ideas. The ideas help him to think dispassionately beyond his personal interests. Whitehead supplies ample evidence illustrating the function of rational religion. He says "The history of rational religion is full of the tales of disengagement from the immediate social routine. If we keep to the Bible: Abraham wandered, the Jews were carried off Babylon and after two generations were allowed to return peacefully. St. Paul's conversion was on a journey, and his theology was elaborated amid travels. The millennium was an age of travel; among the Greeks, Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle exemplify their times."⁴² Rational religion is the result of world consciousness and as such it goes beyond the simple needs of an utilitarian creed. Religion in its communal stage is confined to the interest of the

41. Ibid. p. 28.

42. Ibid. p. 29.

group. Its chief concern is the preservation of the group. It conceives that conduct to be right which leads them to some God to protect it, and that conduct which stirs some irascible being to compass destruction on the community as bad. God was conceived by the primitives as void. And from God the void, communal religion conceives him as a tyrant. The ritual and ethics of a communal religion consist in discerning the will of God and propitiating it. Rational religion goes a step forward and knows God's will and His goodness in order to be like Him.⁴³ The transition is from God the void, to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion.⁴⁴

At the stage of rational religion, the religious unit is not the community but the individual. Ritual tends towards individualistic forms. The tribal dance is relegated to the limbo and the individual prayer takes its place. Individual prayer deepens into spiritual insight.⁴⁵ It is only when religion disengages from the uncritical association with things, it becomes the main instrument for progress. Otherwise the history of religion proves to be "a melancholy record of horrors, human sacrifice and in particular the slaughter of children, cannibalism, sensual orgies, abject superstitions, hatred as between races, the maintenance of degrading customs, hysteria, bigotry. Religion turns out to be the last refuge of human savagery."⁴⁶ "General ideas and world-wide consciousness are necessary for a rational religion."⁴⁷

43. Ibid. p. 30.

44. Ibid. p. 6. cf. *Gītā*, Chap. IV. V. 29.

45. Ibid. p. 25.

46. Ibid. p. 26.

47. Whitehead holds "that generality is the salt of religion."

cf. S. Radhakrishnan: *An Idealist View of Life*. pp. 218-19.

He observes "that religion as it is practised today has a long distance to travel, before it can reach this goal.....Even today popular religion is mixed up with wizards and witches, magic cures, and incantations, ghostly apparitions, and priestly frauds. The mass of men still cling to superstition in the name of religion and believe in priests who affirm that they know the nature of life beyond the grave, the complexion of God and his followers..... A highly instructive study of mankind might be written under the title **A History of Human Stupidity*," in which it would become apparent how our religious experiments and adventures since we began to leave records is an account of one crusade or other on behalf of some illusion or other.

Radhakrishnan, in his plea for a genuine type of Religion, makes a fervent appeal for the play of reason in religion. "Loyalty to ourselves, to our intellect and conscience, requires us to withhold our assent from propositions which do not commend themselves to our conscience and judgment. We become more religious in proportion to our readiness to doubt and not our willingness to believe. We must respect our own dignity as rational beings and thus diminish the power of fraud. It is better to be free than to be a slave, better to know than to be ignorant. It is reason that helps us to reject what is falsely taught and believed about God, that He is a detective officer or a capricious despot or a glorified school master. It is essential that we should subject religious beliefs to the scrutiny of reason."⁴⁸

Rational religion goes beyond dogma because it is in its essence a living experience. It is at once solitary and universal. It is at bottom an endeavour to find something permanent and intelligible by which to interpret the confusion of immediate detail. It is a self-conscious endeavour to apprehend general principles.⁴⁹

Rational religion cannot do without a sound system of metaphysics. "Religion must have recourse to metaphysics for a scrutiny of its terms."⁵⁰ It needs the backing of metaphysics in order to secure objectivity and correct interpretation for its doctrine. It should never fight shy of metaphysics. It must make its individual and independent contribution to metaphysics. Metaphysics must take account of the facts of religious experience in framing its scheme of general ideas. In fact no important reorganisation of any sphere of human thought can confine merely to its own self.⁵¹ Whitehead says that we cannot shelter theology from science, or science from theology; nor can you shelter either of them from metaphysics, or metaphysics from either of them. There is no short cut to Truth.⁵² Religion has to admit modifications from the wide and complete circle of knowledge, and also bring its own contribution of immediate experience.

48. S. Radhakrishnan: *An Idealist View of Life*. p. 219.

49. *Religion in the Making*. p. 37-38.

50. Ibid. p. 67.

51. Ibid. p. 67.

52. Ibid. p. 67.

Dogmatic theologies have fought shy of metaphysics and entrenched themselves behind tradition and scriptures. Liberalising theologians have rebounded from mutually intolerant accounts of God to a simplicity of religious truth⁵³ which avoids metaphysics. There is a tendency to reduce Religion to a few simple notions which appeal to the common sense of men. Such a simplification has a wide purchase on the contemporary mind of man in view of the horrors produced by religious bigotry. The common sense view of Religion answers to the pragmatic need and produces pleasing emotions and agreeable conduct in men. Beyond this it does not go.

Such a Religion in Whitehead's view is not rational and it is only an antecedent phase to it. Under no circumstance should our trust in the ultimate power of reason for the discernment of truth be given up in the favour of any other faculty.⁵⁴ It is not scientific to hope for a simple Religion in a complex world. Simplicity by itself may be all right but when it excludes certain elements and does not account for some others, it must be given up. In the physical world as Science advances we discern a complexity of interrelation. Modern Physics certainly does not disclose a simple world. "We have come to recognise that our existence is more than a succession of *bare facts*. We live in a common world of mutual adjustment of intelligible relations, of valuations, of zest after purposes, of joy and grief, of interest concentrated on self, of interest directed beyond self, of short-time and long-time failures or successes, of different layers of feeling, of life-weariness and zest."⁵⁵

How can we in such a complex world have a simple metaphysics and a non-complex religion. To reduce Religion in such a complex world as ours to a few simple notions is arbitrary and we have no right to impose such *apriori* conditions. The terms used in religion need careful examination. Terms like "God," "Personal," "Impersonal," "Entity" and "Individuality" require the most careful watching and clear defining. They are sometimes used in popular religions in different senses in different

53.	Ibid.	p. 64.
54.	Ibid.	p. 65.
55.	Ibid.	p. 68.

connections,—not to mention the danger of failing to use in any determinate sense. It is these facts that necessitate a sound metaphysics for a rational religion.⁵⁶

Whitehead makes out an elaborate charge against all attempts at the simplification of religious dogmas. He holds that such simplifications are shipwrecked upon the rock of the Problem of Evil.⁵⁷

Rational religion has to meet the Problem of Evil in a realistic manner. "No religion which faces facts can minimise the fact of the existence of evil."⁵⁸ Rational religion in particular has to take note of it. Many systems of theology in the East and the West include a personal God as one of its dogmas and find it difficult to account for the Problem of Evil. Religious conceptions have been unduly simplified in order to be comforting to men. The fact of over-simplification has stood in the way of a sound metaphysics. The various doctrines about God that traditional theology has "set forth have not suffered chiefly from their complexity. They have represented the extremes of simplicity."⁵⁹

Examining the typical concept of God in traditional theology Whitehead finds that there are three main renderings of the concept. "The first is the concept of an impersonal order to which the world conforms. This order is the self-ordering of the world; it is not the world obeying an imposed rule. This is an extreme view of immanence."⁶⁰ Whitehead calls it "*The Eastern Asiatic Concept*." The second is the *Semitic Concept*. The concept of a definite personal entity, whose existence is the one ultimate metaphysical fact, absolute and underivative and who decreed and ordered the derivative existence which we call the actual world.⁶¹

The third is the *Pantheistic Concept* of an entity to be described in terms of the *Semitic Concept*, except that the actual world is a phase within the compact fact which is this ultimate individual

56.	Ibid.	p. 66.
57.	Ibid.	p. 65.
58.	Ibid.	p. 38.
59.	Ibid.	p. 65.
60.	Ibid.	p. 56-57.
61.	Ibid.	p. 57.

entity. The actual world conceived apart from God is unreal. Its only reality is God's reality. The actual world has the reality of being a partial description of what God is. But in itself it is merely a certain mutuality of 'appearance' which is a being of God. This is the doctrine of Monism.⁶²

In most religions the *Semitic Concept* is prominent. In some it combines with the Pantheistic. The concept of a transcendental extra-cosmic personal God has innumerable difficulties in its way. Such a God is completely outside all metaphysical rationalisation. All that we know about him is "that he is such a Being as to design and create this universe and there our knowledge stops. If we mean by His goodness that He is the one self-existent complete entity then He is good. But such goodness must not be confused with the goodness that men are in need of in their daily life. Such a God is no doubt very useful because anything baffling can be ascribed to His direct decree."⁶³

The positing of an omnipotent and omniscient personal extra-cosmic God provides a simple answer to all riddles. Once we posit His goodness and omniscience we cannot think of the existence of Evil in any real sense of the term. The pious theist asserts 'that he cannot account for the existence of evil by any rational method; to want to do so, is to be co-equal with God.'⁶⁴ The theists shudder to do so. There is another comfortable feeling that God created "this best of all possible worlds" and that we should not pit our finite limited intelligence against it.

Leaving aside the problem of Evil for a while let us concentrate our attention on the logical and other consequences of the existence of a personal extra-cosmic God. Whitehead holds that such an entity cannot be proved.⁶⁵

The concept of a transcendental personal God has not given us very good ethical results. Theologians did their best to civilise and moralise their Deity. But this does not take the fangs out. It is the exclusive character of the denominational religions that

62. Ibid. p. 57-58.

63. *Religion in the Making*. p. 59.

64. Mahatma Gandhi: *Columbia Record on God*.

65. *Religion in the Making*. p. 59.

have led to such abominations as religious wars, persecution of heretics and breaking of faith with unbelievers. The Hebrews thought that the integrating principle of the universe was a kind of magnified human person with all the feelings and passions of a human being. He was represented as wrathful, zealous and vindictive. It is this primitive cosmology that led to the burning of witches and the wholesale massacre of Albigensians, Catharists, Protestants and Catholics and a hundred other sects.⁶⁶

Though the Theologians are at great pains to insist that the personal God is an absolutely perfect person, but still the mass of men think of the deity as a glorified human being. The personal description of God is taken advantage of by some. They identify the promptings of their own passions with the voice of an all-too-personal God. The doctrine of a complete transcendence and otherness of God has produced extremely undesirable results in the minds of those who believe it. Aldous Huxley has trenchantly chronicled the results which make most depressing reading. "The history of those sects which have believed that individuals could base their conduct upon the moment to moment guidance of a personal deity makes most horrible reading. From Thomas Schucker, the Swiss Anabaptist who was divinely guided to cut off his brother's head and who actually did so in the sight of a large audience including his own father and mother, down to Smyth-Pigott, who believed that he was God and who fathered upon the parlour-maid two illegitimate children called respectively 'Power' and 'Glory' are instances of how energy directed to a personal God is abused."⁶⁷

Further, it is a mistaken notion to think "definiteness in conception makes for depth in religion." The image narrows down the thought of the divine Being within human limits and works against a more spiritual conception of God-head.⁶⁸ Radhakrishnan points out clearly in his inaugural lecture delivered in the Oxford University "that the religions of the world can be distinguished into those which emphasize the object and those which insist on experience." Religions that insist on objects

66. Aldous Huxley: *Ends and Means*. p. 272-284.

67. Ibid. p. 239-40.

68. S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. p. 59.

stress the transcendental extra-cosmic nature of God. Such a concept reduces religious experience to nothing and gets in its place a God that is like a father in a patriarchal society who has His favourite children to whom He communicates truth. It is this concept that is responsible for the doctrines of the self-disclosures of God and exclusive revelations of God to some. "Dogmatism and Naturalism are the two real enemies to religion. One categorically denies the existence of God, another talks as if it knew all about Him. Both agree in abolishing all the mystery in the world."⁶⁹ Hence they are against the genuine religious spirit. That Religion is essentially experience is stressed again and again by Whitehead. He defines it as the direct apprehension that goes beyond such happiness and such pleasure, there remains the function of what is actual and passing, that it contributes its quality as an immortal fact to the order which informs the world."⁷⁰

He argues that the intuition resulting in a religious vision and experience is not that of a personal God. The content of religious experience is not an extracosmic Being who creates the universe and directs it as a mechanic his machine. Religious experience "is a revelation of character apprehended as we apprehend the character of our friends." But there is this difference that the apprehended character is permanently inherent in the nature of things.⁷¹ Religious experience is the intuition of the general character inherent in the nature of things. It is capable of being universalised. Though at the first instance it emerges as distinguished in consciousness under exceptional circumstances, once it is discerned it becomes a permanent possession. Whitehead advances the analogy of arithmetical truths. We require some exceptional help to detect it, but when known arithmetic is a permanent possession.⁷² The intuition of Religion is not the dis-

69. Ibid. p. 62.

Whitehead observes that "creeds are at once the outcome of speculation and efforts to curb speculation. But they are always relevant to it. Antecedently to speculation there can be no creeds. Wherever there is a creed, there is a heretic round the corner or in his grave.

Adventures of Ideas. p. 59. (edition Mentor 1955.

70. *Religion in the Making*. p. 68.

71. Ibid. p. 50.

72. Ibid. p. 54.

cernment of a definite person or an individual, nor a form of words, but a "type of character." There are many things, says Whitehead, which are thus known; they constitute the ultimate religious evidence beyond which there is no appeal.⁷³

That the content of religious experience is not a definite glorified person is being declared by a large number of religions. Whitehead points out that the evidence for the assertion of general though not universal concurrence in the doctrine of no direct vision of a personal God, can be found by turning to the history of religious thought. He instances the religious thought of China and India. Buddhist philosophy and Hindu thought disclaim the intuition of an ultimate personality substantial to the universe. "There may be personal embodiments, but the substratum is impersonal."⁷⁴ Religion for the Hindu and the Buddhist in the words of S. Radhakrishnan is more a transforming experience than a notion of God. Real religion exists without a definite conception of the deity, but not without a distinction between the spiritual and profane, the sacred and the secular.....In the theistic systems the essential thing is not the existence of the deity, but its power to transform man. Budhi, or enlightenment, which Buddha attained and his followers aim at, is an experience. Perfect insight is the end and the aim of the Buddhist eight-fold path. There are systems of Hindu thought like the Sāṅkhya and the Jaina which do not admit God but affirm the reality of spiritual consciousness. There are theists like Rāmānuja for whom the spiritual consciousness, though not God himself, is the only way in which God can be known.⁷⁵ As Sir Charles Eliot observes such a persistent idea of a great nation cannot be explained away as hallucination or charlatanism. The main streams of religious thought start with direct contradiction to each other. There is only one way of superseding reason, that is by emotion. But emotion cannot secure the objectivity of religion as reason does. "It is reason that secures the general coherence to religion which is denied to hysteria."⁷⁶

73. Ibid. p. 56.

74. Ibid. p. 51.

75. S. Radhakrishnan: *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 21.

76. *Religion in the Making*, p. 53.

Greek thought, Whitehead holds, discountenanced a personal God. "Rational religion in ancient Greece took its stand up on the Pythagorean notion of a direct intuition of a righteousness in the nature of things, functioning as a condition, a critic and an ideal."⁷⁷ Divine personality was inferred from the directly apprehended law of nature.

Christianity, according to Whitehead's interpretation, mainly adopted the position that there is no direct intuition of an ultimate personal substratum for the world. The doctrine of the existence of a personal God is based on inference, which is obviously to be made by all men upon the basis of their individual personal experience. Christianity has not accepted the simple *Semitic Concept* of a transcendental God. Important modifications have been introduced. In most of the Christian churches the "simple semitic doctrine is now a heresy, both by reason of the modification of personal unity and also by the insistence on immanence. Christianity, according to Whitehead, has not adopted any one of the three mentioned concepts of God. Christ Himself insisted on the concept of immanence as central to His doctrine. He said that the kingdom of God will not come watching for it, it comes not by observation; nor will men say, "Here it is," or "there it is," For behold the Kingdom of Heaven is within you." The implications of the Christian concept of the Fatherhood of God are worked out and depicted in moving images by St. John in his two epistles. He was the first to interpret and equate the term God with love. To Him we owe the phrase "God is love."⁷⁸ Later on the concept has been modified to a great extent. The Christian religion did not stop with God's omniscience, but insisted on His immanence. "The Christian God is a factor in the universe."⁷⁹ Whitehead holds that the concept of immanence is implicit in the various parts of New Testament, and was explicit in the first theological epochs of Christianity. Christian theology

77. Ibid. p. 52.

78. *Epistle of John* I. Chap. IV. "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God. *For God is Love.*"

79. *Religion in the Making*. p. 61. Whitehead quotes from an early Christian compilation, called "The Sayings of Christ" found in an Egyptian tomb. The text is "Cleave the roof, and I am there."

was platonic; it followed John rather than Paul.⁸⁰ The moderns have lost their belief in the concept of God because the Christian church promulgated the return to the *Semitic Concept* of God, with the addition of the theological threefold personalities. To support it they invoked tradition. They hailed the inerrancy of revelation. They thus sanctified "ancient ignorance as revelation." They held that it was closed and final. They did not like their missionaries to be the servants of men. "They are the servants of the word of God, the divine grace is to be announced as a miracle, not as a bridge one may build, not as a sublimation of the natural, hence the missionary is not to fraternise nor accept the fellowship of fallen faiths.....and in no circumstances is he to howl with the wolves."⁸¹ Present day Christianity has transformed the gospel of love into a gospel of hate. "The fear of Lord is the beginning of wisdom."⁸² St. Paul adds "That in the flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power."⁸³ Whitehead holds that in the modern world if we want to find God, we must do so with the help of John and not Paul.⁸⁴

The two great interests of rational religion are its search for a comprehensive scheme of generic ideas and its distinct and realistic approach to the problem of Evil.⁸⁵ The first we have treated at some length. No religion which faces facts can minimise the existence of Evil. The reality of Evil is a patent fact today. We who live in a world where fear enters the door with the daily newspapers and the last radio-report in the evening creates a waking nightmare which slips unnoticed into the horrors of sleep cannot by any effort of imagination argue away the existence of Evil. The "passion-torn and the war-shattered world" before us has

80. *Religion in the Making*. p. 62.

81. Karl Barth.

82. Proverbs I, 7. Whitehead adds that this is an odd saying if it be true that God is love.

83. II. Thessalonians. 1, 8, 9.

84. *Religion in the Making*. p. 64.

85. Ibid. p. 42.

struck many as the greatest evil. Men have failed to see anything but evil around us. The present day huge wave of violence has not spared any people nor has it by-passed any country. The presence of Evil on such universal scale has made men sceptical about the possibility of good. It has given rise to the prophets of despair. They have lost faith in the doctrines of the perfectibility and educability of man. They hold that man himself has called his Maker's goodness into question. He has basely dishonoured his own nature, by his cruelty and ingratitude. The depressing drama of human history⁸⁶ has puzzled us into the question "How an omnipotent benevolent Being should form so foolish and vile an animal and still deem him to be "the crown of all creation" and as made in the "image of God." A rational religion cannot set aside pain, suffering and moral evil as illusions. Men have grown very sensitive to them and cannot be asked to be indifferent to them.

There is the extreme view that there is nothing which can be called intrinsically Evil. Evil is what we think to be disagreeable. "There is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so."⁸⁷ It is all a matter of likes and dislikes. Such a view does not give us any standard of moral judgment except that of our capricious and arbitrary whims and fancies. This lands us in an ethical hereticism. It goes against the moral distinctions which we cherish. Besides, the policy of non-intervention which this view advocates is impossible to adhere to. They recommend us to get rid of likes and dislikes and the illusion that there exists such a thing called Evil. Prof. A. E. Taylor argues that the very fact they hold that there is an evil to get rid of (the evil in the present case being the illusion that evil exists) leads to the acceptance of Evil. If there is no evil whatever, how can it be evil that I should be under the impression, that there are evils, and why should I trouble to eradicate that impression.⁸⁸ There is a very prominent

86. C. E. M. Joad observes:—A wise man will occupy his mind not with what is defective and changing, but with what is perfect and eternal. Mankind today is so unedifying an object of contemplation that one will be advised to think about something else. Mankind in fact is the improper study of man.

87. cf. Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. Act. II. Sce. II.

88. A. E. Taylor. *Problem of Evil*. p. 8.

view that Evil is Evil only when viewed from a wrong perspective. All evils are partial. What is really bad for one individual, proves to be good for the whole society. All that we need do is to follow with understanding the line of inter-connection. 'Partial Evil' turns out to be 'universal good.'⁸⁹ The stoics held that Evil is relative and we must put up with it. Such a view mistakes the "goodness of the consequence" of an act with the "goodness of the cause." They are two distinct things. It is one thing for an act to be productive of good, and another thing to be good in itself. Further it is no consolation for one part to suffer and to see that another part profits by it. "That the burnt child learns to keep away from fire is no proof that the pain of an agonising burn is not a bad thing. Still less can we argue that it is no evil that Johnny should be burnt to death, since his fate teaches Tommy and Dick not to play with matches."⁹⁰ The character Cissjupe in Dickens' novel put the matter clearly "the knowledge that only one person out of a million dies annually from starvation in the streets of London does not make such a fate tolerable to the one" that dies of starvation.

Whitehead avows that Christianity according to the message of its Master has faced the problem of Evil in a spirit of realism. This has been possible because of its success "in keeping its metaphysics subordinate to the religious facts to which it appeals."⁹¹ Christianity does not hold the view that the world is as perfect as God meant it to be. It does not take "refuge in the facile solution so esteemed by fortunate people that the sufferer is the evil person."⁹² Suffering is not always a sign or a consequent of sin. The Book of Job is a revolt against such a facile solution.⁹³

89. cf. Chrysippus puts "the worst sufferings, blunders and crimes of men are, in life of the universe, what rants, doggerel and bad grammar may be in a good play, sorry stuff, considered in themselves, but an actual beauty, when taken in their setting as contributing to a total effect." To find fault with their presence in the world is like censuring Shakespeare for the blunders of Dogberry or the vapourings of Ancient Pistol.

90. A. E. Taylor. *Problem of Evil*, p. 9 (1929).

91. *Religion in the Making*, p. 60.

92. Ibid. p. 39. cf. A similar interpretation of the 'Karma' doctrine is criticised by S. Radhakrishnan in his *An Idealist view of Life*, p. 275-181.

93. *Religion in the Making*, pp. 38-39.

In the first place Christianity admits the existence of Evil as inherent throughout the world. But it holds that such Evil is not the necessary outcome of the very fact of individual personality. It derives evil from the contingent fact of the actual course of events: it thus allows of an ideal conceivable in terms of what is actual.⁹⁴

Whitehead regards Christianity as offering us a way to overcome Evil by opposing it with good. Christ is the supreme example set forth for us to emulate. The metaphysics of Christianity has retained the easy power of development. It has built its metaphysics from the sayings and doings of Christ. It is from Christ's life that Christians have to derive their doctrines. The reported sayings of Christ are held to be not so much formulated thought, as descriptions of his insight. They are not abstract concepts, but actual ideas in the mind of Christ. He sees intuitively the relations between good and bad men. His sayings are actions and not adjustments of concepts. He speaks in the lowest abstractions that language is capable of, if it is to be language at all and not the fact itself.⁹⁵ Christ in his Sermon on the Mount and in his Parables undertakes no reasoning about facts. They are seen "with immeasurable innocence." Christ represents "the rationalism derived from direct intuition and divorced from dialectics."⁹⁶ Christianity is not a rigid system. It does not start with clear cut metaphysical axioms. It is less clear in its metaphysical ideas, but more inclusive of facts.⁹⁷

94. Ibid. p. 41.

95. Ibid, p. 46. J. M. Murry regards that Jesus is a genius. To the creative imagination of a genius was added in him the power to live and die for his vision of things to come. In him to the wisdom of the perfect teacher was added the love of the perfect brother. There have been men as Jesus, but none had his love. To be wise and to love is beyond all wisdom. He taught life itself and not how to live....." Speaking about Parables " he says " that the simplest of men could not misunderstand them, nor the wisest add to them....." Understanding is not the faculty by which Jesus can be known: but intuition; we have to seize in an act a greater spirit than our own, we have to pluck from the future the man of the future. Jesus can be reached if he can be reached at all through the man of genius alone. But he will be never understood." (p. 211). *The Life of Jesus*.

96. *Religion in the Making*. p. 46.

97. Ibid. p. 41.

There is some appreciable divergence between Whitehead's interpretation of the Christian view of the problem of Evil and the views of other religious Philosophers. The Christian view is that there are grades and different types of evil and that all of them are not of one class. Moral evil (that is sin) is considered the worst of all. Christianity and the great philosophers Plato and Kant are one in rejecting the doctrine of Naturalism. Both hold that "God brings good out of evil," but never make God the author of moral evil *i.e.*, sin.⁹⁸ Evils of some kind "minister fulfilling His words," but sin has no such place. "Sin is the most gross form of moral evil. It is different from ignorance. It has for its seat the human being's *will*. It is the result of the "wilful defiance" of the Lord and His words."

The philosophically minded professors of Religion point out that in the history of theology it is not for nothing that people subscribe to the view that there is a second and counter principle called Evil, which is responsible for man's sin. They thus pit God against Satan. They attribute Evil to Satan and limit God's powers.

The doctrine of Manichaeism is not without its defects.⁹⁹ The attractiveness of the theory is due to the opportunity it offers man to escape from his moral responsibility. There is Evil in the world, and if we could shift the responsibility for it on to some entity other than ourselves, we will not be held responsible for our acts. This theory "saves our face." It enables us to get out of owning the full shame of all our acts. It is impious to blame God for Evil. So it is attributed to an independent principle.

98. cf. Pope "If plagues or earthquakes break not Heaven's design, Why then a Borgia, or a Cataline." A. E. Taylor holds that earthquake may not be "breaking Heaven's design," but neither Cataline nor Borgia are ministers to God, but they are rebels.

99. St. Augustines explains in his *Confessions* "that the secret reason for his believing in the limitation of the divine powers by the existence of an opposing evil principle lay in his own pride. He regarded Manichæism as a heinous moral fault.

Mill in his autobiography reminds us that he seriously pleaded against the revival of Manichæism, because it flatters human vanity and relieves man of his moral responsibility.

How can human freedom and divine sovereignty go together? Once we grant that the origin of sin is in the rebellious will of men, we have to grant the freedom of the human will. The contradiction between a creator and his creation of free agents is only the result of a crude prejudice. There is nothing incompatible in the creation of free agent by God. It is an unintelligible position to hold that the creator only creates puppets. What is fatal to the belief of the freedom of human will is, in equal degree, fatal to the recognition of moral responsibility.

There is the question as to why the free will of human beings should behave in such a manner. To it there is no answer, because the question cannot arise at all. To ask it is to presuppose that there is some further ultimate root of evil behind the "will of man." There is no such thing beyond the human will. As Kant put it "What would be contradictory is that there should be a remoter cause behind a spontaneous act." Further, Kant says that though we cannot demonstrate that moral responsibility is real, we know not what to think of a man who seriously denies its reality.

Further, the theists of the world who believe in a personal God assert that the presence of a few evils does not go against the existence of a benevolent God. That the world is not created in such a pattern as to give us maximum convenience does not disprove the wisdom of God. Evil does exist in this world. Some evils are there as stimuli to our energy and intelligence and incentives to improvements. All that a theist can say is that the world which God has made is a world in which "there is nothing except our own moral evil which can prevent any of us from attaining the full stature of perfect man."

Whitehead holds that Christianity avows "that evil is not the necessary outcome of the very fact of individual personality. It derives the evil from the contingent fact of the actual course of events."¹⁰⁰ But many Christian philosophers find that the seat of evil is human will. Sin, Reinhold Niebuhr defines, "is rebellion against God. It is not the inevitable consequence of his finiteness

100. *Religion in the Making*. p. 41.

or the fruit of the involvement in the contingencies and necessities of nature. It arises from man's refusal to admit his creatureliness."¹⁰¹

Moral evil has its seat in the human will. The human will feels that it is not able to carry out its resolves. The human mind is, in the words of Freud, "a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement.....It has no organisation and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs according to the pleasure principle."¹⁰² It is this will that is responsible for all evil. It is the need of strengthening of our will that makes us pray to God. The human will and its strength are insufficient. St. Paul said "the good that I would I do not; the evil that I would not, that I do." We often know a thing to be wrong yet we can help doing it. It is in the weak and unsettled nature of the human will that sin grows. What we need is not an insight but a will to give effect to our knowledge.¹⁰³ "To know the good and pursue the evil has been the all too common characteristic of mankind."

Christianity does not claim to explain evil in a clear manner. It does not presume to do so. It gives us a way of life by which we can surmount Evil. It is concerned with overcoming Evil rather than with explaining it. It admits Evil and gives a plan to get out of it. What matters supremely is not the explanation of Evil but its conquest.

Baron Von Hugel's estimate of Christianity brings out the truth "Christianity conquered the philosophy of Greece and the power of Rome in a fair fight, and conquered above all because of what it achieved with regard to suffering. It did not conquer by offering a superior explanation of the facts. It refuted the two solutions of human suffering; Epicureanism and Stoicism.

101. Reinhold Niebuhr: *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. p. 17. (1941) Vol. I.

Further he points out that it is wrong to attribute the evils to which man falls a prey to specify social institutions and historical causes. It is to beg the question. These are revealed on close analysis to be no more than particular consequences of the evil tendencies in man.

102. Freud: *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. p. 104.

103. True knowledge always results in action. It is in this sense that Socrates defined virtue as knowledge. The Sanskrit term *jnana* means not mere intellectual conviction, but that knowledge which expresses itself in virtuous conduct.

See Gita Chap. XIII—Verses 7 to 12.

It refused Epicureanism because man cannot "find his deepest" by fleeing from pain and seeking pleasure however refined it may be. It refused Stoicism since both pain and sin are no illusions but intensely real. What it set against both theories was no theory, but the spectacle of a fact, the fact of a life in which "life's nettle was grasped and mastered." It pointed to the life of Jesus.¹⁰⁴

Whitehead, while admitting that the great rational religions of the world are Buddhism and Christianity, gives himself to a study of their differences. He indicates his preference for Christianity by detailing some features of Buddhism. He starts by avowing that in respect of the crucial question of Evil Buddhism and Christianity entirely differ. He does not stop there, but goes into the causes of the difference. Buddhism has a neat little system of metaphysics. It is a "metaphysics generating a religion."¹⁰⁵ The defect of a metaphysical system is the very fact that it is a neat little system of thought which thereby oversimplifies its expression of the world.¹⁰⁶

Buddhism starts with the "elucidatory dogma"¹⁰⁷ and passes on to facts. It is difficult to develop Buddhism, because it starts with a clear metaphysical notion and with the doctrines that flow from it.¹⁰⁸ It finds Evil essential in the very nature of the world of physical and emotional experience. The wisdom it inculcates is therefore so to conduct life as to gain a release from individual personality which is the vehicle for such experience. The gospel which it preaches is the method by which the release can be obtained. This release is not to be obtained by mere physical death. For Whitehead Buddhism is the most colossal example in the history of applied metaphysics.¹⁰⁹ It is strange that Whitehead should point out that Buddhism starts with the "elucidatory dogma" and passes on to facts. The

104. Baron Von Hugel: *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*. 1st series. pp. 98-116.

105. *Religion in the Making*. p. 40.

106. Ibid. p. 40.

107. Ibid. p. 42.

108. Ibid. p. 40.

109. Ibid. p. 39.

entire volume of criticism directed by rival systems of Indian thought against Buddhism is that it has no sound metaphysical background explicitly stated. Buddhism has built its metaphysics after the empirical investigation of the details of experience. It "points to the facts and asks for their systematic interpretation." This Whitehead deems is "the genius of religion." Buddhism certainly has it as much as Christianity. Whitehead is mistaken in thinking that Buddhism begins with a neat little system of dogmas and derives its doctrines thereof. "Buddha offers his followers a scheme of spiritual development and not a set of doctrines, a way and not a creed. He knew that the acceptance of a creed was generally an excuse for the abandonment of the search. Buddha's teaching begins with *the facts* of his enlightenment. Whatever doctrine there is in Buddha relates to the experience."¹¹⁰ Radhakrishnan points out that "Buddha was struck by the clashing enthusiasms, the discordant systems, the ebb and the flow of belief and drew from it all, his one lesson of the *futility of metaphysical thinking*. The salvation of the soul does not depend on minute distinctions of metaphysical conceits or the habit of restless questioning or the refinement of reason by the subtle disputes of sects.....whatever metaphysics there is in Buddhism is not in the original *Dhamma* but added to it (*abhidhamma*). Buddhism is essentially psychology, logic and ethics and not metaphysics."¹¹¹

Whitehead in observing that "It is difficult to develop Buddhism"¹¹² goes against the existence of four different schools of Buddhism with their distinct and unique metaphysics and epistemologies. There sprang up remarkable developments of metaphysics from the various schools of Buddhism. "All the different shades of philosophic theory—realistic and idealistic—are found within Buddhism itself; and we have so to speak, says Prof. M. Hiriyanna, "Philosophy repeated twice over in India—once in the several Hindu Systems and again in the different schools of Buddhism."¹¹³

110. S. Radhakrishnan: *Gautama the Buddha*. p. 21. British Acad. Lecture. (1938).

111. S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I, 353. (1929) IInd Edition.

112. *Religion in the Making*. p. 40.

113. M. Hiriyana: *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. p. 198. (1932).

Further Whitehead's observation "that Buddhism finds evil in the very essential nature of the world of physical and emotional experience, and that the wisdom it inculcates is therefore so to conduct life as to gain release from individual personality which is the vehicle for such experience"¹¹⁴ must be carefully examined. The ethics of Buddhism does not attempt an escape from the responsibilities of life.¹¹⁵ It is not anti-ethics nor world negation but enjoins strenuous ethical life. The individual ego from which release is sought is the unregenerate self, not the essential personality of man which has to be built through the effort of man. The true spiritual personality we have to build by effort and discipline. The self is something which evolves and grows, something to be achieved and built up by pain and labour and not something given to be passively accepted and enjoyed. We can become something different from what we are. The reality of the person is in the creative will. When we deny the clamour of emotions, stay the stream of things, silence the appetite of the body, we feel the power of the self within our own being.....To be egotistic is to be like rudimentary creature that has grown no eyes."¹¹⁶ The individual personality from which release is sought is the egotistic self. Buddhism too has given a way of overcoming Evil as Christianity. It has also an empirical approach to the facts of life.

114. *Religion in the Making*. p. 39.

115. Schweitzer observes that Buddha's commandment not to kill, not to harm does not arise.....from a feeling of compassion, but from the idea of keeping undefiled from the world. It belongs to the ethic of becoming more perfect not to the ethic of action." See S. Radhakrishnan's reply to it *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*. Chap. III.

116. S. Radhakrishnan: *Gautama the Buddha*. p. 28.

CHAPTER IV.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY (*Contd.*)

GOD IN WHITEHEAD'S SYSTEM.

The religious Philosophy of Whitehead is intimately connected with his metaphysics. It is not an afterthought. The conception of God is a strict and definite metaphysical requirement for his system. To understand the place of God in his system we must strive to study his thought as a whole. Further, we must note the relation, the flashes of his insight bear to his general ideas. It is no use rashly judging his conceptions by its congruence or incongruence with other systems.¹

Whitehead builds a Natural Theology on the basis of a scientific and speculative metaphysics. He holds that a speculative theology which is in consonance with science and metaphysics is possible. He is up against the scepticism that holds that finite reason cannot know all that is in heaven and earth. He does not recognise any limit to the powers of human reason. He affirms that reason can discern the truth of Reality. Reason for him is not a chance by-Product of the evolutionary process. It is a principle governing the entire universe. He asserts "that the ultimate nature of things lie, together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness." Further he holds that the universe rests on a few general principles. "Religious insight is the grasp of this truth."²

Whitehead is opposed to religious mysticism which dares not examine the contents of its experience. He stands for a rational religion which must answer the test of logic. A religion which claims exemption from metaphysics awakens 'just suspicion' in the memorable words of Kant.

1. For a clear summary of Whitehead's religious Philosophy see D. Emmet's *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism*, pp. 242-274.

2. *Religion in the Making*, p. 105.

We have observed in the last Chapter the defects that are incidental to the concept of a transcendent extracosmic creator, at whose fiat the world comes into being and whose imposed will it obeys. The concept that the temporal world is a self-sufficient completion of the creative act of an eminently real unmoved mover does not explain the problem of Evil. Besides Whitehead remarks that such a concept 'has infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and Mahometanism.'³ We have already examined how Christianity according to Whitehead's account stands for the concept of immanence and that 'God is a factor in the universe.'⁴ Whitehead avows that there is a fruitful suggestion in the Galilean origin of Christianity itself. 'It does not emphasize (the concept of God) as a ruling Caesar, or as the ruthless moralist, or as the unmoved mover. It dwells upon the tender elements in the world which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of Kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved.'⁵ Whitehead's God approximates to such a concept. He holds that his God follows the trail of his metaphysical thought. God is not introduced into the system from any religious motives. He takes his stand on Aristotle's conception of an 'unmoved mover.' He tells that his conception of God is as necessary to his metaphysics as Aristotle's to his system. Metaphysical considerations regarding the nature of God must be quite dispassionate. Aristotle, Whitehead holds, 'was the last European metaphysician of first rate importance who was entirely dispassionate in the consideration of his metaphysics.'⁶ In fact 'it may be doubted whether any properly general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other considerations get much further than Aristotle.'⁷ After Aristotle, Whitehead feels that Theological considerations have greatly weighed with Philosophers in the determination and description of the concept of God. He pleads that his concept of God arises out of the need for the completion of his metaphysics. 'The complex nature of Reality and its many sidedness,' Whitehead says,

3. *Process and Reality*. p. 484.

4. *Religion in the Making*. p. 61.

5. *Process and Reality*. p. 485.

6. *Science and the Modern World*. p 216.

7. *Ibid.*

demands a complex and a subtle metaphysics to explain it. Modern Physics does not disclose a simple world.⁸ So it is wrong for us to put aside the complexity of the inter-relations that obtains in the world. We cannot make an arbitrary choice of a few facts and a few simple notions. "It may be common sense but it is not true."⁹ There are two types of simplicities observed William James:—a thin and a thick one. We must take care to pursue the right type of simplicity and not be dictated by considerations of convenience. Our methodology must be a comprehensive one, as to embrace all facts. Our eyes must *rivet* on facts. We should not fly from facts. Every fact must be explained. We want an explanatory metaphysics and not one which leaves out recalcitrant facts. A simple methodology will not do. 'Some of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good methodology.'¹⁰ The evil of a simple metaphysics is that it leaves unexplained a great deal. There is a tendency on the part of a simple metaphysics to suffer from the vice of 'over simplification. Conclusions true within strict limitations have been generalised into fallacious universality.¹¹ Whitehead stands for a sound and complex metaphysics and does not trust mere simplicity. He lays down that the guiding motto in the life of every natural philosopher should be 'seek simplicity and distrust it.'¹² He starts his metaphysics with faith in reason. It is opposed to the view 'that the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without continuity, without coherence or orderliness

8. *Religion in the Making.* p. 64.

9. *Ibid.* p. 64.

Dr. C. E. M. Joad observes pertinently 'that there is no apriori reason, why the universe or (Reality) should be such as to be readily intelligible to a twentieth century mind. *Guide to Philosophy.* p. 559.

10. *The Function of Reason.* p. 8.

11. *Ibid.* p. 22.

12. *Concept of Nature.* p. 163.

Reason says 'The world is no blot for us
Nor a blank
It means intensely and
it means good
To find its meaning is my
meat and drink.'

or any other properties that are given.’¹³ The metaphysics of Whitehead is based on the complete faith that there is order in reality and that reason when it makes a strenuous attempt to realise it can do so. His observations on the concept of God are not in the nature of proofs. He says that “there is in (his concept) the mere confrontation of a theoretic system with a certain rendering of facts. But the unsystematized report upon the facts is itself highly controversial, and the system is confessedly inadequate. The deductions from it in this particular sphere of thought cannot be looked upon as more than suggestions as to how the problem is transformed in the light of that system.”¹⁴ With cautious humility he outlines the nature and function of God in his system.

The chief metaphysical category in Whitehead’s system is *Creativity*. Creativity is the pure, formless substantial activity. It is the matrix of Reality. It resembles the Matter of Aristotle and the ‘Neutral stuff’ of the Realists.¹⁵ There is the difference that Creativity is active and not passive. It is a homogeneous stuff with no character of its own. It is at the base of all actual things. “It cannot be characterised because all characters are more special than itself. But it is always found under conditions, and is described as conditioned.”¹⁶

But a mere boundless Creativity cannot account for the concretisation of Actual Entities. As Whitehead puts it ‘unlimited possibility and abstract Creativity can procure nothing.’¹⁷ The nature of Creativity is Protean like and it lacks determinateness. It is not actual in the sense that it has some definite qualities. It is there before all creatures it is not an entity but a general activity that underlies all things. This pure indeterminable Creativity does not account for the process. It needs determination and limitation by some principle. Such a principle of limitation is God. God is ‘the first created fact. All Actual Entities in fact are creatures of

13. Russell’s *Scientific Outlook*. p. 115 see also p. 123.

14. *Process and Reality*. p. 486.

15. *Process and Reality*. p. 42.

16. Ibid. p. 43.

17. *Religion in the Making*. p. 152.

creativity. God in so far as he is an Actual-Entity is a creature of Creativity. It is also stated that Creativity by itself has no character. Creativity the ultimate force becomes actual in virtue of its accidents. The purely indeterminate Creativity is turned into determinate freedom by the principle of limitation *i.e.*, God. God is the accident by whose virtue Creativity becomes determinate, actual and conditioned. There is no reason given for the accident. The specific mode in which the accident comes to be is not explained. It is merely stated that there is 'a certain arbitrariness about it.'

God is styled by Whitehead as an 'accident' of Creativity.¹⁸ Creativity to account for the course of events needs some primordial principle of limitation. Without taking to such a principle it cannot account for the Process of Reality. From the nature of Creativity, Whitehead says, we can give no reasons why God is as He is. But he asserts that we need God as a principle of limitation, to give shape and actuality to things. Hence, God is asserted as a Principle of limitation that is actual. Thus creative indetermination attains its measure of determination by the Principle of Limitation.¹⁹

In the formation of an Actual Entity diverse elements have to come together into a real unity. It is not any kind of combination that brings about the concretion of an Actual Entity. There has to be order and relevance to it. Mere Creativity and the world of Eternal Objects together with the multiplicity of Actual Occasions cannot account for creation. No order and system could be secured with them only. The protean character of creativity though it is the basis of all Actual Entity forbids us from considering it as an Actual Entity. It lacks in determination and so it cannot completely account for the creative synthesis of the several elements in an Actual Entity and the consequent emergence of novelty.

Here it must be noted that Whitehead conceives the Process of Reality not as a mere mechanical unfolding of things but as a creative Process which enters on novelty through order. The purpose of evolution is immanent as well as transcendent.

18. *Process and Reality*. p.

19. *Religion in the Making*, p. 82.

Whitehead does not consider the Process as complete and self-explanatory. Such a view would result in a deterministic outlook and cannot satisfactorily explain the emergence of novelty. So He is against determinism. He explains the emergence of novelty with the help of a principle which is not entirely a part of the process and at the same time not cut off from it. The mere presence of the multiplicity of Eternal Objects, the Actual Occasion, and an indeterminate creativity cannot account for the emergence of Actual Entities. Eternal Objects need ingression into Physical Prehension to become actual. This can be only done by the Principle of Limitation.²⁰ Apart from God (the Principle of Limitation) the remaining formative elements would fail in their function. The ordering entity God is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world. Such an entity is at the base of all actual things, and the general character of things requires that there be such an entity.²¹ God is the Principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity.²² The independent possibility becomes a definite actuality only through limitation.

God envisages the realm of the possibilities. It is He that determines the selection of the Eternal Objects that ingress into the spatio-temporal flux. He limits one amidst a number of possible worlds. Whitehead puts this as follows "we conceive actuality as in essential relation to an unfathomable possibility. Eternal objects inform Actual Occasions with hierarchic patterns, included and excluded in every variety of discrimination." This needs a principle of limitation. For the emergence and synthesis of an Actual Entity, 'some particular 'how' is necessary and some particularisation in the 'what,' of the matter of fact is necessary." If we do not accept this we cannot account for the Actual Entity. To account for it we have to admit a ground for limitation. "It provides the limitation for which no reason can be given. God is the ultimate limitation and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which stands in His nature to impose."²³ All reasons flow from it.

20. *Religion in the Making*. p. 90.

21. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 216.

22. *Process and Reality*, p. 486.

23. *Science and the Modern World*. 221.

“ God is not concrete but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, but that Nature is the ground of rationality.”²⁴ “ It is God who envisages the realm of possibilities and the world of settled fact so as to focus them on each occasion for the creation of something new. It is He that determines the ideal plans of events by the imposition of His nature. Without such divine control, sheer unlimited activity taken with the ideal world of infinite forms would be unable to achieve anything specific.”²⁵

Creativity which is boundless and prior to God. It is not actual. The general drift of Whitehead's idea is that the Primordial Nature of God and creativity are the complementary sides of the same thing.²⁶ God is the chief exemplification of the metaphysical system. He is not described in such terms, as to be construed as an exception to all metaphysical principles. His Primordial nature is the accident of Creativity. “ He is the unlimited conceptual realisation of the absolute wealth of potentiality. In this aspect He is not before all creation but with all creation He lacks in ‘ eminent reality ’ and is deficiently actual.”²⁷ He lacks ‘ eminent reality ’ because His Primordial nature is essentially conceptual. A mere conceptual realisation is not actual. It needs ingression. It lacks the fullness of actuality. Further the Primordial nature of God is unconscious. Apart from the complex integration of conceptual feelings with physical feelings they are devoid of consciousness. Hence the Primordial nature of God is held to be devoid of consciousness. This aspect of God has neither “ fullness of feeling ” nor ‘ consciousness.’ God is the lure for the feeling i.e., the eternal urge. He is relevant to each creative act. Whitehead sums up the primordial nature of God as follows: “ He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feelings at the base of things; so that, by reason of this primordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of Eternal Objects to the process of creation. His unity of conceptual operations is a free creative act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. It is deflected neither by love,

24. Ibid. p. 222.

25. S. Radhakrishnan. *An Idealist View of Life*. p. 321.

26. D. Emmet's Whitehead's *Philosophy of Organism*. pp. 252-257.

27. *Process and Reality*. p. 486.

nor by hatred. The particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance, of which it is the primordial exemplification. The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity of a primordial character."²⁸ The conceptual feelings that constitute the primordial nature of God exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and the subjective unity of the subjective-aim. The subjective forms of the primordial nature are values that determine the relative relevance of the Eternal Objects for each occasion of actuality.²⁹ It is this principle of valuation that prevents creativity from being a chaos. It is this principle that gives significance to it. It supplies formal conditions for the order of objects. The order in the incoming of Eternal Objects is determined by the primordial nature of God. God's primordial nature is described variously as the 'conceptual realisation,' the "envisagement" or the vision of the Eternal Objects. It is this principle that is responsible for the "order of values which is the reason for that rightness in things, partially conformed to and partially disregarded."³⁰ The primordial nature of God is compared by Whitehead to the "unmoved mover of Aristotle."³¹

Whitehead bases the argument for the existence of God on aesthetics whereas Kant derives it from morality. Further Whitehead holds that the line of his thought extends Kant's argument. Kant saw the necessity for God in the moral order. But with his metaphysics he rejected the argument from the cosmos. The metaphysical doctrine, here expounded (Whitehead's) finds the foundation of the world in the aesthetic experience, rather than—as with Kant—in cognitive and conceptual experience. All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order too is therefore an aspect of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God.³²

28. *Process and Reality*. pp. 486-487.

29. *Process and Reality*. p 487.

30. *Religion in the Making*. p 66.

31. *Process and Reality*. p. 487. Whitehead cites a passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and expresses some analogies to and some differences from his line of thought.

32. *Religion in the Making*. pp. 91-92.

The adjustments of things to their proper aspects is due to the principle of Limitation. Things have to be graded into relevance. 'The order in the world is no accident. There is nothing actual in this world without some measure of order. The order of the world, the depth of the reality of the world, the value of the world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life and the mastery of evil, are all bound together—not accidentally but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of form with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony which is God.'³³ The order in the universe, we are told, is due to the wisdom and the vision of God. The Primordial nature takes note of the 'valuation' process and not 'appetition.' Appetition is the urge towards the realisation of His conceptual nature in integration with the physical. God in his pure Primordial nature is not actual. He is deficient in actuality, because the conceptual realm is only one pole *i.e.*, the mental pole. It needs appetite. That is the urge towards realising itself in the physical world. The urge for appetite is the urge to become fully actual. This is effected by the integration of God's conceptual nature with the evolving events of the physical world. God then becomes fully conscious and actual. The evolving of physical events constitutes the physical pole of God. This is the Consequent nature of God. He is the principle of concretion. "He is the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation which is otherwise riddled with ambiguity."³⁴ "The incoming of the order of Eternal Objects in the temporal course of events is the consequent nature of God. It is God's immanence that is responsible for the order in the universe. It is order in Nature that makes the existence of Actual Entities possible.

God's consequent nature is responsible for the emergence of the novel element and the synthesis of Actual Entities. In this sense he is not the past to all members, but is the presupposed actuality of conceptual operations in unison of becoming with every other creative act.³⁵ The consequent nature of God is

33. *Religion in the Making*, pp. 105-106.

34. *Process and Reality*. p. 487.

35. *Ibid.* p. 488.

conscious, because it has integration with physical prehension. The conceptual *i.e.*, the Primordial nature is not so. "The Consequent nature is the realisation of the actual world in the unity of His nature and through the transformation of His wisdom."³⁶ It is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon His Primordial concept. But for this principle there would be no Actual Entity.

From this we understand that God has a physical pole. He starts from His mental pole, the world starts from its physical pole and grows actual by the ingression of the conceptual nature of God. God and the world need each other for their completion. one is incomplete without the other. There is thus a close interdependence between the world and God. It is God that saves and gives immortality to objects. He becomes actual, with the process of Nature. The world is His physical pole. The mixed-upness of Reality requires of God to rely for His completeness on the world. The completion of God's nature in the fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification in God. He shares with every new creature its actual world. The concrescent creature is objectified in God as a novel element. This prehension into God of each creature is directed with subjective aim, and clothed with the subjective form, wholly derivative from His all-inclusive primordial valuation.³⁷ God's derivative nature depends for its fulfilment on the creative advance of the world. The consequent nature of God is conscious. It is God's wisdom that effects the process.

The primordial nature of God *i.e.*, his conceptual scheme is unlimited. It is not actual. It is infinite and devoid of all negative prehensions. The consequent aspect of God is conscious, and actual and incomplete. It is finite and needs integration with the primordial nature. "God's goodness expresses the determination of His consequent nature."³⁸

Again it is the Consequent nature of God that is responsible for the concrete nature of the actuality. He is the principle of concretion. Whitehead's principle of universal Relativity states

36. Ibid. p. 492,

37. *Process and Reality*. pp. 488-490.

38. *Process and Reality*. p. 493.

‘that there is no entity not even God which requires nothing but itself.’ Each is all in all.³⁹ The creative advance of the universe accomplishes its actual actuality through four creative phases.⁴⁰ First of all there is the conceptual origination of Eternal Forms envisaged in the Primordial nature of God. They are deficient in actuality, but infinite in the adjustment of values. It is this Primordial nature of God that is responsible for the order, grade, and relevance in order of ingression into the physical object. But for it, there will be no determination. The second phase is the temporal actualities, which are actual, but need determination by conceptual ideas before they can be concrete or attain solidarity.

The third phase indicates the way in which God’s Consequent nature is responsible for the preservation of the immortality of the Actual Entities in the unity of His nature. God is the great preservative force. “He does not create the world, He saves it.”⁴¹ God is represented as having a tender care that nothing be lost, He preserves what deserves to be conserved. He uses and makes permanent by His power of transmutation ‘what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.’ God with infinite patience saves the passing world in the unity of His nature. This He does “with the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of His conceptual harmonisation.” “He is represented as the poet of the world with tender patience leading it by His vision of Truth, beauty and goodness.”⁴²

The Consequent nature of God illustrates the general metaphysical position of Whitehead that the problem of philosophy is not of *fluency* and *permanence*, but is of *actuality with permanence*. ‘Actuality with permanence needs fluency as its completion; and actuality with fluency requires permanence as its completion.’⁴³ The first half points out how God’s Primordial nature requires for its completion the derivation of His consequent nature from the temporal world. The actual occasions require the Primordial

39. *Process and Reality*.

40. Ibid. p. 496.

41. Ibid. p. 490.

42. Ibid. p. 490.

43. Ibid. p. 491.

permanence of God for preserving them. The temporal world and the factors in it get perfected and reformed by the fulfilment of the Primordial nature of God in His participation of the process of the world. This is spoken of as the appetite of God. Valuation and appetite are together responsible for the creative advance of the universe. Each temporal occasion embodies God and is embodied in God. God and world stand to each other in mutual requirement. In God's nature permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the world; and in world's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God. World's nature is a primordial datum for God and God's is a primordial datum for the world. The creative advance has for its supreme task the transformation of the disjoined multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition and contrast into a con crescent unity. For the advance of creativity God and the world stand in the relation of opposed requirement. Neither God nor the world can reach completion by its own efforts. Either of them God and the world is the instrument of novelty for the other. Creative advance which gives us the theme of religious cosmologies is a two sided act. On the one hand it is the dynamic effort of the world to pass into the everlasting unity of God's nature. On the otherside it is the static majesty of God accomplishing its purpose of completion by the absorption of the world's multiplicity of effort.

The Actual Entities after achieving their satisfaction do not die away. They pass into novelty and are preserved in the unity of God. It is in the unity of God's nature the self attainment of each Actual Entity becomes perfect. The immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into triumph. All the opposites are in the nature of things, and they are presented to us as a unified concept in the idea of God. "The concept of God is the way in which we understand this incredible fact—that what cannot be—yet is."⁴⁴

The Actual Entities require to be preserved in some unity. In every respect the world and God are interdependent and inter-

44. *Process and Reality*. p. 488-495.

penetrate. It is in God that everlastingness is realised. God needs the world in as much as world needs God. The order and the aesthetic harmony of the world becomes a part of the nature of God. As He is everlasting it is conserved in His non-temporal side. The relation between God and the world is expressed by Whitehead in a series of antitheses. "It is true to say that God is permanent, and world is fluent. It is as true to say that, in comparison with the world God is actual eminently, as that, in comparison with God, the world is actual eminently. It is true to say that the world is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in world. It is true to say that God transcends the world, as that the world transcends God. It is as true to say that God creates the world, as that the world creates God."⁴⁵ God's nature as 'everlastingness' is the apotheosis of the world. God is the principle of concretion by which the conceptual Forms become realised. This is effected by God's nature. God as wisdom is seen in His Primordial nature. Here with infinite patience He preserves the things and saves them from wreckage. His love is the cause that gives immortality to Actual Entities. Actual Entities require a God to preserve them. It is in the ever-enlarging phase of God that there is complete adjustment. "In it the complete adjustment of the immediacy of joy and suffering reaches the final end of creation. The end is the existence in the perfect unity of adjustment as means and in the perfect multiplicity of the individual types of self-existence. It is here the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into an element of triumph. This is the notion of redemption through suffering."⁴⁶ This represents the principle of God as love. In the everlastingness of God immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality. In the final phase the "perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation the love in the world passed into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world." In this sense God is the great companion—the fellow sufferer who understands."⁴⁷

45. *Process and Reality*. pp. 492-93.

46. Ibid p. 495.

47. *Process and Reality*. p. 497.

Whitehead is against determinism, because he believes in creative evolution. It explains the element of novelty in the process. It accounts for the emergence of values. In order to account for them he falls back on a type of platonic thought. The Platonic world of Forms or Ideas corresponds to the conceptual realm *i.e.*, the Primordial nature of God. The Forms represent the world of permanence. They ingress into the flux and get concretised. The Eternal Objects of Whitehead differ from the Ideas of plato. For plato the real world is the world of Forms. It is about Forms alone that we can have knowledge. The sensible world is reduced by plato to an appearance of Reality. It is not real in the sense the Forms are. The Forms have a very high degree of Reality. The assemblage and the collection of Forms constitute Reality. plato speaks of these Forms with reverence and attributes spiritual qualities to them. They are declared to be the goal of human endeavour and the object of human knowledge. The world of becoming *i.e.*, the sensible world is the world of semi-reality. It admits of contradictory description. On Plato's account we cannot have definite knowledge about it, because it does not exist. We have *opinion* about it. The aim of the philosophic discipline and religious endeavour is to lift the soul from the realm of 'opinion' to that of 'knowledge.'

A very important characteristic of the Forms is that they are the source of the particular things in the world. These Forms 'manifest' themselves in the particulars, and the particulars, get their existence by 'participating' in the Forms. Thus there is ingression of the Forms into the world of flux and the ingression gives determination to the featureless flux. There is a fundamental difference between plato's world of forms and Whitehead's 'conceptual realm of Eternal Objects.' Whitehead's realm of eternal objects is not existential, it is an abstract realm. It has no ultimate reality as the forms of plato. It remains only as a mere abstraction where it is divorced from the ingression into the flux of events. The actual world is the concrete occurrence of one of the many possible worlds. It is a selection. White-

head's world of Eternal Objects is conceptually realised in God's nature. "Such a position avoids the realism of independent existence as well as subsistence of Forms. The being of these Eternal Objects is not a ghost-like imitation of actuality, but consists in mere possibility. They are not the metaphysical forces generating the world, nor dynamic powers drawing men and things towards themselves. They are indifferent to their chance embodiment in existence and many of them may not have been manifested at all in existence. They are eternal in their timeless being. They do not cease to be when all else perishes. They are not imaginary or abstract, but identical and individual, universal and non-existent.....yet they are not efficient causes since they belong to the realm of pure being. The relation of Form to the temporal world is that of potentialities to actualities. The Forms and the temporal process require each other. The process can attain order and determination only by participation in the Forms, and the Forms exist as relevant to the realisation in the process of becoming.'⁴⁸

The comparison between Whitehead's line of thought and that of plato can be upheld to the extent that both admit the ingression of Forms in the actual world. Whitehead avows that the line of thought he develops in his cosmology is close to that suggested by plato in his *Timaeus*.⁴⁹ Creation for both is the emergence of a type of order out of a primordial indetermination. Both plato and Whitehead admit that creativity is due to the goodness of God. The world is the "best of all possible worlds." It is due to the determination of God's nature Whitehead points that the *Timaeus* of plato connects behaviour with the ultimate molecular character of Actual Entities. The origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal disorder. The evolutionary doctrine of the Philosophy of Organism is accepted by plato. He does not subscribe to the semitic concept of a wholly transcendent God creating out of nothing an accidental universe.

48. S. Radhakrishnan's *An Idealist View of Life*. pp. 327-28.

49. See A.E. Taylor:—*Plato the Man and His Work*, pp. 455-56.
and Taylor's Commentary on *Timaeus*.

Emmet's *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism*, Chap. VIII

See *Process and Reality*. pp. 129-134.

Plato cut new ground and perplexed the commentators by his doctrine of the evolution of a new type of order arising out of ingression of Forms into objects. The Forms give determination and shape to the featureless flux or stuff. The Forms are like moulds that give rise to objects through limitation. Plato conceives the process of the actual world as a real "incoming of Forms, into real potentiality issuing into that real togetherness which is an actual thing." Creation is represented in *Timaeus* as the incoming of a type of order, establishing a cosmic epoch.⁵⁰

Plato represents in his *Timaeus* God and Forms as distinct but coordinate realities. The activities of God are with the Forms. His knowledge of Forms gives Him the ideal or aim for His activity. God mediates between the Forms and the flux of becoming. He makes things after the likeness of Forms. God in Plato is called the Demiourgos. He resembles Whitehead's Primordial aspect of God. But we must remember that the God of Whitehead is a definite metaphysical entity with specific purpose. The God of Plato and His relation with the Forms is left very vague. While describing these facts Plato drops into the language of myth and metaphor. The relation is not envisaged precisely and God's function is not stated in full. It is clear that Plato explains creative advance as resulting from the ingression of Forms in the stuff of reality through the instrumentality of God. This is all what Whitehead means when he says that the organic philosophy repeats Plato.⁵¹ Though there is some similarity between the platonic tradition and the cosmology of Whitehead, the differences from Plato are not insignificant. Whitehead does not approve the Platonic bifurcation of Reality into the two worlds of Sense and Forms. Further, he is opposed to the doctrine that treats the world of sense as in some sense illusory or semireal. Plato's view that the world of Forms is an unchanging entity is not acceptable to Whitehead. Neither does Whitehead treat them as actual. They become actual only when there is an integration established for them with the process of Actual Entities. The strong tone of mystical experience which Plato envisages in the contemplation of the Forms is not countenanced by Whitehead. He describes

50. *Process and Reality*, pp. 131-34.

51. *Ibid.* p. 132.

mystical experience as 'slipping back' and as a type of atavism. There is no spirituality attached to the primordial nature of God in Whitehead.

Whitehead has much in common with the Naturalist philosophers. But he has his differences with them. He wants to derive more than what is found in the natural process. Reality to him is a creative process. The emergence of novelty he does not explain in terms of the Process. He posits the existence of a transcendental factor *i.e.*, the primordial nature of God. But his naturalist inclinations prevent him from investing them with perfection as Plato does. They too get their perfection by participating in the process. '*Time*' for *Him* is an ultimate reality in which everything happens. There is nothing besides the historical process. The process is purposive and the purposive activity of the process is characterised as responsible for the throwing-up of Emergents. The Naturalist philosophers found that the Mechanist hypothesis cannot account for emergents. It cannot explain the phenomena of *transformism*. Transformism is the occurrence of small variation, whose accumulation results in the gradual evolution of new species according to Darwin. Abrupt variations otherwise called *mutations*, and the metamorphoses undergone by insects could not be explained on the Mechanist hypothesis. It is the unsatisfactory nature of the Mechanist hypothesis that led the naturalist philosophers to vitalism.

Alexander is more like Whitehead than any other recent philosopher. But Whitehead is a little in advance of Alexander. Reality for Alexander is a process as well as a progress. He starts with the fundamental substance called space-time. He holds that Time is the mind of space-Time. Space-Time configures itself into materiality, certain material constellations had plunged into life, certain vital constellations had blossomed into neural patterns that carry what the human beings call their minds.⁵² Life emerges from Matter, and Mind from Life. The cosmic evolution is of the emergent type. Each stage is novel in kind and is never deducible from the earlier stage, although it grows out of it. A further quality exists beyond Mind called *deity* and the being

52. John Laird's Paper on Alexander's Theism. *Hibbert Journal* Jan. -1942.

that possesses it is God. The progress of the process is towards the emergence of this quality. The quality *i.e.*, deity is the *nisus* of the emergent pyramid ladder. The sense of *deity* "is the sense of a new quality above man to which the whole world tends."⁵³ The emergence of the divine quality of the deity is the aspiration and the yearning of religious minded men. The whole world process is now engaged in the production of the deity. "This is a stage in Time beyond the human. As Time is the very substance of Reality, no being can exhaust the future. Even God is a creature of Time."⁵⁴ There is the repeated insistence in Alexander that God the possessor of the quality *deity* is finite. God is not merely finite, but is also not actual. He is a tendency. "God is not actual, but an ideal, and only existent in so far as the tendency towards his distinctive character is existent in the actual world."⁵⁵ God exists only in the striving of the world to realise the emergence of quality *i.e.*, to help it to birth. Alexander describes God as "the power which makes for deity."⁵⁶ God in his actual state does not possess the deity. The quality deity is not attained by Him. But He is the only "nisus towards it."⁵⁷ Further the rich, variety and concrete nature of reality is accounted for by Whitehead by positing the mixed-up nature of things. A mere abstract space-time cannot account for the richness and variety of the emergents. It is difficult to account for the emergence of the various values from such an abstraction. In Whitehead's scheme the concretisation stands and accounts for the emergence of novelty. The conceptual forms ingress into the totality of the physical prehensions according to the determination of God and thus the Actual Entity comes into existence. Whitehead starts with a multiverse and not an abstract space-time. Metaphysically speaking Whitehead's God is not indictable but Alexander's God does not satisfy the metaphysical instinct. There is a sense of the miraculous in Alexander's system. It has a touch of the metaphysical romance about it. This in part is due to his anti-metaphysical bias.

53. Alexander's *Space Time and Deity*. Vol. II. p. 417.

54. S. Radhakrishnan's *An Idealist View of Life*. pp. 321-326.

55. Alexander's paper on *Science and Religion* (Broadcast talk) 1930.

56. Alexander's *Space Time and Deity*. Vol. II. p. 428.

57. Ibid. p. 418.

Both Whitehead and Alexander derive more from the universe than what it has. They conceive Reality as existing in Time. They assert the ultimate Reality of Time and refuse to go beyond the temporal process. To them Time is a quality of Reality. To them there is nothing beyond the historical process. So their God is in Time.⁵⁸ Among the naturalist philosophers Whitehead admits the subsistence of the Eternal Objects as transcending the process while at the same time he does not affirm their actuality apart from their concrete ingression into the physical prehensions. The admission of the transcendental subsistence of Eternal Objects makes them only a tendency and not an actual entity.

58. See S. Radhakrishnan's *criticism of Contemporary Naturalist Philosophers*. Chap. VIII. *An Idealist View of Life*.

See B. Bosanquet: *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*.

CHAPTER V.

Whitehead and Advaita Vedanta.

We have so far examined the fundamental tenets of the metaphysics of Whitehead and described his religious philosophy. Now let us take a measure of his thought in the light of Indian Philosophical systems. Such a study will greatly help us in assessing the specific contribution of Whitehead to metaphysics in general and Philosophy of Religion in particular. Before instituting a detailed comparison of his system with any definite school of Indian Philosophy, let us get at a brief account of the salient features and distinguishing characteristics of Indian philosophical thought.

Indian philosophical thought has a long history of forty centuries.¹ Over this period unaffected by any outside influence the ancient Indian seers developed their fine capacities to be 'in tune with the Infinite.' Their vision and experience, they have formulated with unsurpassed logical skill into systems of philosophy. The intellectual versions of the experience are the *darśanas*. Each school of thought has formulated 'a way of life' and has elaborated 'a faith for living.' The way of life indicated leads the aspirant to the realisation of the spiritual experience. Indian philosophical thought is not a matter of the past as the philosophies of Assyria, Egypt, Crete or Babylon. It is a growing and living civilisation. It has a "sound instinct for life, a strange vitality and a staying power all its own." If the Pagan religions of Greece and Rome gave us a sense of beauty and the largeness of life, Indian Philosophical thought has revealed to us the profound spiritual possibilities of man. To a world

1. See Max Mullers *What can India Teach us. Collected Works.* Vol. XIII. p. 6.

If I were asked under what sky the human mind has most fully developed some of its choicest gifts, has most deeply pondered on the greatest problems of life and found solution of some of them, which will deserve the attention of even those who studied Plato and Kant—I should point to India.

given over to the pursuit of power and passion, they affirmed in unfaltering accents the reality of the spirit and Its indwelling presence in everything. Spirituality is the central message of Indian thought. The search after spiritual experience which is infinite bliss is the goal of all schools of Indian philosophy. The distinguishing trait of Indian philosophy is its practical interest. It is not the result of the instinct of curiosity or the desire to develop the intellectual faculties of man. Religious experience and philosophic vision were sought not in the interest of speculative metaphysics, but for the light they threw on the ultimate significance of life.

The supreme need for philosophic vision and religious experience is established by the Indian thinker after a close and a careful examination of human life, its woes and joys. Vācaspati the great commentator of many a system of Indian philosophy raises the question about the need for the study of Philosophy and the acceptance of religious experience as the goal of life. He argues 'that if all that men want is only happiness, there are various means to it and there is no need to take to Philosophy.' If we want to be merry and avoid boredom 'let us learn to gather sloes in their season to sheer sheep, and draw water from spring with grateful happiness, and no longer vex our souls with impossible longings.'² There are a hundred ways to make oneself happy. Physical disease can be cured by medicine, a love affair might drive off our depression, enemies can be circumvented by diplomacy and spirits can be won over by charms.³ The states of happiness that result from these methods are not permanent. They are all dependent on the strength and the good condition of our sense organs through which alone we can enjoy them. These means to happiness do not always secure the end sought to be attained through them. What was successful once or in the case of one person may not be so at another time or in the case of another person. Even when the means prove successful, the satisfaction derived through them is only provisional in that it is sooner or later replaced by a desire for some other mode of

2. Powys' *Glory of Life*, p. 15.

3. Vacāspati's Commentary on *Sāṅkhya Kārika*, v. 1 & 2,

See S. Suryanarayana Sastri translation, p. 3 (third edi.)

satisfaction. Thus most of these goods are precarious.⁴ Medicines fail to cure, fortifications fall and let in the enemy. Diplomacy and spirit charms are double edged weapons. The remedies stated above cannot prevent the recurrence of the trouble.

A little reflection points out that no body would seriously maintain that life on this earth is so transcendently good that it deserves in itself, without reference to anything beyond, to be supported and perpetuated with delight. That may be the view of a few fortunate souls, but certainly they are unimaginative. Such a view in the words of Lowes' Dickenson cannot command itself to an enlightened understanding. "Too few of us, surely, attain the good even of which we are capable; too many are capable of too little and all are capable for a short time."⁵ So the supreme good of life is something more significant than what appears on the surface. There is a destiny for man more august than any to which he can attain in his life of three score years and ten.

The author of the Yoga Sūtra Patañjali sums up the nature of the pleasures in a significant aphorism.⁶ The normal appetites of men grow with what they feed on. With every satisfaction the want increases and subsequently it becomes a tyrant. Besides, the object of the desired experience leads to an obsessive craving for it. The craving gives rise to discomfort. This is not only true of instinctive cravings, but of major human passions also. It is the same with ambition and vanity. Besides, there is the economic 'law of diminishing return' operating in the field of pleasure. 'The more continuously indulged in a craving the smaller the satisfaction.' Hence, Patanjali concludes that on reflection the pleasures of human life and finite existence are not calculated to give permanent happiness "To the enlightened all is misery."⁷ The pragmatic and practical function of Philosophy is the distinguishing feature of Indian thought. It is this practical

4. M. Hiriyanna. *The Indian Conception of Values*. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Vol. XIX. Part I.

5. G. Lowes Dickinson. *Optimism and Immortality*. *The Hibbert Journal* Vol. I. Part I.

6. *Yoga Sūtra*. II. 15.

7. 'Duhkam eva sarvam vivekinaḥ.'

aim that is responsible for the blending of the religious and the philosophical in India. When Plotinus was asked what is Philosophy he answered after the manner of a typical Indian thinker "what matters most is Philosophy."

The various systems of Indian Philosophy no doubt differ in their formulation of their creeds and tenets. But there is this remarkable unanimity in the determination of the goal of Philosophy *i.e.*, its practical interest.⁸ European philosophical thought takes a different stand. The systems of the west aim at explaining Reality after the logical manner. It is man's essential nature not to rest satisfied till he understands his place in the universe and the universe at large. They make magnificent intellectual efforts to map out Reality and give a neat theory about it. The quest is for a comprehensive and non-contradictory account of Reality. The philosopher seeks Truth and not comfort. Truth is an intrinsic value and man is a solution-seeking animal. As Hegel put it 'it is only animals that are not metaphysical.' The systems of Whitehead, Alexander McTaggart are the daring expressions of the search for Truth. Their ideal is 'truth for truth's sake.' They are not touched by any practical interest. The aim and function of philosophy, Bradley holds 'is to seek and gain possession of Reality but only in an ideal form,'⁹ and J. S. Mackenzie adds 'that the mission of the philosopher terminates in the quest rather than in any action that follows it.'¹⁰ Prof. R. G. Collingwood gives us an exact description of philosophers. He writes "that the Oxford Philosophers were proud to have excogitated a Philosophy, so pure from the sordid taint of utility that they could lay their hands on their heart and say it was no use at all—Philosophy so scientific that no one whose life was not a life of pure research could appreciate it, and so abstruse that only a whole time student and a clever man at that could understand it? They were resigned to the contempt of the fools and the amateur. In Hogbens words they turned out to be 'a tribe of elegantly useless men, whose efficiency consists in the verbal clarity of obscure discoveries.'

8. *Nyāya Manjari*. p. 267. 'Āgamānām virodhepi, nātīva vidyate purusarthe sarvesam avirodhāt.

9. F. H. Bradley. *Essays on Truth and Reality*. p. 12 (1914).

10. Mackenzie. *Ultimate Values*. p. 26 (1924).

The Indian Philosophical systems take an entirely different view. They do not stop with the discovery of truth. They do not subscribe to the view 'truth for truth's sake.' All the values are subordinated and harnessed to the securing of spiritual experience or fellowship with God *i.e.*, Mokṣa. The other values, passions and possessions (Kāma and Artha) are means to it. The third value *Dharma* regulates and secures coherence. All these are only instrumental values and not intrinsic. Their purpose is to lead the soul on to God. The supreme joy is spiritual experience. 'The end of all learning, as Milton put it, 'is to know God aright and out of that knowledge to love Him, to imitate Him, to be like Him as we may the nearest, by possessing our souls of true virtue.' There is no joy comparable to spiritual experience. Every other joy fades into nothingness in comparison with it. Sage Āpastamba observes 'there is no greater gain than the true awareness of the self.'¹¹ The Gītā says 'that on gaining which one feels there is no greater gain' is Mokṣa.¹² It is the immense and the great. That is the *Bhūma*. The Upaniṣad declares that the great itself is to be desired. 'What is great is bliss, and there is no bliss in the small.'¹³ It is this experience that secures fearlessness *abhayam*. It is the goal of life. It is ineffable bliss and it is not attained through mere mediate knowledge. When the Upaniṣads describe jñāna as a means to it, they mean that it is a method. In the plenary sense of the term the experience itself is described as jñāna. The term jñāna is not a variety of mediate knowledge. It is in the words of Radhakrishnan "not conceptual reasoning, nor metaphysical perspicacity but is illumined being direct and immediate consciousness of Reality."¹⁴ The famous Śvetāśvatara passage refers to the knowledge of Brahman as (a Pantha) a way and not as an end.¹⁵ Every system of Indian Philosophy aims at some type of spiritual experience and not the attainment of an object. The experience is differently described

11. *Āpastamba Sūtras* 1, 22, 2 'Ātma labhāt na param vidyate.'

12. *Gītā* VI, 22. 'Yamlabdhvā cāparam lābham manyate nādhikam.'

13. *Chāndogya*. Chap. VII. XXIII. I. Yo vai bhūma tat sukham nālpe sukham asti, bhūmaiva sukham.

14. O Malley. *Modern India and West*. pp. 340-41 (1940).

15. *Svetāśvatara*. III, 8.

as ' nondual knowledge, bliss, Brahman, Paramātmān.¹⁶ Gautama in his Nyāya Sūtra, at the very beginning, points out that the knowledge of the categories helps us in attaining Mokṣa.¹⁷ The author of the Sāṅkhya Kārika holds the view that the knowledge of Sāṅkhya Philosophy helps us to destroy the threefold misery of life.¹⁸ The Dharma of the Mīmāṃsākas is held to secure welfare as well as Mokṣa (Abhyudaya and nissreyas).¹⁹ Spiritual experience in some form or other is the object and goal of the schools of Indian Philosophy. "Religion" thus "is more a transforming experience than a notion of God. Real religion can exist without a definite conception of the deity but not without a distinction between the spiritual and the profane, the sacred and the secular."²⁰ Most of the systems are agreed on the view that the final phase of religion is spiritual experience.

Whitehead's conception of religion and his description have a striking resemblance to the Hindu view particularly the Advaita view. He holds with the Vedāntin ' that religion is an experience of the togetherness of the various aspects of Reality.' He describes it as ' a transforming agency.' Religion is distinguished from other activities and its experiential nature is thrown into relief by contrasting it with Arithmetic. "We use arithmetic but we are religious."²¹ Religious experience is a complex phenomenon, but at the same time it is unitary. The religious consciousness ' though it starts from self-valuation, broadens into the concept of the world as a realm of adjusted values.' Religious consciousness gives us an insight into the complex pattern of Reality. ' Religion,' Whitehead holds ' is found on the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness, concepts whose separate relationships to facts and whose mutual relationship to each other are only to be settled jointly by some direct intuition into the ultimate character of the universe.'²² It gives us the integral vision of things.

16. *Bhāgavata* 1, 2, 11.

17. *Nyāya Sūtra* 1, 1, 1.

18. *Sāṅkhya Kārika* v. 1.

19.

20. S. Radhakrishnan *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. p. 21.

21. *Religion in the Making*. p. 6.

22. *Ibid.* p. 48.

Religion as experience is described best by Whitehead in a celebrated passage. 'Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within the flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal and hopeless quest.'²³

The above definition of religious experience recalls the Advaita Vedāntin's description of Brahman and Brahman realisation as laid down in the Upaniṣads. Brahman is something which stands 'beyond, behind and within the passing flux of immediate things.' The *Muṇḍaka* describes the all pervasive nature of Brahman "the immortal Brahman extending in front, is Brahman that is behind, on right, on the left, below and above."²⁴ The Īśā says that the whole world is enveloped in the self of the Lord. The Gītā echoes the same idea. "The universe is everywhere pervaded by me in an unmanifested form. All beings abide in me, but I do not abide in them."²⁵ Brahman is not merely 'beyond and behind' but 'is within the flux of immediate things.' This aspect of Brahman is a constant theme of the Upaniṣads. It is called the antaryāmi aspect, i.e., Brahman as the inner ruler of things and men. There is a celebrated section in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka which has the designation of antaryāmi brahmaṇa.²⁶ Sage Yājñavalkya instructs Uddālaka about the nature of the inner ruler. It is the basic text for the theistic schools of Vedānta of Rāmānuja and Madhva. "He who inhabits the earth, but is within it whom the earth does not know, whose body is earth, and who controls the earth from within is the inner ruler."²⁷ The section describes the indwelling presence of Brahman as the controller of earth, water, sky, air, heaven, sun, space, moon, ether, darkness and light. It concludes "He who inhabits all beings, but is within

23. *Science and the Modern World*. p. 238.

24. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*. II, 11.

25. *Gītā*. IX—V, 4.

26. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Chap. III, 7.

27. *Ibid.* „ III, 7, 3.

them, whom no being knows; whose body is all beings from within is the inner ruler.²⁸ Lord Kṛṣṇa says 'I am the soul, O Arjuna, seated in the hearts of all creatures. I am the beginning, the middle and the end of all beings.'²⁹ 'The Lord dwells in the hearts of all beings. O Arjuna, causing them to revolve by His mysterious power, as if they were mounted on a machine.'³⁰ On the basis of the antaryāmi concept Ramanuja builds his doctrine of the inseparable relation between Matter, souls and the Lord. The world of matter (acit), soul (cit) and God (Īśvara) are equally ultimate. The first two are absolutely dependent on the third. The dependence is conceived as that of the body upon the soul. Matter and souls constitute the body of the Lord.³¹ He is the sole indweller. He controls supports and utilises it for his own ends.³² The inseparable relation between these three entities is a unique kind of internal relation. The first two are subject to the restraint of the third in all forms. The first two are termed viśeṣanas and the third is called viśeṣya (substrate). The attribute cannot exist by themselves. They need a substrate. The complex unity (Viśiṣṭa) is Brahman. Thus an organic connection between the diverse aspects of reality is established. The unity achieved is not at the cost of diversity but the unity comprehends the diversity. Here distinctions are not denied but the organic unity of the whole is affirmed.

We have so far seen how Brahman is all pervasive and the inner ruler in the hearts of things. He is not only "behind and within the passing flux of things" but is 'beyond' them also. The antāryāmin concept and the all-pervasive nature of Brahman are the 'ceaseless self-expression' of Brahman. This aspect does not exhaust Brahman. If they did so, Vedānta would be a cheap variety of Pantheism. Further Brahman would be tainted in the process of the transformation. Though He is the ground of existence, yet he is in no way dependent on them His immanence

28. *Ibid.* „ III, 7, 15.

29. *Gītā.* X, 20.

30. *Ibid.* XVIII, 61.

31. *Bṛhadāraṇya.* 3, 7, 15 "Yasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni śarīram."

32. The intimacy of the relation is expressed in the following terms "niyameṇa ādheyatvam, niyameṇa vidheyatvam niyameṇa 'śeṣatvam. See Prof. M. Hariyanna *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* pp. 398-401.

does not exhaust His self. Lord Kṛṣṇa says ‘My spirit, which is the source of all beings sustains all things, but it does not abide in them.’³³ Further, it is indicated how Brahman is the transcendent highest and is non dependent on anything, while all other things depend on Him. The Gītā says ‘there is nothing whatever that is higher than I am, O Arjuna; all this is strung on me as rows of gem on a string.’³⁴ ‘And whatever things there may be Know thou they are all from me. I am not however in them.’³⁵ Brahman is thus independent of the world. Nor is he tainted by the activity of giving substance to creation. The *Kaṭha* observes ‘just as the sun (the eye of the whole world) is not contaminated by the external objects (which it illumines) likewise the ātman is not touched by the miseries of the world.’³⁶ It is self luminous. “The sun does not shine there nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings and much less the fire; when that shines everything else shines after that. By its light all this is lighted.”³⁷ We have so far gathered, that Brahman is the independent ground and the goal of existence. He is ‘beyond, behind and within the flux of immediate things.’ We shall now consider as to what exactly is the relation of the passing flux of immediate objects to Brahman? We have to know the nature of Brahman and the status of the world of plurality.

The Advaita Vedāntin’s definition of Brahman is clothed in enigmatic terms. The *Māndukya* describes Brahman “as unseen by the sense organs, unrelated to the things of the world, incomprehensible (by the mind), devoid of marks (which can be the basis of difference) unthinkable, indescribable, essentially of the nature of consciousness which constitutes the character of the self, negation of all phenomena, the tranquil, the blissful, the nondual.”³⁸ The *Kena* observes ‘there goes neither the eye,

33. *Gītā*. IX. 5;

34. *Gītā*. VII. 7.

35. *Gītā*. VII. 12.

36. *Kaṭha*. 5, 11.

37. *Kaṭha*. 5, 15. The same passage occurs in *Mundaka* II, 10 and *Svetāśvatara* VI, 14. See *Gītā* XV—6.

38. *Mandukya Upaniṣad*. I. 7.

nor speech, nor mind; we know it not, nor do we see how to teach others about it; it is different from the known and above the unknown.”³⁹ Yājñavalkya describes Brahman to his most diligent and perseverant interlocutor Gārgi, ‘O Gārgi, the knowers of Brahman say this immutable is that. It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither red colour, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor ether, unattached, neither savour nor odour, without eyes or ears.....’⁴⁰ King Janaka also is instructed in a similar fashion. “It is described as not this, not this.”⁴¹

The negative description is the only method of description that is claimed to be possible in respect of Brahman by the Advaitin. Brahman is described as being beyond “the word of tongue or concept of mind”⁴² for reasons that are strictly logical. The first reason for the inability to describe Brahman in positive terms is that there is no other entity in terms of which it can be described. We have to describe Brahman in terms of its own parts, which description is not only inadequate but is also not possible because Brahman does not admit of part and whole relation. It is impartite (akhaṇḍa).

The logic behind the negative description of Brahman becomes clear when we examine the presuppositions and the general nature of descriptions and definitions. Definition presupposes two entities at least. We must further indicate the differentia of an object from others. To explain is always to relate a thing to something other than itself, that goes before or after. There is nothing besides Brahman in terms of which it can be described. Hence, the difficulty to define it. Further, Brahman is the logical presupposition of all the things in the world. Description of all the entities in the world is possible because of the existence of Brahman. It is the reality of the world. It is the only *Satta* (the reality) that sustains the universe. Since it is the presupposition of all experience, it cannot be described. It alone makes

39. *Kena*. 1, 3.

40. *Brhadāraṇyaka*. 3, 8, 8.

41. *Ibid*. 4, 4, 22.

42. *Taittirīya*. II, 9.

descriptions possible. It is the one transcendent fact in which all other facts are held. Besides these arguments, Advaita thinkers have critically examined the categories of finite thought and have pointed out that they are self-discrepant notions. Śrī Harṣa in his *Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khāḍya* has employed the dialectical method to examine the definitions and conceptions of the various logical categories of finite knowledge. He has examined the concept of *substance*, *attribute*, *relation*, etc., and has convicted them of self-contradiction. The definition set forth by the logician is vitiated by one or other of Four fallacies.⁴³ Self-contradiction is the rock on which all the definitions flounder. The unintelligibility of each of the logical categories is based on the contradiction evident in the category of relation. The category of relation is central to all description and explanation. Let us take an example 'the rose is red.' Redness is predicated of the rose. The predicate must be something other than the subject in order to be significant. We have to face the question, "is the predicate different from the subject or not?" If it is not different it becomes identical with the subject and gets merged in it and fails to be significant as a predicate. If it is different from the subject, then it needs a relation. Now the question is, is that relation different from the terms it relates or identical with them. If it are identical, there is no attribute-subject relation at all. If the relation is different from the terms it relates, then it needs another relation to relate. If we admit the need for the link of relations it lands us in *infinite regress*. Thus, the contradictory nature of relation is brought about. Bradley's conclusion expresses the idea succinctly. The category of relation is a make-shift it is a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary but in the end most indefensible.⁴⁴ From this it follows that the relational is itself self-discrepant. Brahman is supra-relational. 'It is not an object of knowledge but is knowledge. For when knowledge is objectified the knower and the known are mutually alien. In such a case we cannot know an object, but only know about it.' Brahman is knowledge itself so, it cannot be defined in terms of finite categories.

43. They are. ātmāśraya cakrakā, anavastha, annonyāśraya—(self-dependence, arguing in a circle, infinite regress and reciprocal dependence).

44. F. H. Bradley. *Appearance and Reality*. p. 33.

We have so far seen why we cannot have a positive definition of Brahman. The Upaniṣads define Brahman with the help of a demonstrative type of judgment. It is called *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* (qualification per accidens). The several scriptural texts indicate Brahman but do not describe Him. The negative description is likely to be construed as a void or a barren abstraction. In order to avoid such an impression a few scriptural passages describe Brahman from the point of Its nature (*svarūpa*). It is described "as Reality, Consciousness and Infinitude."⁴⁵ The attributes described here are the very nature of Brahman. Though Brahman is one, its constitution is described in a threefold way, because the defects of the world can be roughly grouped under three heads: falsehood, inertness and or finitude and each of these is meant to be excluded by one element of the threefold description of Brahman.

The negative description of Brahman is interpreted by some as resulting in a bare abstraction bereft of all qualities. Brahman turns out to be a pure blank. Such a conclusion is based on the common sense notion which is at best a theory of the first look and not a product of logical thought. The view is based on the Nyāya Principle that there is no way of knowing (*Pramāṇa*) an attributeless being. An attributeless entity is as good as non-being. Śankara knew his critics well and anticipated the viewpoint of his critics. In his commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad he points out 'that Brahman free from space, attributes motion, fruition and difference, being in the highest sense and without a second, seems to the slow of mind no more than non-being.'⁴⁶

The nature of Brahman becomes clear by an examination of the relation that exists between the world of objects and Brahman. But the world has no reality apart from Brahman. Brahman is the ground. The Vedānta sūtra⁴⁷ declares that the world is non-different (*ananya*) from Brahman. The world is the consequent, Brahman is the ground. But here it must be pointed out that the Advaitin does not describe the category of causation as laid down by the Logicians. He refines, qualifies

45. *Taittirīya*. I, 1.

46. Śankara's Commentary on *Chāndogya*. Ch. VIII. 1—1.

47. *Vedānta sūtra*. II, 1, 14.

and restricts its application. It undergoes a considerable change at his hands. He does not admit that Brahman has transformed Himself into the things of the world (*pariṇāmavāda*). He is aware of the difficulties that assail such a position. Brahman would be tainted with the defects of the world. Acceptance of such a view convicts scripture of contradiction. Brahman is the *satta* the being who is responsible for the things of the world. When we refer to the world as effect it must be understood in a specific sense. Vācaspati, the commentator of Śankara, points out 'that non-difference (*ananyatva*) from Brahman does not mean identity (*abheda*), but the denial of difference.'⁴⁸ The effect is not other than the cause, but it is not identical with the cause. The world is the effect and as effect it shares with the cause the negation of 'unreality' and it differs from the cause in falling short of reality. Brahman is the sole reality and is non-dependent and self-explanatory. The world is not eternal and constant else it would not be an effect, nor would it require an explanation as the eternal is self-explanatory. Nor is it unreal (*asat*), in that case it would have nothing at all in common with Brahman and could not be its product. The relation between Brahman and the world is unique. Brahman is not dependent on the world, but the world is dependent on Brahman. The effect has no existence apart from the cause. But the cause is in no way affected by the effect. The laws behind the workings of Nature are expressions of Brahman's will. The causal rigidity that obtains in this world and makes the effort of the scientists possible is due to Brahman. The *Taittīriya* expresses the truth in a poetical language. "Out of fear of Him, the wind blows, through fear of Him the sun rises. Through fear of Him Agni, Indra and Yama speed."⁴⁹ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* describes more fully the dependence of the world on Brahman. 'O Gārgi under the mightly rule of this immutable, the Sun and the moon are held in their positions; under the mighty rule of this immutable, O Gārgi, heaven and earth maintain their positions; under the mighty

48. Bhāmati. II, 1, 14. na khalv ananyatvam ity abhedam brūmah, kim tu bhedaṁ vyasedhāmah."

The *tikā*:—Kāranāt prthak sattāsūnyatvam sādhyate na tu aikyaabhi-prayena.

49. *Taittīriya*. II.

rule of this immutable, O Gārgi, moments, muhurtas, days, nights, fortnights, months, seasons and years are held in their respective places.....⁵⁰ The law and the order that obtain in this world are due to it. There is no reality for anything in this world; only Brahman is real. Puṣpadanta in his praise of the Lord brings out the truth 'Lord thou art the sun, moon, air, fire, water, sky and earth, I know not anything that is, which you are not.'⁵¹ Brahman is perfection and is not a negative infinite.

The scriptural description of the world of plurality as māyā, does not mean that it is illusory and non-real. The entire Advaita dialectics aims at establishing an ontological and an epistemic status to the world other than non-reality. The world is not *asat*, as the barren woman's son or sky lotus, nor is the world a private world as the one we see in our dreams. It is *the world* which we all refer to and understand. In this it differs from the dream world. The entire Advaita dialectic works on two general principles. That which is real is not sublated.⁵² e.g., Brahman. It is ever there and it is the Real. The second principle is⁵³ e.g., the sky lotus and the barren woman's son. These objects are not at all cognised because they are absolutely non-existent (*atyantāsat*). The world of plurality is not real since it is sublated finally in realisation and in deep sleep every day. Nor is the world unreal because it is cognised. Hence it turns out to be not-real and not-unreal. Such a position violates the Law of contradiction. So it is described as indeterminable in terms of the real as well as the unreal?⁵⁴ Everything other than Brahman is within the jurisdiction of māyā.

On the ontological side māyā is represented 'as a beginningless positive substance capable of being destroyed by Brahman realisation.'⁵⁵ Māyā suppresses Brahman and shows up in its place the world of names and forms (*nāma rūpa prapañca*). These two functions are called *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa śakti*. The world

50. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. 3, 8, 9.

51. Puṣpadanta *Mahinnāstotram*. V. 26.

52. Sat cet na bādhyeta.

53. *asat cet na pratiyeta*.

54. *Sadasadbhyam anirvacanīyam*.

55. *Anādi bhāvarūpam vijñānena vitiyate*.

of difference is due to māyā. The identity of Brahman is in no way dependent on difference. Difference as a category is dependent for its intelligibility on identity and presupposes it. Hence difference is not basic.⁵⁶ Whereas 'identity' is not dependent on difference, it is basic, all differentiation is effected within it. Identity would depend on difference, for its intelligibility, if we mean by identity negation of difference (bhedaabhava). But it is not interpreted that way. Identity means its own nature (svarūpa). It is called *tādatmya*. Hence the primacy of identity and its ultimate validity.

Traditional exponents of Śaṅkara try to derive and define Brahman by negating the world. The infinite nature of Brahman is derived by negating the finite. They hold that Brahman is the negation of the world. They represent Reality and *existence* as antithetical principles. Brahman realisation is said to annul the world of plurality. The nerve of their argument is as follows: Brahman cannot be known through any *pramāṇa*, except by its *appearance*. The world of plurality is its appearance. It is by negating and annulling it that we know Brahman. If this was not so, Sankara would have given us, to start with, a description of Brahman and not a dissertation on superimposition (*adhyāsa*).⁵⁷

56. The category of 'difference' is criticised at great length by Vācaspati in *Bhāmali* 1, 1, 4. The summary of the argument is as follows. 'Difference' presupposes two terms because it is a relation; difference needs a locus as well as a thing from which it is differentiated. In technical language 'difference' is dependent on an *anuyogi* and a *Pratiyogi* (*anugoy Pratiyogi nirūpanādhina nirupanohi bhedah bhidyā māna tantratvāt bhedasya*). Is difference a nature of the thing (*svarūpa*), or is it an attribute (*guna*)? If it were the nature of the things, it would break itself into a number of things because of difference being its nature. Thus the process would go on endlessly and it would not even rest with the primal atom.

Nor can difference be the attribute of the relata. If it is so, then is the attribute different from its substrate, or is it of its very nature? If the attribute is different from the substrate, we have three units, the substrate, the difference which is its attribute, and the difference of the attribute from the substrate. Once we start the enquiry into the relation of the difference to the substrate on the one hand and the attribute on the other we are condemned to infinite regress.

The concept of identity in difference is also criticised on the ground that identity is basic and non-dependent on difference for its intelligibility. It is not so with the category of difference.

57. Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Vedānta sūtra*—introduction.

The importance Śāṅkara attaches to the method of negation is the significance of his celebrated *adhyāsa bhasya*. i.e., commentary on superimposition.

The method is set forth in a celebrated tag 'adhyāropapa-vādabhyam nisprapañcam prapancyate'⁵⁸; superimposition and sublation are the two steps in the art of self-realisation. The superimposition i.e., the āvaraṇa aspect of māyā is not a conscious act. It is beginningless (ānadi). Nobody consciously mistakes Brahman for the world of plurality. The superimposition is actual and a present fact. Māyā is the state of normal human activity. Superimposition is not a conscious act, and it is presupposed in all our activities. Śāṅkara holds that all human and vedic knowledge presupposes it.⁵⁹ The withdrawal (apavāda) is a conscious act. Now the question is as to how the world is negated. It cannot commit suicide. On this view the world of things and men ceases to have any significance. It is reduced to an illusion and placed on a par with the dream world. Further it leaves unexplained the law abiding nature of the world.

To the upholders of philosophic unity, the traditional position stated above admits of improvement. No doubt Reality is one i.e., the secondless being. The world is a section and a semblance of it. In the section there cannot exhypothesis be presented a synoptic view of the world, but the whole cannot but be in the part too, informing it, while sustaining it. "The appearance is neither entirely an appearance, nor has it a distinct reality in a fantastic realm of its own. It is real; but its reality it derives from and is reducible to the absolute."⁶⁰ In the words of Radhakrishnan 'the world is not so much negated as reinterpreted. It is transfigured in the intuition of Brahman.' 'Unreal the world is, illusory it is not.'

If the world is illusory, our laudable attempt to realise ourselves through methods like instruction, reflection and contemplation

58. The authorship of the saying is not known, but it is quoted by Mandana in *Brahma siddhi* p. 26—Edited by M. M. S. Kuppaswami Sastri.

59. *Introduction* in Śāṅkara's Commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*. "tas-māt avidyāvisayanyeva pratyaksādinī pramāṇāni sāstranīca."

60. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. *An Advaitin's plea for continuity*. Journal of Madras University. Vol. X No. 1.

would be of no value. If our world is unrelated to Brahman, love, wisdom and asceticism could not prepare us for that life. There is definite instruction and exhortation in the Upaniṣads asking us to transcend nescience in this very life within the world of space-and-time. If they were not well settled causes, they cannot be depended on in our attempt for Brahman realisation. All ethical endeavour will lose its significance. It is because of the reality in appearances there is order and rule of law in Nature. "Reality and Appearance are not to be set against each other as metaphysical contraries. Nothing on earth is utterly perfect or utterly without perfection. Those who have the vision of perfection strive continually to increase the perfection and diminish the imperfection."⁶¹ Śaṅkara points out "that this whole multiplicity of creatures existing under name and form, and in so far as it has the supreme being itself for its essence is true; if regarded as self-dependent it is untrue."⁶² The world for the Vedāntin is not an illusion. It exists. 'It is real not in being ultimate, but in being a form, an expression of the ultimate.'⁶³

From the above description it follows that Brahman is not an abstraction, nor a 'spurious infinite' to use a phrase of Hegel. 'If the world is illusory, Brahman would be a 'negative infinite,' and a pure nothing. 'By knowing it we come to know everything.' The Absolute includes the finite. It is the self-determining principle which manifests itself in all determinations of the finite without losing the unity with itself. The Absolute involves the diversified universe, as the universal involves the particular.⁶⁴ Thus we find Brahman to be something that "which stands beyond, behind, and within the passing flux of immediate things."

In the second part of the definition of Whitehead, he defines religious experience as "something which is real yet waiting to be realised, something which is a remote possibility and yet the

61. S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. p. 31.

62. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Chānd.* VI, 3, 2.

63. S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. p. 31
Sarvam ca nāmarupadivikara jātam, sadātmana eva satyam, svatas tu anrtam.

64. S. Radhakrishnan. *Ethics of Vedānta*. See *International Journal of Ethics*. Jan. 1914 and July 1914.

greatest of present facts.”⁶⁵ These words again echo the creed of the Advaitin. Brahman realisation is not an ecstatic flight to some distant land. The charter of Hinduism says ‘that thou art’ and not ‘that thou wilt become.’ The empirical soul (jīva) is in essence Brahman. Brahman realisation is not something that is produced *anew*. It is there waiting to be realised by persistent vigilance. It is the art of self-discovery. In the words of Vidyāranya it is like the laying of one’s hand on a forgotten golden ornament which is all the time resting on one’s neck. Realisation is *not derivative*. It is *native* to the soul. “Brahman is present because He is eternal and is not dependent on the effort of Human beings.”⁶⁶ It is real, but not realised as yet. It is a making known, not a bringing into being. What is dim is to be clarified and consolidated into a definite vision. It is ‘an effort to unveil the deepest layers of man’s being and get into enduring contract with it. It is an experience and not a mere knowledge. It is an act of awareness. It is the realisation of a perfection, which affords us a standard by which the human is seen to be faulty and the changing to be inadequate. If spiritual realisation is something produced it is bound to go the way of all the objects that have originated in space-time. Realisation is eternal. ‘That which is eternal cannot be achieved by action.’⁶⁷ As the Gītā puts it ‘the unreal never is, the real never is not.’⁶⁸

Though spiritual realisation is ‘the greatest of the present facts, *yet it is a remote possibility*.’ Man by nature is a many levelled being. He is finite as well as infinite. He endeavours after perpetual happiness and is still aware of his limitations. It requires a mighty effort on the part of man to turn inwards. The *Chāndogya* declares ‘that all beings visit Brahman-world, day after day but none realises it.’⁶⁹ The *Kaṭha* points out that only a few can achieve religious experience. The man of religion is a rarity. ‘It is hard for many even to hear (about Brahman);

65. *Science and the Modern World*. p. 238.

66. Śaṅkara commentary on *Vedānta Sūtras*. 1, 1, 1.

“Bhūtam Brahma jignyaśyam nityat vāt na puruṣa vyāpara tantram.”

67. *Mundaka* II, 12 “Nāstyakrtah kṛtena.”

68. Gītā II, 16.

69. *Chāndogya*. VIII—III—2.

many fail to understand even though they hear, a marvel is he that can teach it and lucky is its obtainer—a marvel is he that knows it, when taught by the wise.’⁷⁰ The Gītā echoes the view ‘among thousands of men scarcely one strives for perfection, and of those who strive and succeed scarcely one knows the truth.’⁷¹ In another verse the Lord says it is hard to meet a *mahatma* who has the realisation that Lord Vāsudeva is all.⁷² The Vedāntin holds that with great effort and jñāna man can have spiritual realisation.

Avidyā (ignorance) is the root cause of all the troubles. It is ignorance that is responsible for our separatist feelings. It brings about the split personality, which our intellectuality perpetuates. We thus cut ourselves away from the fundamental Reality that we are. It is at this stage that we forget what our true self is, and we mistake it for our empirical personality. The true self is the persisting self which is the universal seer to all things seen, it is present in all, yet distinct from all. It is the source of the sense of identity through numerous transformations. It remains itself though it sees all things.....Though itself inconceivable, it is the ground and conceiving of every act of knowledge. Even he who denies it presupposes it in so far as he thinks. It is not an organ or a faculty but that which vivifies and disposes every organ and every faculty, the vast background of our being in which all organs, intellect and will lie. Body, mind, and the world are almost arbitrary restrictions imposed on this consciousness.’⁷³ Because of *Avidyā* the universal self is obscured. So we confuse it with the empirical self. In the language of the Upaniṣad ‘when the good (śreyas) and pleasant (preyas) are presented to men, the blandishments of Nature attract the weak soul and he chooses the pleasant through avarice and attachment.’⁷⁴ Men in the unregenerate state can never hope to realise the self. Most men and women love above all the

70. *Kaṭha*. I, II, 7.

71. *Gītā* VII—3.

72. *Gītā* VII—19.

73. S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thoughts*. pp. 26-27.

74. *Kaṭha*. I, II—1 and 2.

pleasures of a life of indolence. They are torn by passions and weakened by distractions. Distractions and passions cut us away from the true self. In the words of A. Huxley 'disinterestedness helps us to break our unregenerate self-hood. It is this self-hood that constitutes, the most heavy and hardly translucent substance which cuts off most of the light of Reality and distorts what little it permits to pass. The Upaniṣad explains how 'the self-existent pierced the openings of the senses outward,' with the result that men look outwards and not within. The self is perceived by those few who desiring immortality turn their eye inwards and see the self.'⁷⁵ The self is concealed in all things and does not therefore appear to be there. But it is seen by the keen-sighted, with the help of a sharp penetrating intellect.'⁷⁶ The path of self-realisation 'is like the sharp edge of a razor difficult to cross and hard to tread.'⁷⁷

Whitehead describes religious experience as that '*which gives meaning to all that passes, something whose possession is the final good and which is the ultimate ideal.*' The Upaniṣad speaks the same language. Yājñavalkya describes Brahman realisation 'as the supreme attainment the supreme glory, the highest world and the supreme bliss.'⁷⁸ "The Bliss and the joy which human beings enjoy is but a particle of this joy."⁷⁹ The very sage instructs his wife Maitreyī that all the joys of the world arise out of the love for Brahman. Towards the end of his long dialogue he concludes "that not for the desire of everything, is everything desired, but for the love of the self everything is desired. It is this realisation that secures *abhaya* (freedom from fear). King Janaka thanks his preceptor for having made that known to him

75. *Kaṭha*. II, I, 1.

76. *Ibid.* I, III—12.

77. *Ibid.* I, III—14.

78. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. IV, 3, 32.

eṣāṣya paramā gatiḥ
eṣāṣya paramā sampat
eṣāṣya paramā lokah
eṣāṣya parama anandah.

79. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 4, 5.

‘ which frees from fear.’⁸⁰ Fear arises from the existence of the second.⁸¹ The individual enveloped by *avidyā* mistakes the worldly joys for the real joy. The Upaniṣads describe that it is not, without difficulty and effort men can have spiritual experience. Bliss or *śānti* is the state of the man who has realised *Brahma*.

Whitehead’s description of peace brings out all the implications and significance of that state. “Peace is not the negative conception of anaesthesia. It is a positive feeling which crowns the ‘life and motion’ of the soul. It is hard to define and difficult to speak of. It is not a hope for the future nor is it an interest in present details. It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight unverbaised and momentous in its co-ordination of values. Its first effect is the removal of the stress of acquisitive feelings arising from the soul’s pre-occupation with itself. Thus peace carries with it a surpassing of personality. There is an inversion of relative values.....”⁸² “Its emotional effect is subsidence of turbulence which inhibits. More accurately it preserves the springs of energy and at the same time masters them for the avoidance of paralysing distractions. The experience of peace is largely beyond the control of purpose. It comes as a gift ⁸³.....Peace is the removal of inhibition and not its introduction. It results in a wider sweep of conscious interest. It enlarges the field of attention. Thus peace is self-control at its widest—at the width where the ‘self’ has been lost and interest has been transferred to co-ordinations wider than personality. Peace is a barrier against narrowness. One of

80. *Ibid.* 4, 2, 4,

81. *dvitīyād vai bhayam bhavati. abhayam vai prāptosi.*

82. There is a famous verse which describes the outlook of the soul who has attained *Brahman*-realisation. “Considerations of mine and thine weigh only with the little minded, to the large-hearted the whole world is a single house-hold”

“*ayam nijaḥ paro veti gaṇana laghu-cetasām:
Udāra-caritānāmtu vasudhaiva kutumbakam.*”

83. On the realisation of the eternal beatitude, one no longer worris “have I done aught that is sinful, or neglected aught that is good.” (*etam hi vava na tapati kimaham sādhu nākaravam kimaham pāpamakaravam iti*)—*Taitt Upaniṣad* II—9.

its fruits is, that passion whose existence Hume denied, the love of mankind as such.”⁸⁴

Whitehead's conception of peace is in most respects the same as that of the Upaniṣad. The metaphysical presuppositions of his system are responsible for certain differences. He conceives the concept of peace as dynamic. Progress is admitted as indefinite. The Vedāntin distinguishes between progress and perfection. The Absolute does not admit of progress but is perfect. Progress is within the Absolute and not of it. Peace, Whitehead defines 'is not the indefinite repetition of a perfected ideal. Staleness sets in. And this fatigue is nothing other than the creeping growth of anaesthesia.....thus there is a paralysis of surprise. And apart from surprise intensity of feeling collapses. Decay transition, loss displacement belong to the essence of creative advance..... Peace keeps vivid the sensitiveness to the tragedy and it sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the level of surrounding facts.”⁸⁵ The dynamic concept of Reality and the belief in the ultimate reality of Time are responsible for the dynamic view of peace envisaged by Whitehead. He takes the temporal order of events as a fundamental character of Reality. There is nothing beyond the historical process. The evolution proceeds in the historical process through the complex interaction of several factors. The Vedāntin points out that the concept of progress is limited and is possible only in the empirical world of facts. The concept is not free from defects. It is not inevitable, but due to man's effort. Progress belongs to the historical and temporal process. The purpose of history and the full realisation of the true nature of the individual is not completely achieved in the historical process and time order. Perfection is different from progress.⁸⁶ 'Perfection is in the eternal

84. See *Kaṭha*. I, II, 23. The ātman cannot be attained by the study of the Vedas, nor by intellect, nor even by much learning, by him it is attained whom it chooses—this his (own) ātman reveals its own form.”

85. *Adventures of Ideas*. pp. 368-69.

86. *Philosophy* (British Institute Journal); (1938).

S. Radhakrishnan. *Spiritual Values and Progress*.

See S. S. Suryanarayana *Advaita and the Concept of Progress*. J.O.R. Vol. XI.

not in the everlasting. Time is real only as the vehicle of values. Values abide and things endure." Spinoza held 'by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.'

Further perfection refers to the ultimate depth of one's own being. Progress as a concept is intelligible only when viewed in the light of purposes. Things only change. Progress and regress is the character we ascribe to them in the light of our purposes. Purposes are manifold, and they are subjective. One man's goal is another man's *mirage*. Progress is possible because of the perfection of Brahman. The supreme bliss is perfection and it makes all progress possible. Some of our contemporary philosophers in their passion to be ever on move in any direction at any cost, so long as the change is rapid and gives scope to their unwearied energy, have not only got their gods on the move, but also envisaged a dynamic peace. The perfection of self-realisation is criticised by some as non-moral because it admits of no distinction of good and evil. It is a state beyond good and evil. Such a position is not an invitation to practice unethical conduct. The distinction of good and evil presupposes a world of individual selves. Morality and its distinctions are significant only in the relative world and not in the Absolute. When one transcends the separatist feeling, the delimited nature of man, he feels one with the whole world, and in that state these distinctions have no meaning. They are the results of self-consciousness. The *Mahābhārata* exhorts the spiritual aspirant "to give up good and evil, truth as well as untruth. Having given up truth and untruth give up the consciousness that you have given them up."⁸⁷ But as a rule those that are "begotten of God cannot sin." It is the realisation of the fundamental oneness that leads to the fellowship with human beings. Ethical conduct and ritual at best are aids to spiritual realisation and do not effect redemption. The good life is the *sine qua non* of Godly life. Morality is the road to spiritual realisation. Perfection is defined by the word (*Śānti*) peace. Self-realisation is not a type of inactivity. Self-realisation is represented as an ocean of joy and there is no beyond for it.

87. *Mahābhārata*. XII. pp. 337-40.

Whitehead's celebrated definition of religious experience is in many respects similar to the Vedāntin's view. Both are agreed that spiritual experience is the goal of religion and that it cannot be attained by the method of logic unaided by intuition. The state of religious experience is described in the same manner. The concept of religion as experience is the most rational way to conceive it. Religion as experience goes under the name of mysticism. Mysticism insists that spiritual experience is central to religion. It is scientific and humanistic. It is scientific because in the last resort it rests on verifiable truths and 'not correct solutions of creedal puzzles. It rests more upon experience than doctrines. 'It is not opposed to science or reason. It is not contingent on any events past or future. No scientific criticism or historical discovery can refute it as it is not dependent on any impossible miracles or unique historical revelations. Its only apologetic is the testimony of spiritual experience. It is not committed to the authenticity of any documents or the truth of any stories about the beginning of the world or the prophecies of the end.'⁸⁸ Besides there is nothing supernatural about it. It is the development of the essential in man. Mysticism is opposed to dogmatism on the one hand and to Naturalism on the other. Naturalism looks upon the world of sense and matter as the only kind of existence, and the mechanical law of causation as the only law; the tangible and visible as the only evidence and the scientific method as the only way of knowing the truth. Mysticism admits that there is at the heart of the universe a mysterious element. A detailed and full description is not possible in terms of scientific categories. Whitehead observes "The certainties of science are a delusion. They are hedged around with unexplored limitations.....Whenever some new mode of observational experience is obtained the old doctrines crumble into a fog of inaccuracies."⁸⁹ "It (Human thought) only dimly discerns, it misdescribes and wrongly associates. But always there remains the same beacons that lure. Systems, scientific and philosophic, come and go. Each method of limited understanding is at length exhausted. In its prime each system is a

88. S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. pp. 294-295.

89. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 198.

triumphant success: in its decay it is an obstructive nuisance. The transition to new fruitfulness of understanding is achieved by recurrence to the utmost depths of intuition."⁹⁰ Mysticism is opposed to dogmatism. Prof. A. C. Bradley observes 'that in the end there must be mystery for us, the claim to possess the whole truth, to know what God is as God Himself knows it, is that blasphemy of the abstract mind against which we have to be constantly on the guard.'⁹¹ Mysticism is opposed to dogmatism because it talks as if it knew all about God. They do not realise the limitations of scientific categories.

We have so far examined the nature of religious experience which is the supreme goal of life as defined by Whitehead by comparing it with the Vedāntin's account. Now let us examine how far the God of Whitehead answers the religious needs of men.

90. *Ibid.* pp. 203-204.

91. A. C. Bradley. *Ideals of Religion*. p. 156.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION AND THE CONCEPT OF GOD.

Metaphysics, on Whitehead's view, is descriptive of experience and is based upon a penetrating insight rather than on logical proofs. He does not offer any proofs for the existence of God in the traditional style. Nor does he think that proofs are possible. The fundamental categories of his metaphysics: Potentiality, Creativity, Actual-Entity, Eternal Objects, Purpose, Order require the concept of God for their logical completion. God is treated as the other categories are. He is not only the completion of the system, but also the supreme instance of it. Whitehead's theodicy is dictated by his metaphysics.

The abstract God of the metaphysician at best satisfies the logical need of men at the stage of self-consciousness. It gives us a cold concept, which affords no enlightenment to the perplexed and no consolation to the distressed minds. Whitehead has for his model Aristotle who derives his God from the principles of his metaphysics. The God of Aristotle is the unmoved Mover contemplating His thoughts. He has no physical activity, because He is not a material object. His immateriality rules out the possibility of physical activity. Still He is necessary to explain two things that are imperishable, *e.g.*, Time and Change. Time cannot have come into being and cannot cease to be since that would mean that there was a Time before Time was, and that there will be time after Time has ceased. And Change being continuous with Time is concomitant. For a continuous Change, there must be something to produce it. The platonic Forms are not capable of producing eternal motion. A mere power to produce eternal motion is not enough. Its essence must be not mere power but actuality, otherwise it would be possible for it not to exercise this power, and change would not be eternal nor everlasting. Such an actual power must be an immaterial substance. He is named God. He effects motion and change without physical touch. He effects causation by being an object of desire. In

the words of Prof. W. D. Ross "Aristotle's God is the efficient cause of the world by being the final cause and in no other way. "God is that being which combines self-dependent existence, with freedom from all change."¹

Whitehead follows Aristotle's model and posits a God who is free from theological associations and is part and parcel of his metaphysics. He starts with a metaphysical doctrine that conceives Reality as an interrelated process. He pleads that the conception of 'Law must be construed as immanent' and not as imposed on the world.' The conception of 'Law as imposed' dominated traditional theology for a very long time.² Newton stated that the correlated mode of the behaviour of bodies forming the solar system required God for the imposition of the principles on which all depended. Descartes, Galileo and Newton subscribed to this doctrine. Though Whitehead showers a good deal of praise on 'the doctrine of Law as imposed,' he is not in favour of it.³ He holds that theological beliefs created a gap between the world and God. The world was to derive its reality from the imposed will of a transcendent God. The Laws of nature rested for the theologians on the "accidents of the will of God" and "not on the necessities of His nature." Thus the nature of God was exempt from all the metaphysical categories which applied to the individual things in the temporal world. The exemption from metaphysical rules gave rise to the concept of an absolute being, omnipotent, omniscient source of all things, for His own existence requiring no relations to anything beyond Himself. He is represented as internally complete. With the result the theologians made no effort to conceive the world in terms of the metaphysical categories by means of which they interpreted God, and they made no effort to conceive God in terms of the metaphysical categories which they applied to the world. For them God was eminently real and the world derivatively real. God was necessary to the world, but the world was not necessary to God. There was a gulf between them. Whitehead feels that

1. W. D. Ross. *Aristotle* (new and revised edition) Chap. VI. pp. 179-186.

2. See *Adventures of Ideas*. Part II, Chap I, for a discussion of the several conceptions of Laws of Nature.

3. *Adventures of Ideas*. pp. 145-47.

a sound metaphysical theory requires a solution exhibiting the plurality of individuals as consistent with the unity of the universe and a solution which exhibits the world as requiring its union with God, and God requiring his union with the world. Such a solution presupposes not a theological God but a metaphysical Entity that is finite and immanent to the process. From His nature the Laws flow and not by the 'accidents of the will.' The chief difficulty of the conception of an extra cosmic God is, how to know Him. Whitehead trenchantly points out "that the worst of the gulf (between God and world) is that it is very difficult to know what is happening on the further side of it. This has been the fate of the God of traditional theology. 'It is only by drawing the long bow of mysticism that evidence for His existence can be collected from the temporal world,'"⁴ Further he adds that the concept of "unqualified omnipotence is accompanied by responsibility for every happening." Thus God becomes responsible for the Evil in the world. Whitehead wants to avoid such difficulties so he attempts to construct a God who is not extra cosmic. Such a concept he believes overcomes the difficulties that are raised against theological conceptions.

Neither the God of Aristotle, nor that of Whitehead performs the function for which God is invoked by man. The concept of God answers certain definite requirements of religious consciousness. Aristotle for whom Whitehead has such admiration⁵ has given us a God who is perfect and as such who does not soil his hands by creating imperfect things. His one activity is self-contemplation. He does not create and so is neither responsible for the existence of Evil nor its continuance. He only moves the world through His appetite. Such a God is "not the loving father of mankind" nor 'the Lord of all the worlds and the friend of all.'⁶ Religion requires a personality, and not a completed philosophy of Organism.

Whitehead's conception of God is framed to explain the process. He observes "that the evolution of history is incapable of rationalisation because it exhibits a selected flux of participating

4. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 217.

5. *Science and the Modern World*. p. 215.

6. *Gītā*. IV, V—v. 29.

Forms. No reason, internal to history, can be assigned why this flux of forms, rather than another flux should have been illustrated.”⁷ He points to the primordial nature of God as the explanation for it. The primordial nature of God is the *disideratum* for his metaphysics. It is by virtue of this entity “that the multiplicity of Eternal Objects obtains its graded relevance to each stage of concrescence. Apart from God there would be no relevant novelty.”⁸ William Temple holds that the very fact of positing an entity because of logical requirement does not tell us as to how ‘novelty’ results from a metaphysical entity.⁹ The nature of the entity must be described and conceived as a personality to account for the novelty. To assert a mere ground of possibility is not to explain the fact of novelty. How the primordial nature of God accounts for novelty will remain inexplicable unless we conceive God as a spirit or a personality.

Further we are told that God is the principle of concretion. This merely means that concretion is impossible without God. Here too we are not told how the God principle helps concretion. These facts are bound to remain unexplained if we do not go beyond the concept of Organism to the concept of personality. Once we posit a personality, we explain such facts as novelty and concreteness in the light of its purposes. The initial prejudice is due to the neat presuppositions on which Whitehead builds his metaphysics, namely that we cannot refer the universe or its process to any class higher or wider than itself. It has no similar and no other, all classes and concepts must be found within it, not outside it. Our seeking to understand the process must be from within and not without. We are ourselves part of the universe, or factors of it, and an outside view of it is impossible. The question is not how God is outside of us but how does He participate and inform the universe. Whitehead admits a force beyond God called ‘creativity.’ Creativity is the ultimate and the basic metaphysical entity. It is described “as indeterminate and has no character of its own. It is like Aristotelian ‘matter.’ “It is always described as conditioned.”¹⁰ It be-

7. *Process and Reality*. p. 64.

8. *Ibid.* p. 229.

9. William Temple. *Nature Man and God*. p. 256-260 (1934).

10. *Process and Reality*. p. 43.

comes actual only in virtue of its accidents. Apart from its accidents it is a mere hypothetical abstraction. The primordial nature of God is the first accident. Creativity lives only in God. God is only one of the accidents of creativity. As Radhakrishnan points out "Since God is only one of the accidents He cannot be regarded as the source of the accident itself. He cannot be both the cause and the effect."¹¹ We never get a clear view of creativity. It stands as a lofty abstraction. It is not like the Absolute of the Idealists or the Vedāntin. They conceive it as spirit *i.e.*, consciousness, intelligence and full of creative activity. So they describe God as the mode of the Absolute. Such a course is not open to Whitehead because he does not conceive creativity in terms of any attribute. We are not able to conceive the difficult concept of Creativity nor do we understand as what is the source of the limitation which turns this purely indeterminate creativity into a determinate freedom.

The 'consequent nature of God' has a bearing on the attributes of God. God evolves with the world. Whitehead observes "that the theme of cosmology, which is the basis of all religions is the dynamic effort of the world passing into everlasting unity and of the static majesty of God's vision accomplishing its purpose of completion by absorption of the world's multiplicity of effort."¹² The fluent world becomes everlasting by its objective immortality in God, which is the function of the consequent nature of God. It is this aspect of God that saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of His own life. "God's role is not the combat of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force, it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonisation. He does not create the world. He saves it: or more accurately He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth beauty and goodness."¹³ In another passage Whitehead refers to God as "the great companion and the fellow sufferer of men."¹⁴

11. S. Radhakrishnan. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 326-31.

12. *Process and Reality*, p. 494.

13. *Ibid.* p. 490.

14. *Ibid.* p. 497.

William Temple suggests that Whitehead is very near the Christian gospel if he could transcend the concept of Organism on to the idea of Personality. The concept of Organism does not fit with the several images that Whitehead introduces in his description of God. The attributes can have no meaning apart from the concept of a personality or spirit. Both are objectionable to Whitehead. Strictly speaking terms like, 'love,' tenderness and 'great companion,' 'fellow sufferer' etc., have no cosmic significance. They fit in only with a personal conception of God.

Whitehead's God is bound up with the evolving universe. He is dependent on the universe. He realises his fullness through the process of reality. God finds his completion in terms of the world process. He has a past which is irrevocable and an unrealised future. At no time do we have a completely perfect God. There is a finite aspect which is a constitutive feature of God. He does not tell us clearly as to what happens when the primordial nature of God becomes the consequent nature.

A God that is finite and is evolving does not satisfy the requirements of religion. Most religions conceive the personality of God after the manner of a perfect human being. No doubt to conceive Him so is not correct but that is the limit of human imagination. He is represented as all good, all wise and all powerful. He created us and the familiar world of visible things. He cares for us and wishes us well. We owe the gift of eternal life to him. By practising certain disciplines such as contemplation, meditation and prayer and by living a moral life we can establish fellowship with God. The concept of God in religion is independent of the world. The world is God-dependent and the reverse is not true. A struggling finite God does not answer the religious needs.

Scientific Materialism and intellectual Humanism are doctrines that do not adequately account for the needs and aspirations of man. Every human being has a two fold nature the infinite

and the finite.¹⁵ There is a constant struggle between these aspects. The religious minded try to harness the finite life and its value to realise God and enjoy His fellowship. Taking the art of human life as it is lived, we find that mere knowledge and the faculty of reason cannot help us completely. Assuming for a moment the absolute reality of evil man finds himself up against it and is not able to conquer it unaided. Impulses drive him one way; fear holds him back; desire pulls, duty forbids; thus there is the tug of war. To conquer evil and live in concord with the Lord and his creation is the ambition of each soul. In this conflict the doctrines of scientific Materialism and secular Humanism help him very little. De Burgh in one of his addresses observes “no man of sober mind can look either within himself or outwards upon the world without being over powered by the sense that he is groping his way with wavering balance and ‘uncertain vision’ between two abysses of splendour and abjection. On the one side the desire of his reason for an infinite good, which every experience of disillusionment serves only to rekindle; on the other his actual impotences menacing him with despair, as at best should fortune favour him with stoic apathy and resignation.”¹⁶

The problem of temptation brings out the need for God in a significant way. Human knowledge is of no avail in the presence of temptations. Virtue is not mere knowledge. More often mankind has known the truth and still pursued the wrong. To know a thing is not enough, we must have the strength to will it. There is a sanskr̥t passage which explains in a pointed manner the human helplessness. ‘Man knows what is *Dharma* and does not practice it, and he knows what is *adharma* and does not desist from it.’¹⁷ St. Paul’s confession echoes the sentiment ‘the

15. Pascal describes man:—Dependence, desire of independence..... we float on a vast expanse, ever uncertain and drifting, swept from one extreme towards another; whatever goal we think to clutch for firm anchorage, gives beneath our touch and if we follow it, escapes our grasp and eludes us in an unending flight..... this is our natural condition. Yet most opposed to our inclination; we burn with desire to find a sure resting place, a final and a enduring basis to build there on a tower rising to infinity.

16. De Burgh, *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*. 2nd November 1936 (1936-1937) p. 27.

17. Jānāmi dharmam na ca me pravṛtṭih
Jānamyadharmam na ca me nivṛtṭih.

good that I would I do not; the evil that I would not, that I do.¹⁸ St. Augustine declares in dejection 'I know not how it is, but an object of desire becomes more seductive when it is forbidden.' The representative man Arjuna in the *Gītā* asked Kṛṣṇa 'what impels a man to commit sin, in spite of himself and driven as it were by force.'¹⁹ Lord Kṛṣṇa puts his finger on the main cause and the source *i.e.*, unregenerate human desire. Human egotism sets itself against the infinite and works as if nothing but its strength counts. Evil arises according to Reinhold Niebuhr not on account of man's finiteness, but out of his refusal to admit his creatureliness. It arises of man's rebellion against God. He hankers after infinity. The scientific materialist giddy with the success attained over material things declares himself to be God. He declares 'the world is false, without a moral basis, and without God, what is there that does not spring from mutual union. Lust is the cause of all.'²⁰ He recounts his conquests and equates himself with God. 'This enemy I have slain, and others too I will slay. I am the Lord of all, and I enjoy myself. I am prosperous mighty and happy. I am rich and of high birth, who is there like unto me? I will perform sacrifices, I will give alms, I will rejoice.'²¹ Faith in conceptual reason, and self-conscious intellect with its clear analysis and limited aims are in the words of Radhakrishnan 'the logical counter parts of human egoism.' This is the deadliest foe of the soul. Reinhold Niebuhr remarks that this refusal to admit the creatureliness of man is sin, and in it he sees all evil.²²

From this it follows that for many of us it is difficult to live aright, if we have nothing more secure to lean upon than our own 'puny reason' and 'wavering uncertainty' of our ethical judgments. Pascal remarks 'by yourself it is no use trying to do good, you are too sinful; by yourself it is no use trying to be

18. St. Paul, *Rom VII*—19.

19. *Gītā*. III, 36. Dr. C. E. M. Joad bases his argument for the existence of God in his book *God and Evil* on the moral argument. 1943.

20. *Gītā*. XVI, 8.

21. *Ibid.* XVI, 14, 15.

22. Reinhold Niebuhr. *Nature and Destiny of Man*. Vol. I, p. 17-25.

wise; your folly is too crass.’²³ The great theists of the world have employed their gifts of logic and argumentation, and their moral fervour to lay bare the infinite wretchedness and helplessness of men, the infinite goodness of God and the immensity of the gulf between them is bridgeable only by divine grace. Men have been lured into the acceptance of the belief through sheer human experience. Pascal says “fortunately,” there is no need to try by ourselves (to conquer evil) since there is One who will lead us and give us the strength to do good and wisdom to go right.’ The Lord in the Gītā gives such an assurance ‘those who meditate on me and worship me and no other, and who are ever devoted to me—to them I ensure all that is necessary.’²⁴ Jesus says “let not your heart be troubled. Ye believe in God.”²⁵ The human heart naturally needs such a God to confront successfully the suffering in life. Moral life loses its point and significance without the reality of God. God in most religions is represented as the loving father; or the great companion. The personality of God is absolutely necessary for the religious aspirant. The God of religion is not a mere intellectual abstraction. Such a concept hardly satisfies the religious soul. Judged by this test Whitehead’s God does not answer the requirements of religion.

Whitehead holds the traditional theology is open to criticism. He holds that a philosophical theology based on the concept of an organism is in consonance with scientific postulates and in the time process can alone claim the final acceptance of men.’ In this task, Whitehead declares, theology has failed. ‘I am not disguising my belief that in this task, theology has failed. The notion of an absolute despot has stood in the way, the doctrine of grace has been degraded and the doctrines of atonement are

‘23. See Shakespeare:— *Measure for Measure*. Act. II. Sec. II.

Man, Proud man
Dress’d in a little brief authority
Most ignorant of what he is most assured.
His glassy essence like an angry ape
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As makes the angels weep.

‘The fool hath said in his heart there is no God’

24. *Gītā*, IX—22.

25. *St. John*. XIV—1.

mostly crude.’²⁶ He does not stop at this, he goes on to assert that the ‘liberal theology of the last two hundred years has confined itself to the suggestion of minor, vapid reasons, why people should continue to go to church in traditional fashion.’²⁷ He says that the mode of establishing God by ‘drawing the long bow of Mysticism’ is not praiseworthy. He trusts Mathematics and science too much to the exclusion of other factors. ‘Because he delights in Mathematics, he supposes that his favourite subject must provide the solution of every problem in the universe. His pre-supposition that symbolic logic and Mathematics are the key to the problems of aesthetics, ethics and theology is responsible for such an abstract concept of God. This is an illustration of the fact as to how great minds can be obsessed by single ideas.’²⁸ The God of Whitehead does not completely exist. So we cannot know Him. He is not the creator of the world, so we cannot have the faith that there is order and purpose in the universe. For his completion He is dependent on the world process, so he is finite. Of His goodness and Love we have no description and no ground.

As against this contention it is stated that the God of the theologians is not established by reason and that unscientific imagination is responsible for it. Alexander who adopts a conception of God similar to that of Whitehead asserts ‘that their God is not a fancy embodied under some mood of excitement, but has its basis in the solid facts and in the general nature of things.’²⁹ ‘God’ they hold, is assigned by the traditional religions to a department of experience shut off from ordinary thought. They are distrustful of the witness of God in ourselves and the light of nature. Alexander asks us “what guarantee have we that light may not be a wandering fire. The light of Nature cannot be its own guarantee. It needs confirmation from the accordance of its deliverances with the whole of experience.”³⁰ This rule must not only be confined to physical law but to the emotional experience of men. The conception of God as a natural object

26. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 218.

27. *Ibid.* p. 217.

28. W. T. Staces’ review of P. A. Schilpp’s *Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead Mind*, Vol. II. No. 205. Jan. 1943.

29. *Science and Religion* a symposium. p. 136 (1930).

30. *Ibid.* p. 137.

does not answer the needs of men and to that extent it is not in accordance with the deliverances of the whole of our experience. The metaphysical tendency of the age has been to envisage objects under the form of Time, 'to write' in the words A. E. Taylor, the Objects 'life history.' The entire 'hierarchised nature of the universe is explained as due to the 'configuration in a Kinematical system, with the result we get a God who is abstract.

Another chief contention of Whitehead against traditional religion is the criticism of anthropomorphism. He holds that a number of evils flow from the conception of God as a perfected human being. The conception of God as a person is explained as resulting 'from the inability of men to proceed rationally or to think in abstract terms.' Men are in general creatures of imagination. 'It is small wonder,' says Alexander, 'that a creator who makes his creatures and sways their lives by His ordinances is easier and more natural to our work-a-day minds than such a being as has been suggested. We shadow forth our abstract thoughts in most accessible images and overlook their weakness, leaving them rather to provoke in our theologies whole volumes of controversy spent on the insuperable task of giving rational form to imagination.'³¹ The rationalist religious prophet goes on to assert 'that it is more reasonable (and helpful) to worship a being whose love draws us to Him from the front and whom we thus help into existence rather than a being independent of our efforts who pushes us from behind.' The traditional religions of the world are accused of anthropomorphism for conceiving God in man's image and endowing him with human qualities. No doubt there is much truth in this charge, but that it is entirely due to the limitation of man. Thomas Aquinas points out that there is no way left for men to think of God except in the method of analogy. Dr. Joad rightly points that "the conceit involved in the traditional view is nothing compared with the aggrandisement of the human spirit implied by the philosophy of emergence. For the emergent God is not only imaginatively conceived by man's spirit. He is actively made by man's efforts. Not only are his attributes products of our conception, not only are his virtues and values the projection of our aspirations, but *his very reality is our gift*. Thus man is made the measure of all truth.'³²

31. *Science and Religion*. Symposium p. 136-137.

32. Dr. C. E. M. Joad. *God and Evil*. p. 152-153.

Such an exaltation of man is no better than the traditional anthropomorphism of religions. The Emergent theory of God takes a very narrow view and leaves out of account other things than man that are independent of him *e.g.*, values, objects of worship, etc. On this ground it proves to be a very narrow humanistic creed.

Further the doom of God, if the scientific picture of the world is true according to the second Law of Thermo Dynamics, is no better than that of the world. The world would be reduced to a condition of eventless stagnation. All energy will be evenly distributed and the universe will come to rest in a uniform glow of cosmic radiation. As with the universe, so it is with God if He is bound up with the world. From these facts it follows that 'science at best has cleared the board of the universe for the re-entry of religion and it has no contribution to make to the writing of the play.' A God so conceived cannot evoke or inspire sentiments proper to religion.

Whitehead claims that his conception of God has no responsibility for Evil a problem that precludes many from the acceptance of theism. He observes that the "worst (aspect of the traditional concept of God) is the unqualified omnipotence that is accompanied by the responsibility for every detail of every happening."³³

Prof. W. R. Sorley in his thought provoking Gifford lectures, *Moral values and Idea of God*, maintains that the problem of evil necessitates the acceptance of a good omnipotent God. He sustains the argument with a reference to our feeling. The very fact that evil is a problem which men face constitutes, says W. R. Sorley, disables us from denying God. But for the existence of an omnipotent good God we would not trouble ourselves with the problem of evil. Evil would be a fact and not a problem inviting us to give it fight and arouse in us stern determination to combat and exterminate it successfully. The very urge to combat evil and the ultimate faith that it is not absolute and eternal presupposes the existence of God. Evil is a problem to us because of the existence of God.

33. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 217.

Dr. Joad an erstwhile agnostic, who styled himself a few years ago 'an impenitent rationalist' declares that the very problem of Evil which precluded him from accepting the existence of God, is responsible for his acceptance of the belief in a God. He finds the fact of Evil as a positive proof for the existence of God. The nerve of the argument is as follows."³⁴ We are confronted with a universe which contains evil, which is ultimate and real. To know that there is no defence against it save our own strength of will and wisdom is distressing and unbearable. If we have no other power to help us we have supinely to acquiesce in evil. The theists hold after the manner of Pascal there is no need to do that. There is a power that is akin to us, which affords the standard by which the human is seen to be faulty. God is the power. He is not enjoying in amused detachment from the wings the drama of the universe, He is sensitive to our wishes, and responsive to our hopes, and akin to our spirit and is continually with us. Such in short is the concept of God.

The doctrine that has the longest intellectual ancestry and tradition is the concept of God. Cicero said 'what the Gods are is a matter of dispute, but that they are is denied by none.' Epictetus held the view that 'we are all fragments of God.' The concept answers the needs of men and lends significance to moral efforts. It is the deep need of men. To the worshipper God is as much a fact as a green leaf or a sun is for a dispassionate observer. Speculative theology should not cut itself off from the fact of religious experience. It must be based on it and not construct the God of religion purely from an intellectual point of view.

The various traditional arguments for the existence of God 'yield not a God of religion but a possible supreme first cause.' The first cause argument begins with the world and postulates an uncaused first. Such a cause must be a personality who can design purposes, because in the world we find design and purpose. It cannot be due to the activity of blind Nature. This in essence is the teleological argument. Further, there is the ontological argument which takes the distinction between existence and Idea. It points out that there is one idea (*i.e.*, the idea of God) which

34. Joad. *God and Evil*. Chap. III.

spurns the distinction. Descartes derives existence from essence. He asserts, God's existence follows from His essence. Existence makes for perfection. In addition to these three arguments there is the most powerful argument *i.e.*, the moral. God is a practical postulate necessitated by moral reason. Kant says; 'If it be asked why it is incumbent to have any theology at all, it appears clear, that it is not needed for the extension or correction of our cognition of nature or in general for any theory, but simply in a subjective point of view for religion—the practical or the moral use of reason.'³⁵

All the proofs are merely matters of definition and description. 'They proclaim but do not prove.' They can be refuted by better reason. The first cause argument is open to attack on several fronts. In the first place the validity of the concept of causation can be questioned in the light of the findings of modern physics. Secondly the validity of applying such a concept to the world as a whole can be questioned. There is no reason why we should call halt for the regress at the first cause. If the world needs a cause for its origination then God who creates it also must have a cause. To exempt God from the law of cause and effect is to deny the universality of the Law. If it be urged that God is uncaused, the same can be true of the world. Prof. Sorley's observation on this issue is significant. "As long as we regard the first cause as simply accounting for the beginning of the world-history it fails to account even for that beginning, for we are forced to ask what made the beginner begin and begin just then. Only the contents of the world can show us that it has a meaning which requires some other kind of explanation than antecedent events. The cause we must seek *is not merely the first cause but a final cause.*"³⁶

The cosmological argument can give us at best a designer. For what we know he is finite. It is possible, that a company of creators are at work in co-operation for the origination of the world. They may work in shifts or simultaneously. They are limited by the material. Such a finite designer can never be the God for religion.

35. Sorley's *Moral Values and Idea of God*. p. 329, (1930), Fourth Edition.

36. Sorley's *Moral Values and Idea of God*. p. 320.

The teleological argument has a distinctive character. It is founded upon certain special features and designs in the contents of the world, which reveal the presence and the realisation of purpose, and lead us to the inference of a benevolent creator. This argument has suffered at the hands of the doctrine of evolution. Adaptation is to be effected by environment or chance variation. The evolutionist sees no need for a personality to design the entire course of evolution. Adaptation of the needs of living being is the pervasive feature of Nature, and is held as the result of an age long semi-mechanical process. The Proof at best raises a presumption in favour of God.

The ontological proof is urged from two motives. (1) Our highest must not be severed from Reality, and it must not be in the form of an apodeictic proof. Existence and essence are necessarily connected. Kant's criticism that 'a man can as little increase his knowledge of reality from mere ideas as a merchant can increase his property by adding ciphers to the written statements of his accounts' does not apply to the idea of God. Hegel points out that Kant's example appeals at once to the ordinary understanding, for there is nothing the plain man can grasp more clearly than the difference between the idea of money and money in pocket. Hence the success of Kant's illustration.³⁷ From this it follows that the proofs at best indicate that the historical world of becoming is not self explanatory. It needs some other entity. The proofs can best raise a presumption in favour of a God and not demonstrate Him. Only religious experience can give the final conviction. Dawes Hicks sums up the case for the proofs as follows. 'The cosmological, teleological and moral arguments are grades in a hierarchical order, the first providing the ground work for the second, the second for the third. The first points that nature is not a self-contained and self-explicable system reducible without remainder to law and infers a necessary being above and beyond Nature as the ground of its contingency. The second does not prove but points out to the intimate connection between a necessary Being and a purposive intelligence. How can there be purposiveness without a mind. We at best get a God who may work for evil or ethically neutral ends. We need

37. Sorley. *Moral Values and Idea of God*, p. 309.

evidence for his goodness. Rational theology finds its coping stone in the moral argument.”³⁸

The best proof; if proof it can be called is the need men feel for God. “Epicurus remarked and not without reason that with a little bread and water, the wise man is the equal of Jupiter himself, Gilson improves the remark ‘the fact is perhaps that with a little bread and water man ought to be happy but precisely is not; and if he is not, it is not necessarily because he lacks wisdom, but simply because he is man, and, because all that is deepest in him perpetually gainsays the wisdom offered..... The owner of a great estate would still add field to field, the rich man would heap up more riches, the husband of a fair wife, would have another still fairer or possibly one less fair would serve, provided only she were fair in some other way..... This incessant pursuit of an ever fugitive satisfaction springs from troubled deeps in human nature..... The very insatiability of human desire has positive significance; it means we are attracted by a powerful goal.”³⁹

It is this need which troubles man and he can never find rest till he reaches it. The passion for communal improvement, or the zeal for social applause cannot distract man from this fundamental unrest. Action however exciting, labour however absorbing, penury however exacting, love and hate however obsessing leave still a yawning gap. You may beat this exigency down, you may starve it out, or crowd it away, the thing refuses to be eradicated. Pascal in a famous passage observes ‘the human mind believes naturally and the will loves naturally, consequently for lack of real objects it attaches itself to false objects.’ The need to believe can never be eradicated. If we knock down the gods from the pedestal, human idols spring up in their places. The worship of the dictators in the totalitarian countries springs out of this motive and illustrates Pascal’s observation.⁴⁰

38. Dawes Hicks. *The Philosophical Basis of Theism*. Chap. V.

39. M. Etienne Gilson. *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. p. 270-72.

40. Disraeli observed:—“Give man nothing to worship and nothing to revere, and He will find altars and idols in his own heart and his own imagination fashioning his own divinities and finding a chieftain in his passions.”

We find that man's supreme aspiration is to reach God, because it frees him from fear (abhaya). It is the conquest of fear and is an antidote to failure. St. Augustine in the opening words of the confession declares 'Thou O God hast made us for thy self and our hearts are restless until they find rest in thee.' Spinoza in his unfinished *Treatise on the improvement of understanding* says "after experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile, seeing that none of the objects of my fear contained in themselves anything either good or bad; except in so far as the mind is affected by them. I finally resolved to enquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else, whether in fact there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous supreme and unending happiness." He dismisses in turn the pursuit of riches, fame, pleasures of the senses. All the evils that attend their pursuit arise he says, 'from the love of what is perishable.' 'But love towards a thing eternal, and infinite feeds the mind, with joy, and itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our strength.' It is the intellectual love of God. The author of the *Imitation* towards the conclusion of his work exhorts men to have simple faith in God and not trust 'curious and unprofitable reasoning.' 'God is able to work more than man can understand.' So all reason and natural search ought to follow faith, not to go before it, nor to break in upon it.' Thus we find that the God of religion answers the deepest needs of men and He is the truest truth.' As Berdeyaev puts it "where there is no God, there is no man, man without God is no longer man."

Whitehead's metaphysical arguments for the existence of God are no improvement on the traditional proofs. We have seen how the traditional proofs do not demonstrate the existence of God after the manner of a proposition. These proofs at best raise the presumption in favour of the existence of God, but do not prove. Religious experience and the fulfilment of human needs alone constitute the conclusive evidence for the existence of God. Whitehead's view that God rounds off his metaphysical system does no more demonstrate the existence of God than the traditional proofs. The author of the *Vedānta Sūtra* points out

that mere reasoning cannot lead to any definite conclusion. Reason can be refuted by better reason but spiritual realisation is ultimate and self established. The function of God in any religious philosophy worth the name, is to give satisfaction and strength to the individual in the art of living. Satisfaction of the metaphysical instinct is not enough. Barren metaphysics, dry intellect sheer logical rigour, architectonic thinking and the sense of a rounded metaphysical system cannot give us a God of religion.

The concept of an immanent God is not a doctrine foreign to Indian thought. The theistic school of Vedānta of Rāmānuja has developed an organic conception of Reality. Brahman, according to Rāmānuja, is a unity (viśiṣṭa) of real parts, souls and matter (cit and acit). It is not a distinctionless unity. Brahman is devoid of two kinds of external distinctions. There is no similar (sajātīya) entity to Brahman, and no dissimilar entity other than Brahman. God is possessed only of internal distinctions (svagata bheda). Matter and souls constitute the very body of Brahman. They are the outer walls (Prakāras) and God is the Prākārin (the indweller). Brahman unlike Whitehead's *creativity* is determinate and the abode of infinite auspicious attributes. In the state of dissolution Brahman retains all the objects and souls in their unmanifest form. This is the causal state of Brahman (Kāraṇāvastha). Rāmānuja holds the view that 'the Upaniṣadic texts that refer to the denial of the ultimate nature of the world of objects, and those that describe God as being beyond, thought and speech, refer and really indicate the unmanifest state of Brahman.⁴¹ Rāmānuja takes care to indicate that Brahman is the supporter and the world of *cit* and *acit* are supported. The analogy of an organism is worked out in details. The authority of the śruti and the traditional view that God is an independent factor, makes Ramanuja lay stress on and throw into relief the predominant independent nature of God. But he is at the same time anxious to preserve the organic nature of God with the world. But his allegiance to scripture is responsible for his over emphasis of the independent nature of God. He does not make God dependent on the world process in any sense. But he does not lose sight of the fact that God is intimately connected with the world process. Whitehead's conception of God as

41. Rāmānuja *Śrī Bhāṣya*. 1, 1, 1.

immanent is not without its significance for religious philosophy. But the God of Whitehead is represented in such austere intellectual terms that He turns out to be an abstraction. The immanent nature of God alone can give meaning to the concept of grace and the representation of God as love. Whitehead envisages God's presence under three aspects, 'God as wisdom' *i.e.*, His primordial nature; God as, Love, *i.e.*, His consequent nature and, God as Judge. Radhakrishnan throws up a fruitful suggestion that such a view is strangely reminiscent of the Hindu conception of God as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. He interprets God in a refreshing manner in terms of these concepts, and brings out the full force of the immanence of God and the organic nature of Reality. The God of religious philosophy cannot merely be construed in terms of wisdom and sovereignty. No doubt the creative will of God has sovereignty over all. But His creativity and love cannot be explained except by positing the organic nature of the world process and the immanence of God. The religious consciousness of men wants a loving God who is there at the hearts of the universe, responding to our hope, sensitive to our wishes. Such a "God becomes the guide and the ground of the progress. He is not a mere spectator, but a sharer of the travail of the world." The Gītā idea of God is that he is not only the ātman in all, nor merely the goal of man but is the friend of all.⁴² The struggle against evil is conducted by Him with us. We have evidence of his presence in the miracles that are wrought by men of religion. "The Ṛgveda says "All that is bare he covers; all that is sick he covers; By His grace the blind man sees and the lame walks."⁴³ The concept of *avatāra* (incarnation) of the Lord is only a striking expression of the immanence of God; His continual presence is there in the universe. The redemptive function of God is not intelligible apart from His immanence. The immanence of God does not in any way militate against man's effort. Because there is God in and at the process of evolution, it does not mean that man has no responsibility. "Religion gives us no secret which absolves us from living."⁴⁴ The third aspect of God as the judge, makes it necessary that moral effort on the part of man is as

42. Gītā. V—29.

43. *Rg Veda*. 1 VIII. 79. 2; VIII. 4. 7.

44. S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. p. 101.

necessary as God's co-operation "The struggle is not a mere parade nor history a mere pageant." God helps us to build the perfections on earth, and progress towards the goal. He is actually helping us and is with us. The absolute idealism of Śāṅkara was alive to all the defects of (*pariṇāma vāda*) i.e., the doctrine that the entire world is a transformation of Brahman. So he explained Brahman under two modes: Brahman from the cosmic end and the Absolute Brahman. The Absolute is at once 'the sum and source of limitless possibilities. One of the possibilities is being actualised in the cosmic process. God is the supreme from the cosmic end. He is the living spirit and not a mere objective thing. Advaita thinkers have never lost sight of the function of God. Īśvara (God) comes in as a third entity between ourselves and Brahman from which we are non-different. The Advaitin's conception of Īśvara is criticised as not having any purpose, and he is placed on the same status as the individual soul; because he is also conditioned by nescience (*māyā*). Others hold the view that God in Advaita is a concession to the ordinary consciousness. Not all can comprehend the Absolute that is above all relations (*nirguṇa, nirviśeṣa*); at least for their sake there has to be a personal God. There is a third view that the concept of God is irrelevant to Advaita metaphysics.

A close examination of the Advaita concept of God lays bare the importance of the doctrine and its place in Advaita metaphysics. Like all the students of tradition the Advaitin quotes the scriptures in support of his acceptance of the conception of God. Passages that refer to God as the 'source from which all things come, they spring by which they are sustained and the good into which they enter.⁴⁵ all refer to personal God.

Apart from scriptural evidence the concept is arrived at long other lines of arguments. The explanation of the origination of the universe as the work of creative conscious will is logically more satisfactory than the view, that it is the result of fortuitous concourse of primal atoms, and the view that it is the spontaneous evolution of Nature (*prakṛti*). It may be contended that the explanation that spirit is the cause of the world is a poor thing. But it is more intelligible than the rejecting and ignoring of the

45. *Taitt Upaniṣad* III.

spirit as the cause. From spirit as cause it is easier to pass to Brahman which is neither cause nor effect.

The methodology of the Advaitin is critical. It passes in review the different conceptions of the universe and criticises them in turn. In its criticism it never fails to note their varying fullness and worth. The lower category is criticised in the light of the higher in which it finds its fulfilment. It is a progressive discovery of truth. The method of criticism is 'immanent.'

Īśvara is the absolute viewed from the cosmic end. The world of plurality, which admits of social intercourse and is referred to as the world, cannot be the creation of individual souls, nor is it an illusion. It needs a cosmic intelligence. The world is not only a theatre of secular events but it is also the place where we practice 'the art of soul making.' It has moral significance and is not hostile to the aspirant's efforts to build spiritual values. Īśvara with the help of nescience creates the world. Nescience (māyā) is the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) and Brahman conditioned by nescience (mayopahita caitanya) is the efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa): But here it must be pointed out that Māyā by itself cannot constitute the cause, nor Īśvara by Himself. The threefold definition of Īśvara as creator, sustainer and destroyer is possible only for what is both efficient and the material cause. Hence Īśvara with His power Māyā is the material-cum-efficient cause (abhinna nimitta upādāna kāraṇa). Māyā does not obscure Īśvara's power. He is the ideal for man. "Reality is not," says Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri "less but more than God; not by eschewing God, but by realising and transcending Him, can we realise the self; for the world is God-dependent; and to ignore God may well lead to the world asserting itself as if independent and weighing us down, as in saṁsāra; and release requires the realisation first of the dependence of world on God."⁴⁶

From this it follows that worship of Īśvara is an inevitable step in the realisation of Brahman. The great Advaita dialectician Śrī Harṣa held the view "that even inclination towards Advaita metaphysics is not possible without the grace of the Lord."⁴⁷

46. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. *Sankaracharya*.

Śrī Harṣa. *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya*. Chap. I. V. 21. p. 96-97.

47. Īśvaranugrahādeva pumsām advaita vāsana.

Madusūdhana, the champion of later day Advaita, towards the completion of his polemical treatise *Advaita Siddhi*, expresses the view "that he knows not of any truth beyond the fascinating figure of Lord Kṛṣṇa with flute in hand of the hue of fresh cloud dressed in yellow silk, of lip like *bimba* fruit, of face charming like the moon, and eyes like lotus."⁴⁸

The concept of Īśvara is represented in a number of ways. A certain school of Advaita holds the view that Brahman reflected in bits of impure Māyā is jīva (soul).⁴⁹ Brahman reflected in the pure element of Māyā is Īśvara. A second view represents Īśvara as the reflection in Māyā. He constitutes the prototype and the individual souls are his reflections in *avidyā* (a variety of māyā).

There is a third view that does not use the analogy of reflection, but represents Brahman as the unlimited and the individuals as delimited, after the manner of the delimitation of space in the form of room, pot etc. Īśvara on this view is conditioned, but not dominated by Avidya.⁵⁰

It is interesting to note that māyā or *avidya* is not a bond to Īśvara as it is to us. He wields it and we view Him as limited by it. He does not feel it as a limitation. Īśvara would not be aware of nescience if there were not individual souls bound. But so long as there is even one jīva in bondage Īśvara will be aware of nescience. This supremely merciful redeemer of men from bondage helps the jīva to get rid of bondage. As soon as souls obtain release from bondage they do not become Brahman, but become Īśvara. As Īśvara they help and uplift other souls from bondage. When all of us become Īśvara, We lapse into the Absolute. We find thus that Īśvara has a definite function and he is bound up with the process. There is also the fact that salvation is not a mere private concern of the individual. It is

48. Madhusūdana's *Advaita Siddhi*.

Vamsivibhūṣita karāt navaniradābhāt
Pīṭambarāt arunabimba phalāḍharostāt
Pūrṇendu sundara mukhāt aravinda netrāt
Kṛṣṇāt param kimapitattvam aham na jāne.

49. The first view 'bimba pratibimba' vāda.

50. This is called avaccheda view.

also an effort to save others. The God of religion is organic to man's effort.

We have so far dealt with the Advaita attempt, of envisaging Brahman under two modes with the help of the metaphysical principle of Māyā. Students of metaphysics who are after, not mere philosophical unity at the cost of the loss of satisfaction of religious instinct will find the attempt of Śaṅkara more sustained than that of Whitehead. The creativity principle in Whitehead is similar to Brahman of Advaita. While Śaṅkara postulated consciousness infinitude and bliss as the nature of Brahman (Svarūpa), Whitehead left creativity uncharacterised and indeterminate. The conceptions of creativity the primordial nature and the consequent nature of God are more philosophically sustained in Śaṅkara than in Whitehead. However baffling and perplexing the doctrine of Māyā is still it serves as a ground of explanation, for the conditioning of Brahman and the emergence of the world of plurality. The doctrine of Māyā is not a mere confession of failure but it is a wisdom born out of the inadequacy of other explanations for the emergence of the world (ārambha vāda, pariṇāma vāda). The Īśvara of Advaita satisfies all the religious requirements. He is more powerful than the individual souls who are deluded by Māyā. He wields Māyā and it does not dim his vision. Īśvara helps the individual soul in his effort to Brahman realisation. The concept of personality helps the Advaitin to envisage Īśvara as the creator, sustainer, companion, etc., of the individual souls. He is not a different or a second metaphysical category. There are no two Brahman as the theist superficially criticises Advaita. It is Brahman viewed under two modes, and not a second Brahman. Whitehead's creativity does not give us a Īśvara nor a principle which can give us a God of religion. Two steps in the metaphysical path will lead Whitehead to Śaṅkara. From organism it is one step ahead to the concept of personality, from personality it is another to spiritual consciousness. Whitehead's metaphysics is a half way house to the absolute idealism of Śaṅkara.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL ESTIMATE AND CONCLUSION

We have so far examined the various aspects of the religious philosophy of Whitehead in the light of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta. In this Chapter we shall try to get at an estimate of whitehead contribution to metaphysics in general and philosophy of religion in particular.

The philosophical system of Whitehead has its chief merit in having for its basis scientific principles. He has constructed a system that is in line with the findings of modern Science. It is to that extent a scientific account of Reality. The system has no theological bias and it is strictly metaphysical in its implications. Whitehead has before him Mathematics as the major pattern. His metaphysics too is strictly mathematical. This has given a rigidity and logical compactness to the system.

To a very great extent Whitehead believes in the efficacy of reason and is guided by its methods. But this should not lead us to think of his system as an arid rationalism. A great part of his system is based on the appreciation of feelings and on notions drawn from Aesthetics.

In a short autobiographical note to a volume devoted to the study of his philosophy he writes "that Beauty, moral and aesthetic is the aim of existence and that knowledge and love and artistic satisfaction are among its mode of attainment. Logic and science are the disclosures of relevant patterns and also procure the avoidance of irrelevancies.¹ The rationalism of Whitehead is stirred by the intellectual beauty of reason and love of God. His entire metaphysics is a "hymn to intellectual beauty." His love of reason has not blinded him, to the limitations of reason. He does not equate life with logic. He is too well aware that

1. *The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead.* Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp.
p. 8.

there are modes of life other than the logical. "A true rationalism he says, must always transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration. A self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt at a particular set of abstractions."² He never fails to face facts, and find the theory behind them. To know Him aright "is courage, to walk with him is to feel the visitings of a larger purer air, and the peace of an unfathomable sky." The wisdom of Whitehead is not given to us in a form "which he who runs may read." There is a unique background of broad sympathies and great leaning as humanist, as mathematician and artist in his philosophy. Even such of those who do not agree with his metaphysics and find it inadequate do not deny his title to the claims of being a great thinker. He is a great Idealist too in the plenary sense of the term.³ He has put into general circulation a great many discoveries of science and has synthesised them with religious intuitions. He must be remembered not so much for his system as for 'the wisdom of unsurpassable massiveness and integrity which illuminates' his remarks. In his own words 'true intuitions are a treasure forever. They can be incorporated into innumerable systems, but no system is of value that does not incorporate them.'⁴

Whitehead has a style all his own suffused throughout with the peculiarities of his genius. There is a freshness of treatment in the handling of the most familiar material. The system abounds in flashes of intuition, and is replete with side lights on all topics. He could very well have said as Bacon did "that he marked all knowledge for his province." No important aspect of human life and culture is left out and none is over emphasized. His reflections on Sociology, Education, Social reconstruction, Civilisation are all based on his metaphysics. They have the same hue around them. He has made a most impressive attempt to build a speculative edifice that answers to the different needs of men. His ambition for a completed system is something that has no parallel, and hardly does any other surpass him. Out

2. *Science and the Modern World*. p. 250.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*. pp. 14-15.

4. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 227.

side Plato no European thinker has contributed so much to modern thought as Whitehead has done. He is the only Professor who is a Fellow of British Academy as well as a Fellow of Royal Society of Science. He talks with authority on science, and brings to philosophy his entire knowledge of science and Mathematics.

He is a great philosopher who inquires about the meaning of intuition, and defends our religious moments. He is not the theologian that defends dogmas and rickety religious institutions. He regards God as one who persuades rather than compels. He admits the finiteness of God, and accounts for the existence of evil as arising out of the mutual obstructiveness of things. His dynamic concept of Reality leads to the conception of civilisation as a cooperative adventure not only of men, but of man and God. The interdependence of the world and God is one of the central doctrines of his system. He applies the concept of progress and Evolution to the Process of Reality. He is afraid and suspicious of dogmatic ways of thinking. As Metz observed "he is not so much a great system maker as a seer or genius, and his want of systematic power is fully compensated by the depth and width of his vision, by his wealth of ideas, and the persistent and penetrating energy of his thought. What he has said of Plato, his revered philosophical master, that he was the greatest of metaphysicians but the poorest of systematic thinkers applies *mutatis mutandis* to him."⁵

Civilisation, Whitehead holds, is the joint realisation of, Truth, Beauty, Art and Adventure in social life. His entire way of thinking is based on a dynamic conception of Reality. He does not distinguish between perfection and progress. He does not believe in the mere force of abstract ideas. He stands for concrete values which are actualisations of ideas. In a recent article under the caption *The Problem of reconstruction*⁶ he writes as follows. "Historical knowledge is essential but very dangerous. The old phrases are misleading..... Again we must insist that history is essential for the direction of action; its *naive* application is very dangerous. Still more dangerous are the

5. Metz. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*. p. 614.

6. *Atlantic Monthly*. Feb. 1942 (Published in New York).

simple minded generalisation of specialised scientists beyond their own limits of special knowledge. The truth is that we must work together. Historians must study the new possibilities of action, and the scientists must learn the old chequered history of human emotion passing into large scale social activity. He continues "Forgive me when I conclude with the confession of a personal political faith, I do not trust any extreme abstract plan of universal social reconstruction. Such plans are important for stimulation of the imagination. But in practice every successful advance is a compromise."

His metaphysics, like all speculative systems, moves round the traditional problems of philosophy; the relation between One and the Many, Change and Duration, Becoming and Being, Facts and Forms, World and God. He is against the bifurcation of Nature. His philosophy of Organism is built on the organic nature of things. This concept he derived from Einstein's Relativity. His reconciliation of the One and the Many is not achieved at the cost of variety. Transcendence of the antithesis does not mean annihilation of one factor or the other, or absorption of one by the other. "It means reconciliation of tensions, balancing of contending parts and establishment of equilibrium between them; in short, it means synthesis."

In this synthesis he is aware, more than any one else, that intellectual attempts will not give us the final truth. He defines philosophy "as the attempt to express the infinity of the universe in terms of the limitations of language."

In order to attain a true integrated view of Reality which is in consonance with the deliverances of Science, Whitehead sets himself against the dualistic view of Nature. He is opposed to the bifurcation of Nature into Appearance and Reality, into the Noumena and phenomena. The Cartesian dualism of cogitating minds and extended Matter had to be some how combined by the invention of a crude theology as the one Occasionalism envisaged. Failing that, we have to admit that Science is the mere study of the phenomenal world of which all that we can say at the end is that its truths are very true and that they throw

7. *The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead.* Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. p. 14.

no light on metaphysics. There we are left with a Reality which is unknowable and indeterminable in terms of intellectual categories. The Absolutist of the East and the West held the view that the Absolute is to be intuited and that it is not an object of mediate knowledge. Kant found a way out; the twofold nature of Reality in his Practical Reason and its affirmation. Dualism in one form or other was there all the time demanding a satisfactory explanation from the philosophers. Whitehead set the task before himself. Arthur Lovejoy in his book in the chapter on Whitehead⁸ points out "that no one has so impressively asserted the utter incredibility of the hypothesis of bifurcation of Nature into two systems of Reality which in so far as they are real are real in different senses."

Whitehead's thought is an alternative to the current Dualism. It is an answer to the hasty logic that declares, because the one is Real, the many are an illusion. He corrects it and holds the view that one is the pattern of the Many. The many go to make the One. There is no antithesis between the One and the Many.

In evaluating the metaphysical system of Whitehead we must not under-estimate its affiliation to traditional European Philosophy. Whitehead holds the view that his scheme of interpretation "can claim for each of its main positions the express authority of one or the other of the supreme Masters of thought:—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke and Hume."⁹ Specially he describes his system as Platonic. His respect for Plato is expressed in his cryptic celebrated statement 'the safest general characterisation of European Philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of foot notes to Plato.'¹⁰ Though he describes his system as Platonic he still holds the view that his system "is not exegesis of Plato's writings."¹¹

Throughout his writings he alludes to Plato. He holds the view that Plato and his system in some form or other hold the key to all philosophical problems. "All modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the world in terms of

8. Arthur Lovejoy. *The Revolt Against Dualism*. Chap. V.

9. *Process and Reality*. p. 53.

10. *Ibid.* p. 53.

11. *Ibid.* p. 60.

subject and predicate, Substance and Quality, Particular and Universal. The result always does violence to that immediate experience which we express in our actions, our hopes and our sympathies, our purposes, and those which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal analysis. We find ourselves in a "buzzing" world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas under some disguise or other, orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to solitary substances, each enjoying an illusory experience. "O Bottom, thou art changed, what do I see on thee?" "The endeavour to interpret experience in accordance with the overpowering deliverances of common sense must bring us back to some restatement of Platonic Realism, modified so as to avoid the pitfalls which the philosophical investigations of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries have disclosed." But Whitehead at the same time does not subscribe to the idealist aspects of Plato's thought. He is opposed to Plato's division of Reality into the World of Ideas and Opinion. He follows closely A. E. Taylor's interpretation of Plato and holds the view that many an important doctrine of Plato has been neglected. Whitehead observes that if we had to render Plato's general point of view with the least changes made necessary by the intervening two thousand years of human experience in social organisation, in aesthetic attainments, in Science and in Religion, we should have to set about the construction of a philosophy of Organism."¹³

Whitehead throws great emphasis on the other doctrines in Plato's system than the doctrine of Ideas. He holds the view that Plato has failed to coordinate systematically all the doctrines of his system. He has displayed great depth of "metaphysical intuition." "The greatest metaphysician the poorest systematic thinker."¹⁴ The 'urbanity' in the writings of Plato has attracted Whitehead. He holds the view that the doctrines of 'universal relativity' and the notion of 'immanence' and the mixed nature of things, and the incoming and informing nature of Eternal Objects into the world of flux and immanence of God and his finite nature are all found in some form or other in Plato.

12. *Process and Reality*. p. 63.

13. *Ibid.* p. 54.

14. *Adventures of Ideas* p. 213.

Whitehead's main contention is directed against the impenitent rationalist and the anti-rational mystics. "They exclude from rationalistic thought more of the final values of existence. The intimate timidity of professionalised scholarship circumscribes reason by reducing its topics to triviality, for example to bare *sensa* and to tautologies. It then frees itself from criticism by dogmatically handing over the remainder of experience to animal faith or a religious mysticism incapable of rationalisation."¹⁵ Whitehead's claim is that he has avoided these defects and constructed a metaphysics with certain of the elements of Plato's thought.

"A few of the main doctrines of Plato stand out and they are of priceless importance for Science and Philosophy" says Whitehead. The seven important doctrines The conception of the Pysche, the Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical relations, The Receptacle. The Physical elements and Ideas have been in some manner incorporated in the system of Plato. In the opinion of certain interpreters of Plato, Whitehead's stress on the realistic elements in Plato provides a most valuable corrective to the still not defunct misconception which sees nothing of capital importance in the Platonic philosophy besides the theory of ideas.¹⁶ "Plato the mathematician has for long disappeared from the explicit Platonic tradition."¹⁷ The explicit development of "Platonic doctrines has been exclusively in the hands of religious mystics, of literary scholars and of literary artists."¹⁸ Whitehead wants and claims to have rescued the valuable element in Platonic thought in the Philosophy of organism." The doctrine of the immanence of God and his selection of the Eternal Objects into the ingression of Actual Entities, the persuasive aspect of God, the concept of dynamic Actual Entity and the mutual relatedness and pull of things are derived by Whitehead from Plato. The central doctrine in Whitehead's thought is directed against the view "that objects of the world are shivered into a multitude

15. *Ibid.* p. 151.

16. See Prof. A. E. Taylor's Plato's *Timaeus*. See, Solmsen's *Theology of Plato*.

17. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 191.

18. *Ibid.* p. 191.

of disconnected things situated in an empty space and exerting a force between them. The recent discoveries of quantum physics and Relativity do not admit the possibility of the doctrine of simple location of the Newtonian dynamics "Modern Physics has abandoned the doctrine of simple location. The physical things we term stars, planets lumps of matter, molecules, electrons, protons, quanta of energy are each to be conceived as modifications of condition within Space-Time, extending through out its whole range. There is a focal region, which in common speech is where the thing is. But its influence streams away from it with finite velocity throughout the utmost recesses of Space and Time. Of course, it is natural, and for certain purposes entirely proper, to speak of the focal region, thus modified as the thing itself situated there. But difficulties arise if we press this way of thought too far. For physics, the thing itself is what it does, and what it does is this divergent stream of influence. Again the local region cannot be separated from the external stream. It obstinately refuses to be conceived as an instantaneous fact. It is a state of agitation only differing from the so-called external stream by its superior dominance within the focal region. Also we are puzzled how to express exactly the existence of these physical things at any definite moment of time. For at every instantaneous Point-Event within or without the focal region, the modification to be ascribed to this things is antecedent to, or successive to, the corresponding modification introduced by that thing at another point-event. Thus if we endeavour to conceive a complete instance of the existence of the physical thing in question, we cannot confine ourselves to one part of space or to one moment of time. The physical thing is a certain coordination of Spaces and Times and of conditions in those Spaces at those Times, this coordination illustrating one exemplification of a certain general rule expressible in terms of mathematical relation."¹⁹

From the denial of simple location, we have to admit the fact that within any region of space-time there is a multitude of things in a sense superposed. A thing in short is a composition of things concrete. There is an interweaving of qualitative and quantitative elements in every everything.²⁰ One thing assimilates

19. *Adventures of Ideas*. pp. 201-202.

20. *Ibid.* p. 203.

another thing. This doctrine is an echo of Plato's words. "My suggestion would be that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however slight and momentary the effect, has real existence; and I hold *that the definition of a Being is power.*"²¹ Whitehead points out that Plato's definition of a Being is that which exerts power. This means that the essence of a thing is to be implicated in causal action on other beings. Further a few sentences after the passage cited above Plato writes "Being, as being known, is acted on by knowledge, and is therefore in motion, for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon as we affirm.....can we imagine being devoid of life and mind, and to remain in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture."

Plato wavers in *Timaeus* between the two conceptions of Law:—Immanence and Imposition. In the earlier dialogues he is in favour of a transcendent God who imposes his will and design on the universe. The creator is described not as constituting a factor of the world of flux. In these dialogues Plato distinguishes the two realms, the Eternal world of Ideas and the fluent world disclosed by the senses which fails to participate with any exact clarity in the Eternal Forms. Thus there is the wellknown distinction between things eternal and temporal. "The things which are seen are temporal, the things which are not seen are eternal."²²

Further Plato envisages in *Timaeus* the world soul as a transcendent object and not as a component factor of the world of flux. But the conception of God as a supreme and omnipotent Being is not at any rate according to Whitehead's reading of Plato the final view of Plato.

Plato in his later dialogues advocates the view that God is the factor of the world of flux and that every individual thing is necessarily a modification of its environment and cannot be understood in disjunction from other objects. He enunciates the doctrine of the interrelated organic nature of things and their mutual attraction. He denies the possibility of conceiving 'being'

21. *Sophist*. 247 (Jowett's Translation of Plato's dialogues).

22. *Corinthians* II—IV—18.

as static. He holds the view "that action and reaction of the internal constituents is the sufficient cause of the flux of the world." "Nothing was given off from it, nothing entered it—there was nothing but itself."²³ The mutual relatedness of things is the law that is holding the universe. The conception as law is the chief interest in the later dialogues of Plato. Whitehead commenting on Plato's statement "I hold the definition of 'being' is simply power,"²⁴ declares that the suggestion is the charter of the doctrine of the immanent law."

Among the chief concepts of Plato the *receptacle* is most important. It is the most difficult idea on Plato's own admission. It is similar in many respects to Whitehead's concept of creativity, the Lucretian void, the Aristotelian Matter and Leibnizian God. It is not merely Geometrical space with its mathematical relations: It is the "natural matrix of all things."²⁵ It gives cohesiveness to Reality. It is because of this we are able to speak of the universe in the singular. It is devoid of all forms. It is "the foster mother of all becoming."²⁶ In Whitehead's words it is the community within "the course of history is set in abstraction from all particular facts. The conclusions of modern physical science are nearer to Plato's conception of *receptacle* than to other systems. The modern mathematical conception of Space-Time is the nearest analogue to Plato's *receptacle*."²⁷ This doctrine of Plato asserts the real communication between entities. The communication is not accidental, it is itself an element in the *receptacle*. It participates in no Forms. It is described in the *Timaeus* in the way in which the many Actual Entities of the physical world are found as components in each other's nature. It is the doctrine of the immanence of law derived from the mutual immanence of Actual Entities."²⁸ Whitehead's conception of Creativity is a slightly modified version of Plato's *Receptacle*. Another important conception in Plato is 'Eros' and it has its

23. Plato *Sophist* 247. Jowett's translation.

24. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 165.

25. *Ibid.* p. 172.

26. *Ibid.* p. 172.

27. Description of Receptacle. See. *Adventures of Ideas*.

28. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 172.

analogue in Whitehead.²⁹ It is associated with an inward ferment "an activity of subjective feeling which is at once the immediate enjoyment and also an appetition which melts into action. The 'Eros' is represented in the *symposium* "as the final urge towards the ideal perfection. Whitehead has been considerably influenced by Plato. Plato's definition of "object as power," his conception of the Receptacle and the doctrines have greatly influenced Whitehead's system. More than all these Whitehead is of opinion that the central interest of Plato is the belief that Mathematics and its pattern "are the keys to unlock the mysteries within nature" Plato reprobates "the swinish ignorance of those who have failed to study the doctrine of proportions."³⁰ Whitehead's greatest admiration for Plato is his conception of the Divine 'as a persuasive agency and not as a coercive one.' This doctrine is described "as the greatest intellectual discovery in the history of Religion."³¹

Whitehead's differences with Plato are stated in the Chapter on God. He does not consider the Idealist interpretation of Plato as Plato at its best. He does admit that Plato has held contradictory views in his dialogues. He finds great value in Plato's intuitions more than in his system. Whitehead finds a close parallel to his conception of an Actual Entity in Plato's thought. He says that Plato has conceived "the Process of the actual world " as a real incoming of Forms into real potentiality issuing into that real togetherness which is an Actual Entity.

We should not lose sight of the fact that Whitehead in his anxiety to find sanctions for his thought in Plato should have set aside the Idealist interpretation of Plato. This line of interpretation has the longest intellectual ancestry in the world of Philosophic thought. Plato knew too well that his critics would find fault with the lapses in his system. None knew it better. With characteristic urbanity and humility he points out that there can be no dogmatic finality about any philosophic system. He says "If, then Socrates, we find ourselves in many points unable to make our discourse of the generation of Gods and the universe

29. *Ibid.* p. 189-190.

30. *Laws*, Book. VII, 819. D.

31. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 213.

in any way wholly consistent and exact, you must not be surprised, nay we must be well content if we can provide an account not less likely than others, we must remember that I who speak and you who are my audience are but men and should be satisfied to ask for no more than the likely story.”³² Plato in the seventh epistle expresses the great Vedāntic truth short of which the philosophic quest cannot stop namely that a final system can not be verbally expressed. Whitehead puts a great deal of stress on the realistic elements in Plato’s thought and does not accord the necessary value to the Idealistic elements in Plato, hailed as the Prince of the Idealists.

Next to Plato Whitehead is most influenced by Locke the Father of British Empiricism. Whitehead avows that the great merit of Locke’s “*Essay concerning Human Understanding* is its adequacy and not its consistency. It comes very near the explicit formulation of the philosophy of Organism.”³³ The inconsistency of Locke’s is due to the critical acceptance of the traditional categories e.g., subject-predicate relation, the conception of substance, the operation of force at a distance, the doctrine of simple location in Space etc. It is because of the tacit assumptions of these thoughts that Locke’s system was open to attack from Hume. Whitehead finds that Locke is “the nearest approach to the philosophy of Organism.”³⁴ Locke’s conception of the particular things is similar to the conception of an Actual Entity. Locke defines his conception of a particular thing “as those other things exercising their function as the felt component of their constituents.”³⁵ Locke defines the essence of a thing as “the real internal constitution of things whereon their discoverable qualities depend.”³⁶

Besides Plato and Locke Whitehead mentions several others as having expressed some one or other of the doctrines of the philosophy of Organism. He examines in over forty pages in

32. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 135.

33. *Process and Reality*. p. 70. Whitehead discusses the affinities of his thought to Lock’s. pp. 70-73, 182-199.

34. *Process and Reality*. p. 75.

35. *Ibid.* pp. 72-73.

36.

his Gifford Lectures the elements of Organic philosophy present in Descartes, Hume, Kant and Bradley.³⁷

Whitehead's claim in metaphysics is that he has provided an alternate line of thought which evades Hume's deduction, better than the one indicated by Kant. The world of Newtonian Dynamics had taken for granted the doctrine of simple location of objects in space. The movements of bodies and forces that exert between them operate at a distance. Whitehead with the help of the conclusions of modern physical science has established that there is no simple fact, and that there are no isolated objects in empty space. He has sketched a view of Reality that is continuous and has no gap. He is for an organic view of Reality. 'No things are "together" except in experience; and no things are, in any sense of 'are' except as components in experience, or as immediacies of process which are occasions in self-creation.'³⁸ The necessity for the acceptance of this view and the difficulties that confront a purely atomistic view of scientific Materialism have already been stated. Whitehead again urges the necessity for science to adopt a metaphysics. The principles that underlie scientific investigation become unintelligible without a metaphysics. "Science does not diminish the need for metaphysics, It only renders the metaphysical need more urgent."³⁹ Thus Whitehead in the first instance attacks scientific materialism and opposes the bifurcation of Nature into isolated bits of Matter on one side and a plurality of Minds on the other side. He grows eloquent when he speaks of the pattern of Reality. "Nature suggests for our observation gaps, and then as it were withdraws upon challenge. For example ordinary Physical bodies suggest solidity. But solids turn to liquids and liquids to gases. And from the gas the solid can again be recovered. And most of the solid of solids is for certain purposes a viscous fluid. Again impenetrability is a difficult notion. Salt dissolves in water and can be recovered from it. Gases interfuse in liquids. Molecules arise from a patterned interfusion of atoms. Food interfuses with the body and produces an immediate sense of diffused bodily vigour."⁴⁰

37. *Ibid.* pp. 182-218.

38. *Adventures of Ideas.* p. 304.

39. *Aim of Education and other Essays.* pp. 229-231.

40. *Adventures of Ideas.* p. 255.

The gap that we see between living bodies and lifeless bodies is not so great as we think it to be. Whitehead holds "that the living bodies can be pursued down to the edge of lifelessness. Also the functioning of inorganic matter remain intact amid the functioning of living matter. It seems that, in bodies that are obviously living, a coordination has been achieved that rouses into prominence some functionings inherent in the ultimate occasions. For lifeless matter these functionings thwart each other, and average out, so as to produce a negligible total effect. In the case of living bodies the co-ordination intervenes, and the average effect of these intimate functioning as to be taken into account."⁴¹

Having established the organic and continuous nature of Reality; he has to support and make intelligible the concept of process and the identity of object necessary for knowledge. He has great sympathy with the Empiricist and gives in some places unmeasured praise to Locke and Hume. He avows that "the philosophy of organism can be best understood by conceiving it as accepting large portions of the expositions of Hume and Kant with the exception of their presupposition."⁴² Hume according to Whitehead is a writer of unrivalled clearness. His analysis of experience into sensations and impressions, and his account of simple and complex ideas elicit Whitehead's admiration. Whitehead holds the view that Hume was very near the philosophy of organism when he emphasised the 'Process' aspect of Reality and objects. Hume rightly emphasised the process inherent in the fact called Mind. His analysis of the Process is faulty. He thought that his mere abstract Laws of association could account for causation and mind. Hume "confused a repetition of impression with an impression of repetitions of impressions."⁴³

Hume is not able to account for the constructive element in knowledge. He has to fall back on some external Laws of association. A pure world of sensations cannot give us knowledge. Besides impressions and ideas, Hume assumes a principle to distinguish them. "The difference betwixt these consists in the

41. *Adventure of Ideas*. p. 266.

42. *Process and Reality*. p. 182.

43. *Process and Reality*. p. 188.

degree of force and the liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.”⁴⁴ This principle of force and liveliness goes under the name of ‘prehensions’ in the philosophy of Organism. Without some such internal principle we cannot account for the construction of knowledge. “Hume muddles the importance of an idea with the fact of the entertainment of the idea.”⁴⁵ He holds that the frequency of the correlation of impressions is also attended by an expectation of the repetition of the impression. The justification for this expectation is adduced on pragmatic grounds. Throughout his *Treatise* Hume steadily affirms the fundamental importance of the concept of ‘cause.’ And finally, when he cannot fit it into his metaphysics he appeals beyond his metaphysics to an ultimate justification outside any rational system. This justification is practice.⁴⁶ Hume presupposed the independent isolated nature of sensations and did not derive their nature from their inter-related character. “He never allows impressions to be derived from correlated ideas though the difference between them consists in ‘force and vivacity.’ The truth is that Hume retained an obstinate belief in an external world which his principles forbade him to confess in his philosophical construction. He reserved that belief for his daily life and for his historical and sociological works.”⁴⁷ The fundamental mistake Hume committed was to conceive of “every impression of sensation as a distinct existence. But he also strayed into the fields of the philosophy of organism when he clothed the impressions with ‘force and liveliness.’ In this he admitted that there can be no bare sense without some affective tone. Sensationalism and radical Empiricism never realised this fact that “no material for the interpretation of sensa is provided by the sensa themselves as they stand, barely, present and immediate.” We do interpret them. It is here, there is the rub.” Empiricism tacitly introduces the alien and uncritical considerations like the Laws of Associations for the fact of interpretation. Such laws and literary forms in which they are expressed provide us ‘a philosophy delightful

44. Hume's *Treatise of Knowledge*. Part I.

45. *Process and Reality*. p. 189.

46. *Ibid.* p. 186-187.

47. *Ibid.* p. 196.

to read, easy to understand, hard to believe and entirely fallacious.' The interpretation according to Whitehead, is a feat due to the occasions and the growing together of the Actual entities."⁴⁸ The unity of an actual occasion is compatible with its conception as a process once we accept the Law of the immanence of objects. Hume and William James who reject the concept of the soul consistently have to provide an adequate account for the idea of personal unity, as maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstances. This the philosophy of organism does.

Whitehead does not supplement the Empiricist tradition on the Kantian model. He holds that the Idealist tradition of Kant has introduced in epistemology alien considerations for accounting for the interpretation of knowledge. The feat of interpretation according to Whitehead is performed by the facts themselves in the grouping of an actual occasion.

Kant was the first great philosopher who gave the full sweep to the notion that an act of experience is a constructive functioning transforming the data supplied to the senses. The synthetic categories of understanding supply the moulds in which the data are manifested. It is these mental categories that introduce order into the realm of knowledge. "Whatever is not knowledge is inchoate. Kant states his theory at the commencement of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, "objects are given to us through our *sensibility*. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions. These intuitions become thought through the Understanding and hence arise conceptions." Whitehead agrees in one specific sense with Kant's dictum "that thought without content are empty, intuition without concepts are blind." Whitehead admits that the functioning of concepts as an essential factor in knowledge. "But for Kant apart from concepts that there is nothing to know; since objects related in a knowable world are products of conceptual functioning whereby categorical forms is introduced into the sense datum, which otherwise is intuited in the form of a mere Spatio-temporal flux of sensations."⁴⁹ For Kant knowledge is the process where there is a passing from subjectivity to objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis

48. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 232.

49. *Process and Reality*. p. 216-217.

and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity. The subject or the superject is thrown up from the grouping up of the Actual Entities. Whitehead is keen that no alien consideration should be introduced in the knowledge-situation. Once we make the objective world a construct from the subjective experience there crops up two realms, Appearance and Reality. Whitehead is against every form of dualism. "The problem of philosophy is to reconcile the philosophical conception of a real world with the world of daily experience."⁵⁰ "The empiricist leader Hume introduces the ominous appeal to practice, not in criticism of his premises, but in supplement to his conclusions." F. H. Bradley the Prince of Idealists "repudiates Hume, finds the objective world in which we live, and move and have our being, inconsistent if taken as real."⁵¹ Neither the idealist tradition nor the pure Empiricist solves this problem. Whitehead holds that his system of thought has found a solution for it. He wants us to take the entire experience for our field. "Nothing can be omitted:—Experience drunk, experience sobre, experience sleeping, experience waking, experience drowsy, and experience wide awake, experience self-conscious, and experience self-forgetful."⁵² And in all this experience there is a dual nature, the physical and the mental. Whitehead boldly declares "superficially the position which I have here put forward is certainly an instance of the revolt which Love joy criticises. But in another sense I have endeavoured to put forward a defence of dualism, differently interpreted. Plato, Descartes, Locke prepared the way for Hume; and Kant followed upon Hume. The point of this discussion is to show an alternative line of thought which evades Hume's deduction from philosophical tradition, and at the same time preserves the general trend of thought received from his three great predecessors. The dualism in the later Platonic dialogues between the Platonic 'souls' and the Platonic 'physical nature,' the dualism between the Cartesian, thinking substances and the Cartesian extended substances, the dualism between Lockian 'human understanding,' and Lockian external things.....all these kinds of dualism are found within each occasion of actuality

50. *Process and Reality*. p. 218.

51. *Ibid.* p. 218-219.

52. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 290-91.

.....The world is not merely physical, nor is it merely mental. Nor is it merely one with Many subordinate phases. Nor is it merely a complete fact, in its essence static with the illusion of change. Wherever a vicious dualism appears, it is by reason of mistaking an abstraction for a final concrete fact.”⁵³

Thus Whitehead stands out in all his greatness with his varied and vivid contributions to the different branches of knowledge. As a Mathematician he has redefined many a fundamental category and notion in that science. Whitehead and his friend Russell are jointly responsible for laying the foundations of mathematics as they are understood to day. They have also indicated that the science grows out of a few fundamental propositions that cannot be demonstrated and are couched in terms that cannot be defined. The pioneer work of Whitehead was taken up with the elucidation and exploration of these basic properties and fundamental terms; *e.g.*, the concepts of Number, Point and Straight line. These were for the first time explained by Whitehead according to the rigorous rules of logic. Thus he laid the foundation of that branch of mathematics called *Logistics*.

Whitehead attacked the physicists ‘concept that what is measurable alone is real.’ He has pointed out serious defects in the conventional operations of measurement adopted by the physicist to construct his space-Time. Besides these specific contributions he has built a most impressive speculative system of metaphysics on the conclusions of modern physical science. He has championed the cause for the need of a sound metaphysics for science. He has corrected the extravagant claims of science and made it less dogmatic. He has proved that science does not diminish the need for metaphysics but on the other hand renders the metaphysical need more imperative.

In the course of the construction of his system he has laid down the requisites for a rational metaphysics and Religion. He has taken note of all the aspects of experience and has given each element its due share. Emotion and feeling which are as a rule neglected in logical systems have found their appropriate place in the system. He has checked every type of extravagance to

53. *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 244-45.

which Idealism and Realism are prone to. He has recognised the importance of speculative daring and the play of imagination as necessary elements in philosophical thought. Logic, he says, does not give us Reality in its fullness nor do the sciences reveal the fundamental elements of nature. It cannot be maintained that all the sciences put together succeed in describing the ultimate structure of things or provide a satisfactory interpretation of experience as a whole. Whitehead convicts scientific Materialism based on Newtonian Dynamics with inability to be explanatory and intelligible because they have no metaphysics or scheme of general metaphysical ideas. It is speculative metaphysics and flashes of intuition that bring new material within the scope of the general law. The speculative system has its immissible value on the Adventure of Ideas. Sometimes they obtain quick acceptance, and at other times they prove to be the gadflies of civilisation. But speculative venture has its fruits in the last. In an eloquent passage Whitehead holds the view that speculative extension beyond direct observation spells some trust in metaphysics, however vague they be..... But metaphysical understanding guides imagination and justifies purpose. Apart from metaphysical presupposition there can be no civilisation.”⁵⁴ It is speculative metaphysics that can explain the undiscovered limitations of problems.⁵⁵

Whitehead is not slow to correct systems of thought that fly from facts and take refuge in a congeries of ideas unrelated to concrete circumstances. He insists that “philosophy must set to work at the concordance of ideas conceived as illustrated in the concrete facts of the real world.” It is this specific *sense of the concrete* and *mixed up nature* of things that is central to Whitehead’s thought. In understanding the constituent elements we must “urge our observation beyond the boundaries of its delusive completeness and to urge the doctrines of science beyond the delusive air of finality.”⁵⁶ This characteristic urbanity and a wholesome fear of dogmatism haunt the reader in every page of Whitehead’s philosophical writings. He inveighs against the false accuracy and exactness of some scientists. In the closing

54. *Adventures of Ideas*. pp. 163-64.

55. *Ibid.* p. 186.

56. *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 199.

pages of Whitehead's most recent utterance (Ingersoll Lecture) he sounds the warning "there is not a sentence which adequately states its own meaning. There is always a background of presuppositions which defies analysis by reason of its infinitude In fact, there is not a sentence, or a word, with a meaning which is independent of the circumstance under which it is uttered. The essence of unscholarly thought consists in a neglect of this truth. Also it is equally the essence of common sense to neglect these differences of back ground which are irrelevant to the immediate purpose.....¹ The conclusion is that logic, conceived as an adequate analysis of the advance of thought is a fake..... The exactness is a fake.

Though Whitehead emphasized the value of speculative metaphysics he was not slow to see the defects of the Idealists. He holds that philosophy is afflicted by dogmas. Some believe that the categories of philosophy are clear, obvious and irreformable. There are others who hold that it is not possible to build a metaphysical system and rest satisfied with the clarities of detached expressions. They do not answer the challenge to surmount them which is the very purpose of science. There are others who hold that intellect is intrinsically tied to erroneous fiction. They fly to mysticism of the antirational variety. Whitehead steers clear of all these and erects his system and then applies his metaphysical ideas in his reading of civilisation and History. In his own words the function of philosophy and life "include a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow."

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF A. N. WHITEHEAD'S WORKS

Scientific Works:

1. A Treatise on Universal Algebra. (1898).
2. The Axioms of Descriptive Geometry. (1901).
3. The Axioms of Projective Geometry. (1906).
4. An Introduction to Mathematics. (1908).
5. Principia Mathematica in Three Volumes in Collaboration with Bertrand Russell. (1910—1913), Second Edition (1925—27).
6. The Organisation of Thought. (1917).
7. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. (1919).
8. The Concept of Nature. (1920).
9. The Principles of Relativity with Application to Physical Science. (1922).

Philosophical Works:

1. Science and the Modern World. (1926).
2. Religion in the Making. (1926).
3. Symbolism and its Meaning and Effect. (1928).
4. Function of Reason. (1929).
5. Process and Reality. (1929).
6. Aims of Education and other Essays. (1929).
7. Adventures of Ideas. (1933).
8. Modes of Thought. (1938).

For a complete chronological bibliography of Whitehead's Works See *the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead*. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. pp. 703—725.

Some Important Works on Whitehead's Philosophy Consulted:

1. The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. Evanston North Western University.
2. Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism. by Dorthy. M. Emmet.
3. Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge by John Blyth.
4. Articles on the Chief Notions of the Organic Philosophy of Whitehead by Sidney E. Hooper, Editor *Philosophy* (The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy).
5. The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God by Stephen Lee Ely (University of Wisconsin).
6. Philosophy of Whitehead by Dr. Rasvihary Das of Indian Institute of Philosophy Amalner (India).
7. The Chapter on Whitehead's Philosophy in Metz's A Hundred Years of British Philosophy.
8. The Chapter on Whitehead in Dr. Joad's Guide to Philosophy.
9. S. Radhakrishnan An Idealist View of Life Chapter VIII.



